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ABSTRACT
Verification continues to pose one of the greatest challenges for today’s chip design.
Formal verification and simulation-based verification have been widely adopted.
Both of them always rely on assertions (a.k.a. properties) to express a design’s in-
tended behaviors. State-of-the-art formal verification suffers from the scalability is-
sue, and the simulation based method does not suffice in covering design behaviors.
Moreover, the used assertions are always manually written, which greatly lowers
the usability of hardware verification. For complex system on chip (SoC) design,
the electronic system level (ESL) methodology creates a high level abstract view of
the design, and the model is used for verifying functionality and performance at the
early stage. Due to the fast simulation speed and high model complexity, the entire
verification methodology is unsystematic and ad hoc, and lacks the support from
EDA tools.
In this dissertation, we first present two systematic input stimulus generation
methods for simulation based verification of register transfer level (RTL) design.
The first method is based on STAR, a technique for generating input vector patterns
for all paths of an RTL design using RTL symbolic execution. To attack the path
explosion problem in STAR, we present HYBRO and the symbolic state caching
method. HYBRO uses branch coverage metric to guide the path exploration. It is a
best-effort method that produces excellent coverage for practical designs. Symbolic
state caching considers the reachable state space when exploring different paths. It
only generates tests for paths leading to previously uncovered state space. As a
result, the path explosion problem is mitigated, and the entire method is much more
scalable than the original STAR.
Another method for simulation based verification is based on GoldMine, an auto-
matic assertion generation tool that was developed at the University of Illinois. We
use the counterexamples generated from formal verification of GoldMine assertions
to incrementally refine the internal decision tree. The counterexamples in every iter-
ation can deterministically increase the coverage of the design and eventually cover
ii
the whole reachable input space.
To improve the quality of generated assertions, we present a novel technique that
combines static and dynamic analysis of RTL source code to discover word level
features for assertion mining algorithm. That allows the mined assertions to be at
the same level of abstraction as RTL instead of the Boolean bit level. The machine
learning algorithm, as such, is thus agnostic to the level of abstraction of its features.
For ESL verification, we present our technique for generating assertions from
transaction level models (TLMs) using GoldMine. The generated assertions, which
are in the form of frequent patterns in simulation traces of TLMs, are able to ex-
press functionality specification as well as performance specification. Our static
analysis technology also guides the mining algorithm to generate assertions captur-
ing the data propagation relationships among function parameters and return values
in TLMs. We attempt two mining algorithms for TLM assertion generation: se-
quential pattern mining and episode mining. We demonstrate that episode mining
is more scalable and generates higher quality assertions than does sequential pattern
mining.
Diagnosing performance violations in ESL verification is still a manual and time-
consuming process in industry. We present an intelligent method to localize root
causes of performance violations from simulation traces. We propose a concurrent
mining method to discover concurrent patterns from the traces, which are potential
root causes of the violations. We apply three categories of domain knowledge to
increase the effectiveness of the mining results. We show that the concurrent pattern
mining with domain knowledge pinpoints the root cause of a violation to a few
patterns among transaction traces of massive size.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Hardware Design Methodology: A Glimpse
The advance of process technology along with reductions in the cost of silicon
have made it possible to integrate more and more transistors into a single chip of
silicon. Our capability in designing such complex chips has not improved over
the past years. Hardware design methodology enables us to efficiently design such
increasingly complex chips. In this section, we give an overview of the design
methodology that has been adopted in industry. This can help the reader appreciate
the status and role of hardware verification in chip design flow.
To design a chip, we start with the specification, which includes functionality of
the chip, the performance requirement, the power requirement, physical constraints
like size and area, and fabrication technology. In this thesis, we are concerned with
the functionality and the performance.
At the system level, we build the system level model according to the specifi-
cation. This system level model is then used to decide what kind of architecture
and interconnect is the best for the design. In that process, we need to verify the
functionality of the system model against the specification and evaluate the perfor-
mance of different architectures in different usage scenarios. In some processor
based applications, the system level model provides a virtual platform for software
development at an early stage.
System level model creates an abstract and high level view of the design. The
detailed logic implementation for each block is done at the register transfer level
(RTL), in which a synchronous digital circuit is modeled in terms of the flow of dig-
ital signals (data) between hardware registers, and the logical operations performed
on those signals. We use a hardware description language (HDL) like Verilog or
VHDL to create an RTL model for the design. In parallel, functional verification
ensures that the RTL design satisfies the specification.
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Once functional verification of the RTL design has been completed, the RTL de-
sign is synthesized into an optimized gate level netlist. Physical constraints such
as timing and area are considered in this process. Synthesis tool tries to meet these
constraints by calculating the cost of various implementations. Physical implemen-
tation converts the netlist into a GDSII layout file, which is finally fabricated in
foundry.
1.2 Understanding Hardware Verification
Due to the high fabrication costs of hardware, detecting and preventing errors in
hardware is vitally important. Fixing bugs after delivering the chip to customers is
difficult, and chip callback will incur considerable loss to companies. In the early
1990s, the notorious Pentium FDIV bug caused Intel a loss of about $475 million
replacing faulty processors. Hardware bugs can even be catastrophic in safety-
critical systems, such as nuclear power plants and traffic control system. Therefore,
hardware verification is critical to the design of reliable hardware.
Verification is a primary source of bottlenecks in the hardware design cycle. Due
to the growing complexity of hardware systems, verification has already become
the dominant cost in the full design process. According to ITRS [4], verification
engineers outnumber design engineers, with this ratio reaching two or three to one
for most complex designs. The widely adopted verification technologies can be
mainly grouped into two categories: formal and simulation-based verification.
1.2.1 Formal Verification
Static formal verification aims to prove the functional correctness of a design with
respect to a mathematical formal specification. The purpose is to establish soft-
ware or hardware system correctness with mathematic rigor. In general, there are
three formal methods used in hardware verification. The first one is based on model
checking for finite state machine verification [5]. The second one is deductive veri-
fication. The last one is equivalence checking.
Model checking is an automated technique that, given a finite-state model of a
system and a formal property, systematically checks whether this property holds for
that model [6]. The properties are expressed in propositional temporal logic [7], and
the system is modeled as a state-transition graph. The model checking procedure
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efficiently traverses all reachable states of the system and automatically determines
whether the property is satisfied by the state-transition graph [8]. In general, there
are two possible outcomes: the specified property passes the model checking, or
the property is falsified. In the latter case, a counterexample is also generated to
explain why the property fails. Users can take advantage of the counterexample
to fix the design bug. However, model checking suffers from the state explosion
problem, which means that the state space of the system being verified must be
relatively small. The increasingly complex hardware is still several orders of mag-
nitude too large to be verified by model checking [9], although there has been a lot
of research in combating the state explosion problem, such as binary decision dia-
gram (BDD) based symbolic model checking [5], abstraction [10], bounded model
checking [11], and compositional model checking [9].
Interactive theorem proving is a typical deductive verification technique, and it
verifies the system by equational reasoning. A collection of mathematical proof
obligations are generated from the system and its specification. The truth of these
proof obligations implies the correctness of the system [12]. The advantage of
interactive theorem proving is that it does not impose a priori limit on the state space
of the system that can be verified. The user can control the verification problem size
during the verification process by breaking down proofs about very large systems
into proofs about small components [9]. The disadvantage is that it requires manual
guidance during the verification process. The user needs to provide a sequence of
theorems to the verification system.
Equivalence checking verifies whether two descriptions/implementations of a cir-
cuit function are equivalent. In other words, the two descriptions should exhibit
exactly the same input/output behaviors. Typically, the two descriptions are at dif-
ferent levels of abstraction. For instance, a gate level implementation is checked
against the RTL design or an RTL design implementation is checked against the
system level model. There are combinational equivalence checking and sequen-
tial equivalence checking. In combinational equivalence checking, the two designs
are first transformed into a single miter circuit [13], and then the output of the
miter circuit should be proved to be constant 0. The proving algorithm can use the
Boolean satisfiability engine. Sequential equivalence checking is more complex
and requires the state traversal of the product machine of two sequential designs. In
practice, structural similarities between two designs are always exploited to reduce
the complexity of sequential equivalence checking [14].
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1.2.2 Simulation Based Verification
Due to the scalability issues of formal verification, the simulation based verification
(also known as dynamic verification) is still the dominant verification method for
complex SoC. It simulates the design by providing stimuli on the inputs to exercise
the design. The observed responses on the output are checked against the specifica-
tion. Coverage analysis measures whether the design has been adequately exercised
and the functionality of the design has been sufficiently covered.
The stimulus generator is the most challenging part of developing a simula-
tion based verification environment/testbench. In practice, it uses directed tests or
constraint-random generated tests. Directed test generation relies on the verification
engineers to manually construct certain test cases according to the specification. In
constraint-random method, verification engineers provide a set of constraints on the
design inputs according to design specification. A constraint solver then randomly
generates tests satisfying the constraints. Although directed tests capture much of
the desired system behavior, they do not suffice in checking for unintentional erro-
neous behavior. The constraint-random method is intended to capture infrequent or
unexpected design behavior.
In order to evaluate the comprehensiveness of the simulated tests and the degree
to which the design has been simulated, coverage metric is utilized in simulation to
provide a quantitative measurement. Multiple types of coverage metric are available
in: code coverage, structural coverage, and functional coverage. Coverage feedback
information can be used to guide further test generation [15].
1.2.3 Assertions in Verification
Assertions or invariants [16] provide a mechanism to express desirable or required
properties that should be true in the system. Assertions accurately encode intended
behavior in the form of temporal logical expressions for a state transition system.
The design can then be verified against those assertions.
Assertions are used for validating hardware designs at different stages through
their life cycle, such as pre-silicon formal verification, dynamic validation, runtime
monitoring, and emulation [17]–[19]. Assertions are also synthesized into hard-
ware for post-silicon debug and validation and in-field diagnosis [17]. In formal
verification, assertions can serve as the formal specification (properties) that must
be satisfied on the design. A model checking tool verifies whether the assertions
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are true or false on the design.
In simulation-based verification, those executable assertions are employed to
monitor the dynamic simulation, improve the internal design signal observability,
and reduce the debug effort [18]. First, the assertion monitors dynamically check
whether the simulation conforms to all provided assertions. In addition, traditional
simulation-based verification checks the input and output behaviors against spec-
ification. It is a black-box test and lacks internal signal observability. Assertions
provide the internal test points and turn the black-box simulation into a white-box
simulation. Finally, verification engineers typically have to trace back to internal
signals tediously when there is a mismatch on outputs. The adoption of assertions
simplifies that diagnosis and detection of bugs, since the failed assertions pinpoint
the location of an error.
1.2.4 System Level Verification
The design of SoCs is becoming increasingly complex with the deployment of
multi-core processors and embedded memories. ESL design and verification is
an emerging electronic design methodology that focuses on the higher abstraction
level concerns first and foremost. ESL verification involves the tasks of checking
the functionality and evaluating the performance and power at the early stage of
system development. Raising the abstraction level results in faster development
of prototypes, simulation, and earlier system validation and software development.
From the perspective of verification, the reduction of implementation details in sys-
tem level design can increase the simulation speed and allow for a more global
view of the complex system. Transaction level designs, also called transaction level
models (TLMs), are widely used for ESL modeling. The structural data transmitted
between modules is abstracted to a transaction. Details of communication among
modules are separated from the details of the implementation of functional units
or of the communication architecture. TLMs speed up simulation and allow for
exploring and validating design alternatives at a higher level of abstraction [20].
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1.3 Motivations
1.3.1 Simulation Test Generation
Because of the infeasibility of exhaustive simulation, the termination point of ran-
dom simulation is very nebulous. Contemporary industries often use a numeric
value, like a few million simulation cycles, before concluding the random simula-
tion phase. Evidently, such a methodology is unsystematic and inconclusive. De-
spite various coverage metrics used to evaluate the simulated tests, there is no assur-
ance that there are no gaping holes in the design behavior. Coverage closure, or the
process of determining the completeness of functional coverage of input vectors, is
one of the most daunting challenges of the present-day validation environment. It is
desirable to have a scalable and systematic input vector generation strategy towards
coverage closure.
1.3.2 Assertion Generation
Generating good assertions poses a major challenge for design verification. As-
sertions in current verification flow are manually written by verification engineers.
Manual construction of minimal, but high functional coverage assertions takes mul-
tiple iterations and man-months to achieve. Too many assertions can result in degra-
dation of simulation performance. Too few assertions, however, cannot guarantee
sufficient functional coverage. In sequential designs, temporal assertions spanning
several cycles are usually the source of subtle, but serious bugs. Writing temporal
assertions is also more challenging than writing combinational assertions.
In the software community, the assertions/invariants are mainly used to improve
maintainability and readability of programs. For example, invariants can be in-
lined in software releases to prevent bugs. Any future modifications to the software
should not break the expected invariants. Program verification also relies on invari-
ants to prove program correctness [21]–[23]. The Floyd-Hoare approach requires
that the program loop exhibits a loop invariant, also known as an inductive asser-
tion. The loop invariant should be preserved during every execution of the loop
body. However, it is difficult for programmers to write these invariants. The soft-
ware engineering community has exerted a great deal of effort towards building
automatic invariant generators to make the creation of invariants less manpower
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intensive.
Abstract interpretation and the constraint-based approach are the two most widespread
frameworks for static invariant inference [24]. Abstract interpretation performs
an approximate symbolic execution of programs until an assertion is reached that
remains unchanged by further executions of the program [25]. Constraint-based
techniques use decision procedures over non-trivial mathematical domains (such
as polynomials or convex polyhedra) to represent concisely the semantics of loops
with respect to certain template properties [26].
Dynamic invariant inference for software was pioneered by the Daikon tool [27]
and has gained significant attention in the software engineering community. In a
nutshell, the Daikon approach tests a large number of candidate properties against
several program runs. The properties that are not violated in any of the runs are
retained as likely invariants, which implies that the inferred invariants are not sound.
In the hardware community, academia and industry have recently proposed sev-
eral solutions [28]–[35] to automate the assertion generation process. GoldMine
[29] is a tool specifically designed for automatic assertion generation from RTL de-
sign. The engine combines data mining and static analysis techniques. It mines the
simulation traces of a behavioral RTL design using a decision tree based learning
algorithm to produce candidate assertions. Note that the candidate assertions may
be spurious due to the causality established by simulation data. They are passed to
a formal verification engine to filter out spurious assertions.
Current assertion generation solutions like GoldMine generate assertions at the
bit level, and term-level information from the RTL abstractions is completely lost.
Even if there are word level variables in RTL, all bits are ungrouped. Those me-
chanically generated bit level assertions have low readability and are typically not
in a human-digestible form. Frequently, designers find the machine generated data
too difficult to parse and assimilate since it is at a lower level of abstraction. In ad-
dition, each generated bit level assertion has very low coverage of the input space,
and the bit level assertions tend to be repetitive, and therefore numerous. These
disadvantages drastically limit the usability of the mechanically generated bit level
assertions.
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1.3.3 System Level Verification
The state-of-the-art of modeling and verification of ESL designs is still unsystem-
atic and very ad hoc. The commercial ESL tools provide very limited support to
ESL verification [36]. To improve the observability of the entire system, system
engineers always instrument code in ESL models to collect dynamic simulation in-
formation. This instrumentation requires users to be familiar with the models. Also,
due to fast simulation speed, the collected execution trace files are so large that it
becomes awkward to analyze them manually and further debug the ESL models.
Lifting the assertion based verification methodology to the system level is one
promising way to improve the efficiency of ESL verification. Assertions can be
adopted for on-line monitoring of the model simulation or serve as a formal speci-
fication of ESL models. Assertions were recently introduced for the verification of
SystemC designs [37], [38], but there is no automatic assertion generation method.
Another challenge is that all previous definitions of system level assertion do not
take into account the performance specification/intent of ESL models. It is indis-
pensable to have an automatic method for the generation of system level assertions,
which express both functionality and performance.
When using TLMs for complex SoC design, system engineers can simulate the
models and then evaluate the SoC performance through an off-line analysis of all
transaction traces. However, current tools are not able to automatically analyze and
troubleshoot the root cause of a performance violation from an enormous amount
of transaction trace data. According to our industrial collaborator, localizing the
root cause of a tough performance violation could take system engineers two days
to two weeks, which tremendously increases the time-to-market of their product.
1.4 Approaches of the Thesis: Static Analysis and Data
Mining
In this thesis, the combination of high level static analysis and data mining based
dynamic analysis is extensively explored for hardware verification. Although the
individual techniques depend on the target application domain, all of them adhere
to this principle.
Static analysis literally refers to the techniques used to reason with all possible
behaviors of a system without executing the system. In hardware, we use the term
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static analysis to mean methods that analyze design structure/function (analogous
to program syntax and semantics in software) [39]. Examples of structural methods
include cone-of-influence [40], localization reduction [41], and weakest precondi-
tion computation [24]. Formal verification and symbolic execution [42] are also
considered forms of static analysis of the semantics of a model.
Data mining is the process of deciphering knowledge from data [3]. Data min-
ing uses dynamic behavior in the form of simulation data or training sets to find
statistical correlations and make inferences about a system. Typically, data mining
finds its applications in web-mining, online recommendation systems, health-care,
and bio-informatics. In data mining community, a set of mining algorithms has
been proposed for different application problems, such as association rule mining,
decision tree based learning, and sequential pattern mining [3].
1.4.1 Why Data Mining for Verification?
Simulation based verification is still the main method for verifying complex SoC.
During simulation-based verification, tremendous amounts of data are generated
due to the fast simulation speed in both RTL and ESL. Performing detailed analysis
of the simulation data to hunt design bugs is like finding a needle in a haystack. Data
mining naturally lends itself to our verification problem and is an ideal technique
for performing the simulation data analysis. We expect that data mining will replace
manual waveform analysis, and the knowledge discovered from the simulation data
could ease hardware verification.
1.4.2 Data Mining Guided by Static Analysis
Simply application of data mining on the dynamic simulation data from hardware
has several disadvantages, which can be offset by static analysis. First, data mining
is not able to simulate judgment, i.e., it will not be able to decide how interesting
a piece of information (say, a rule) is to the hardware verification domain [3], [43].
Without domain knowledge, data mining algorithm tends to produce a lot of un-
interesting information to verification engineers. Static analysis is able to extract
domain knowledge from the designs. For example, data mining is used to derive
logic rules between two signals in the design. Static analysis techniques such as
cone of influence can identify whether the two signals influence each other. If the
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two signals are independent, any logic rule between the two signals is spurious and
cannot be used for hardware verification.
Second, static analysis can aid the feature extraction of data mining. In the raw
simulation data, all high level design variables are ungrouped into bit level signals.
If we use the bit level signals as features in mining algorithm, the discovered knowl-
edge is hard for the verification engineer to digest since high level design intents are
lost. Our static analysis technique can extract high level structures from the design
and retain them as features for data mining.
Third, static analysis is useful for preprocessing raw simulation data and thus
guiding the mining engine to generate more meaningful patterns for verification en-
gineer. In constraint-random verification, some of the design inputs are randomized
in the stimulus generator. As a result, it is difficult for the mining engine to identify
potential relationship between signals. For example, signal a and signal b have the
potential relationship a = b. In random simulation, they are concretized to a = 1,
b = 1 in one simulation trace, and a = 2, b = 2 in another simulation trace. A data
mining algorithm would not be able to find the relationship a = b. However, our
static analysis technique can transform the simulation data and assign a symbolic
value to a and b, which helps the mining engine discover the relationship a = b.
1.5 Contributions
1.5.1 RTL Verification
Systematic and Scalable Input Vector Generation through Hybrid Analysis of
RTL Source Code
We propose HYBRO and symbolic state caching methods for generating high cov-
erage input patterns in RTL [44],[45]. The two methods both use a hybrid approach
that combines dynamic and static analysis of the RTL source code. HYBRO im-
proves the scalability of input vector generation by considering branch coverage as
the metric for guiding the input vector generation. We implement the Verilog RTL
symbolic execution engine and show that the notion of branch coverage helps al-
leviate the inefficiencies caused by previous path-based approaches to input vector
generation and also achieve high coverage. We also describe two types of optimiza-
tions, dynamic slicing and local conflict resolution, that increase the efficiency of
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HYBRO significantly.
We also propose an explored symbolic state caching method to attack path explo-
sion. Explored symbolic states are states starting from which all subpaths have been
explored. Each explored symbolic state is stored in the form of bitmap encoding of
branches to ease comparison. When the explored symbolic state is reached again in
the following symbolic execution, all subpaths can be pruned. The symbolic state
caching method is promising in showing high coverage on benchmark RTL designs,
and the runtime of the test generation process is reduced from several hours to less
than 20 minutes.
Stimulus Generation for Coverage Closure Using GoldMine Assertions
We propose a methodology for attaining coverage closure of design validation using
GoldMine spurious assertions [46], [47]. We take advantage of the counterexam-
ples from the formal engine to incrementally generate stimulus and finally achieve
coverage closure. GoldMine uses a formal verification tool to check the gener-
ated assertions and a counterexample is generated for each spurious assertion. In
our methodology, we feed these counterexample traces to the simulation engine to
iteratively refine the original simulation trace data. We introduce an incremental
decision tree to mine the new traces in each iteration. The algorithm converges
when all the candidate assertions are true. Our algorithm will always converge and
capture the complete functionality of each output of a sequential design on conver-
gence. Our method always results in a monotonic increase in simulation coverage.
We also introduce an output-centric notion of coverage, and argue that we can attain
coverage closure with respect to this notion of coverage.
Word Level Feature Discovery for Enhancing RTL Assertion Mining
We propose a technique that uses static and dynamic analysis of RTL code to dis-
cover word level features [48]. We use simulation guided weakest precondition
computation to discover word level features in terms of primary inputs. A post
processing of assertions is employed to remove redundant propositions. The gen-
erated word level features are used by machine learning algorithm. This allows
the generated assertions to be at the same level of abstraction as RTL. We do not
modify the learning algorithms themselves to achieve our goal. The machine learn-
ing algorithm, as such, is agnostic to the level of abstraction of its features. By
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using those discovered word level features, the machine learning algorithm is able
to generate the word level assertions. Experimental results on Ethernet MAC, I2C,
and OpenRISC designs show that the generated word level assertions have higher
expressiveness and readability than their corresponding bit level assertions.
1.5.2 ESL Verification
Assertion Mining for System Level Design
We propose a method for automatically generating assertions from Transaction
Level Model (TLM) simulation traces [35], [49]. The generated assertions express
design specifications in the form of linear temporal logic with quantitative temporal
constraints [50]. We first generate the assertions without regard to the quantitative
time constraints. They are mined in the form of frequent patterns in the simula-
tion traces. We mine simulation traces using episode mining to identify frequent
episodes comprising function calls and events. We then annotate the episodes with
real time parameters to express quantitative time constraints among the function
calls or events in the episode. When mining such TLM assertions, we employ
symbolic execution to generalize the parameters and return values of function calls
in the traces to help the mining engine generate high quality assertions. We have
constructed a realistic AXI-based interconnection network platform on which we
demonstrate experimental results. We show that our technique efficiently generates
high quality performance and functional assertions on the AXI-based platform and
a transaction level AMBA-based DMA controller. We demonstrate that episode
mining is more scalable and able to generate a more compact set of high quality
TLM assertions than previous efforts using sequential pattern mining. The number
of generated assertions using episode mining can be reduced by up to 228 times,
and the time interval between two events/function calls in each assertion is smaller
than 50 time units.
Diagnosing Root Causes of System Level Performance Violations
We propose a methodology to localize root causes of latency or throughput viola-
tions [51]. We use a concurrent pattern mining approach to infer frequent patterns
from transaction traces to localize root causes. We apply three categories of do-
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main knowledge from the violations and models to filter the irrelevant transaction
traces and increase the effectiveness of the mining results. We provide three culprit
scenarios to the mining algorithm by including transaction traces relevant to the
corresponding culprit scenario. The mined concurrent patterns then belong to that
culprit scenario. We provide a case study for diagnosing performance violations
of an experimental platform and show that our domain knowledge can reduce the
number of transaction traces up to 92.8%. The concurrent pattern mining pinpoints
the root cause to one of fewer than 10 patterns among 100000 transaction traces.
1.6 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows.
In Chapter 2, we present the background on the techniques used in the thesis.
In Chapter 3, we first present our previous work STAR for RTL validation input
generation and show the path explosion problem in STAR. We then present HYBRO
and symbolic state caching methods to attack the path explosion problem and thus
improve the efficiency and scalability of the input generation method.
In Chapter 4, we present our methodology to generate input stimuli to achieve
coverage closure using GoldMine.
In Chapter 5, we present the methodology to discover word level features using
static and dynamic analysis of the RTL source code.
In Chapter 6, we present our technique for generating assertions from system
level designs using GoldMine. We compare two different mining algorithms for
system level assertion generation.
In Chapter 7, we present our methodology for localizing root causes of latency
or throughput violations using a concurrent pattern mining approach.
In Chapter 8, we present a summary of the work and conclude this thesis.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
In this chapter, we present some definitions and background on the techniques used
in the thesis.
2.1 Static Analysis of RTL Source Code
2.1.1 Basic Definition
We treat the RTL source code as a “program” as in [39], [40]. We analyze the CFG
of the RTL design.
A simple path in the RTL CFG is a path which is executed in a single cycle. A
sequential path refers to a path that is executed across multiple time cycles. In order
to account for the sequential behavior of the RTL, the RTL CFG is sequentially
unrolled. This means that the CFG is replicated many times, with the variables in
each unroll being annotated by the corresponding relative time cycle.
In the CFG, a conditional node Ni is control dependent on conditional node Nj
if the outcome of evaluating Nj determines if Ni should execute or not. Nj is said
to dominate Ni. A control dependency graph is a data structure that maintains the
control dependencies within a single time cycle.
2.1.2 Symbolic Execution
Symbolic execution [52] refers to the execution of a single path with symbolic in-
puts. Symbolic execution of a path generates symbolic expressions that are a logical
conjunction of the guards and assignments to the variables used in guards along that
path. Symbolic execution of a sequential path generates expressions such that ev-
ery variable along the path is annotated by the time cycle to which it belongs. A
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constraint in our context is a symbolic expression translated in a form that is accept-
able by an SMT constraint solver. The symbolic execution described here considers
only the synthesizable subset of Verilog, which make the design of execution en-
gine easier and the generated symbolic expression compatible with SMT solver.
The entire execution engine is working on the CFG and expression tree structure of
each statement.
Symbolic execution follows only the current concrete simulation path instead of
considering all control flow paths in a process. This can dynamically reduce the
state space considered to a large extent when compared to symbolic simulation. In
addition, the symbolic simulator handles all paths in the control flow graph, some
of which actually are infeasible paths due to the conditional dependency in different
behavioral design blocks. However, the symbolic execution engine always follows
the feasible path whose feasibility has been demonstrated by concrete simulation.
Our symbolic execution engine is integrated with a commercial simulator, from
which the dynamic concrete execution path information is collected.
2.1.3 Weakest Precondition Computation
In software verification, Dijkstra’s weakest precondition [23] of a program state-
ment S is a function mapping any postcondition R to a precondition, which is de-
noted as wp(S,R). It is the weakest precondition on the initial state ensuring that
execution of S terminates in a final state satisfying R.
In case of hardware RTL, the assignments to all state variables happening in one
cycle correspond to state transitions in hardware. Such state transition relations can
be viewed as the statement st in wp(st,P ) [53].
Let I be the set of primary input variables and let r =< r1, r2, ...rn > be the
set of all state variables. We denote the transition function for state variable r′i as
r
′
i=Ti(I, r). The transition relation is T =< T1, T2...Tn >. We let E(r′)[r′ \ T ]
denote the substitution of each r′i appearing in expression E with its corresponding
transition function Ti. The weakest precondition of predicate P with respect to
transition relation is defined as follows:
wp(T , P (r′, I ′)) = P (r′, I ′)[r′ \ T ]1
1I ′ and r′ represents the primary inputs and register variables in next cycle. r and I are in current
cycle. r, I and I ′ may coexist in the resulting wp.
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The resulting weakest precondition is still a predicate. Therefore, we can com-
pute the weakest precondition backward for k consecutive cycles. We denote it
as wpk(T , P ). Specifically, we use wp0 to denote the weakest precondition in a
single cycle if the variables used in P are intermediate wire variables. Because
these intermediate variables are neither primary inputs nor register variables in the
RTL, wp0 computes the weakest predicates on primary inputs in a single cycle. We
henceforth omit T in the wp notation.
2.2 GoldMine for Automatic Assertion Generation
GoldMine combines two diverse technologies, data mining and static analysis, to
generate assertions automatically. Data mining comprises dynamic, statistical tech-
niques that are computationally efficient, but depend heavily on domain information
for deriving relevant knowledge from a system. Static analysis of designs (including
formal verification) captures domain (design) information, but suffers from compu-
tational complexity issues. Together, these two technologies offset each other’s
disadvantages. The static analysis, when used to guide the data mining, gives rise
to useful domain knowledge, i.e. assertions. Figure 2.1 shows the architecture of
GoldMine. It is composed of a Data generator, Static analyzer, A-Miner, Formal
verifier and A-Val components.
A-MINER FormalVerification
Data
Generator A-VAL
Simulation
Traces
Likely
Assertions
System
AssertionsTarget RTLDesign
Temporal/Propositional
AssertionsStatic Analysis
Designer Feedback
Figure 2.1: GoldMine architecture
In GoldMine, the generated assertion form is G(a ⇒ b), 2 where a is proposi-
tional and b can be temporal. We are only considering bounded assertions, so we al-
low “next” operator(X). The specified bound is given by the mining window length.
It is not possible for us to generate unbounded liveness properties expressed using
“eventually” operator F . Although “until” operator(U ) has not been shown in the
examples of this chapter, some of our assertions can be interpreted as a “bounded”
2We use LTL [7] notation for expressing GoldMine assertions. We can produce SVA [54] as well
as PSL assertions.
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until operation. For example, a ∧ Xa ∧ XXa⇒ XXXb , we can potentially ex-
tend this to a contrived “until” proposition like aUb. It should be noted that it is not
faithful to the true semantics of the Until operation, since the observations are only
within a mining window.
2.2.1 Data Generator
The data generator phase of GoldMine is used to provide the data for the data min-
ing algorithm. For a given RTL design, the data is obtained through dynamic sim-
ulation traces. The design is simulated for a fixed number of cycles ( 10,000) using
random input patterns. Regression tests, if available, can also be applied to obtain
traces.
The sequential behavior of a design is usually expressed in the form of temporal
assertions. GoldMine is capable of generating combinational as well as sequential
assertions. We need to provide a mining window length, or the duration of time
cycles for which we want to capture temporal behavior. For instance, if we want to
consider the following behavior: once a is valid, d will be valid two cycles later,
the mining window length can be set to 2. The generated assertions will span up
to a maximum of 2 cycles. For example, a ⇒ XXd can be one form of generated
assertions.
For sequential behavior, the sequential variables within mining window are anno-
tated with the cycle in which they are assigned. Then the sequential variables with
cycle annotation are treated the same manner as combinational variables. In this
example, variable a can be annotated as a(t − 1), a(t) and a(t + 1) within mining
window.
2.2.2 Static Analyzer
The static analyzer extracts domain-specific information about the design and passes
it to the data mining algorithm. We extract the logic cone of influence for every
output that we are interested in assertions for. The data mining phase (A-miner) is
restricted to analyzing only the logic cone of any output [29]. This limits the search
space of the mining algorithm from all the inputs, to the relevant variables in the
design.
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2.2.3 Decision Tree Based Learning and A-Miner
The data mining phase of GoldMine is called A-miner, for assertion mining. A-
Miner uses a decision tree based supervised learning algorithm to map the simula-
tion trace data into conclusions or inferences about the design.
In the decision tree, the data space is locally divided into a sequence of recursive
splits on the input variables. Each decision node implements a “splitting function”
with discrete outcomes labeling the branches. This hierarchical decision process
that divides input data space into local regions continues recursively until it reaches
a leaf. We require only Boolean splits at every decision node, since our domain of
interest is digital hardware. The example in Figure 2.2 for an output z shows the
simulation trace data for inputs a, b and c.
An error function picks the best splitting variable by computing the variance
between target output values and the values predicted by decision variables. The
predicted value on each node is the mean of output values, denoted by M , while
the error at a node is denoted by E in the example. When the error value becomes
zero, it means all output values are identical to the predicted value and the decision
tree exits after reaching such a leaf node. When the error value is not zero, the
variable with minimum error value is chosen to form the next level of decision
tree. A candidate assertion is a Boolean propositional logic statement computed
by following the path from the root to the leaf of the tree. In the example, the
splitting of input space into two groups after decision on variable a leads to E = 0,
corresponding to assertion A1. Along the a = 1 branch, another split occurs on b.
Assertions A2 and A3 are obtained at the leaf nodes.
Figure 2.2: Decision tree building process and assertion generation.
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2.2.4 Formal Verifier and A-Val
The candidate assertions inferred by A-miner are based purely on statistical corre-
lation metrics like mean and error. We restrict the candidate assertions we consider
to those with 100% confidence. This means that even if a single example in the
trace data does not subscribe to a rule generated by the tree, the rule will be dis-
carded. Despite this strict restriction, A-miner may still infer candidate assertions
that are true of the simulation data, but are not true of all possible inputs. To identify
candidate assertions that are system invariants, the design as well as the candidate
assertions are passed to a formal verification engine. If a candidate assertion passes
the formal check, it is a system invariant. Otherwise, the formal verifier gener-
ates a counterexample trace that shows a violation of the candidate assertion. The
SMV [5] model checking engine is a part of GoldMine, along with a commercial
model checker. In the example in Figure2.2, A1 is declared false, while A2 and A3
are declared true. In GoldMine, A-val forms the evaluation phase for the assertions,
to bridge the gap between the human and machine generated assertions.
GoldMine provides a radical, but powerful, validation method. Through mining
the simulation trace, it reports its findings in a human digestible form (assertion)
early on and with minimal manual effort. However, in GoldMine, there is no con-
cept of feedback from any phase to the data miner. Given that data mining performs
very effectively when given feedback, we have incorporated feedback from the for-
mal verification phase for enhancing the simulation test data in Chapter 4.
2.3 Transaction Level Models
Transaction level models (TLMs), also called transaction level designs, separate the
details of communication among computation modules from the functional details
of these computation modules [20]. The communication is through channels. The
channel’s interfaces provide a set of communication primitives(function calls) to
computation modules and hide low-level communication protocol details. Com-
putation modules are connected via their ports to the channels. Transaction level
modeling in SystemC involves communication between SystemC processes using
function calls. The designers then fully focus more on communication between
the processes in computation modules instead the algorithms performed by the pro-
cesses themselves. Transaction level designs are typically employed for perfor-
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mance evaluation of different architectures, software development or as reference
models for RTL designs. Additionally, this high level model greatly improves sim-
ulation performance and helps to shorten the time to market.
In practice, designers adopt different TLM coding style and model accuracy
when modeling a hardware design for different purpose. TLM can be untimed or
timed model [20]. Untimed TLM is mainly used for software programmers in early
software development and is also called programmer’s view (PV). Timed TLM is
appropriate for the use cases of architectural exploration and performance analysis.
TLM 2.0 is the latest industrial standard for transaction level modeling from the
OSCI [55]. The standard allows for model interoperability throughout the design
community. In TLM 2.0 library, a transaction is a data structure(class) commu-
nicated between modules using function calls. An initiator module is responsible
for initiating a transaction and a target module responds to transactions initiated by
other modules. The same module like a router can be both an initiator or a tar-
get. An example system level model using TLM 2.0 can be shown in Figure 2.3.
Module A serves as an initiator and calls the library function nb transport fw
of socket1 to transmit a transaction to target Module B through forward channel.
Target Module B gives response through backward channel.
Module A Module B 
Initiator 
Socket1 
Read_process() 
{ 
   Trans=mm.allocate(); 
   XXX 
   socket1.nb_transport_fw(Trans,…) 
   if(ret ==TLM_COMPLETED ) 
    wait(1ns); 
} 
 
Target 
Socket2 
nb_transport_fw(Trans,X) 
{ 
   if(phase==BEGIN_REQ) 
  { 
       notify(resp); 
   } 
      return TLM_UPDATED;   
} 
 
forward 
backward 
Figure 2.3: An example about using TLM 2.0 to build system level model.
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CHAPTER 3
EFFICIENT VALIDATION INPUT
GENERATION IN RTL BY HYBRIDIZED
SOURCE CODE ANALYSIS
3.1 Introduction
The validation phase of RTL design is widely accepted as being responsible for
perpetual bottlenecks in the design cycle. It is estimated that over 70% of design
time and resources is spent on design validation [4]. In current practice, application
of known stimuli or directed tests helps capture expected behavior of the design.
Although development of directed tests is an arduous task involving many man-
months, the directed test suites usually converge at an acceptable point. However,
in the case of random stimuli, such confidence is far from being achieved. Even in
state-of-the-art industrial environments with many dedicated validation resources,
the design is considered as stable after the application of a large number (>1 trillion)
of random patterns. Since that metric is devoid of information regarding design
behavior coverage, it is very unsatisfactory.
In this chapter, we first introduce STAR (STatic Analysis of RTL), a technique
for automatic generation of high coverage functional vectors in RTL using static
analysis of the HDL source code. This technique directly manipulates and analyzes
RTL source code as a “program” instead of reasoning with logic gates. STAR
specifically uses symbolic execution [52] of the RTL in conjunction with concrete
simulation (a.k.a. concrete execution) to form a practically feasible, efficient input
vector generation strategy.
Symbolic execution in RTL is adapted from that in software [52]. It refers to
the execution of a single program path with symbolic inputs. As a result of sym-
bolic execution, the symbolic path constraint for that path is generated. In RTL,
the design is simulated using symbolic values of inputs, instead of concrete values.
Symbolic execution is different from symbolic simulation, which has been applied
widely at the gate level [56] and at the RTL [39]. Symbolic simulation is a static
methodology that deciphers all possible executions by traversing RTL source code.
21
Instead, symbolic execution follows a single concrete execution path of RTL and
symbolizes it. Since it is dynamic, it only considers feasible paths, a luxury that a
static engine like a symbolic simulator does not have. A test is generated using con-
straint solving of the symbolic constraints. The STAR algorithm divides the RTL
design into feasible paths and generates tests to cover each path. This “divide-and-
conquer” strategy can be employed for a combinational (or a single cycle) design
as well as a sequential design. For sequential designs, the RTL code is unrolled for
a number of cycles, and an RTL path can be across several cycles.
The STAR algorithm consists of several basic steps. Initially, a random concrete
stimulus is applied to the design, and an execution path is obtained. The RTL ex-
pressions in the concrete simulation path are extracted using symbolic execution.
The expressions are composed of branch conditions as well as assignment state-
ments that use RTL operators. We refer to the branch condition as guard and the
expressions as symbolic expressions. The conjunction of guards in terms of input
variables provides the path constraints under which the concrete path is executed.
One or more of these constraints are now inverted (or mutated). The resulting sym-
bolic expression now corresponds to another path in the design. The Satisfiability
Modulo Theories (SMT) constraint solver [57], which is a SAT-based decision pro-
cedure for linear arithmetic logic, is used to solve the new path constraints and
produce an input vector pattern that is a test for the new path. The inversion of
constraints can be done systematically to cover all paths in a region in a depth-first
manner or a breadth-first manner.
STAR generates input vector patterns for all paths of an RTL design. For a combi-
national design, these are simple paths. For a sequential design, these are sequential
paths that involve sequential unrolling over multiple cycles. The semantics of se-
quential “always” process denotes a process that can potentially loop forever. As a
result, a huge number of paths must be enumerated. We unroll a sequential RTL de-
sign for as many cycles as required to completely describe the temporal behavior of
the variables, or the sequential depth. Within the unrolled RTL design, a sequential
path starts at the initial cycle and ends at the unrolled cycle. Given any intermediate
cycle k, a sequential path is divided into two subpaths: one from the initial cycle
to cycle k, and another from cycle k to the end of the unrolled cycle. In STAR, our
algorithm involves the mutation of guards on a sequential path, and each mutation
generates a new path. This leads to path explosion [58], a situation in which the
number of paths will increase exponentially with the number of branches in each
cycle and the unrolled cycles, i.e., unrolling depth. Such exhaustive enumeration
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of all possible paths limits the scalability of the STAR approach severely, making it
effective only for small designs with few paths.
To attack the path explosion problem, we present HYBRO (HYbrid analysis and
BRanch Coverage Optimizations), a methodology to generate input vectors in RTL
automatically and with extremely high coverage. HYBRO circumvents the path
explosion problem faced by STAR by considering branch coverage as the metric
for guiding the path exploration. In STAR, the extracted symbolic expressions are
placed onto a constraint stack, containing the guards of a single symbolic execu-
tion. In order to systematically explore the design, one of the guards is mutated or
inverted. The STAR algorithm terminates when all the conditional expressions in
the RTL or guards in the constraint stack have been exhausted. This exhaustive enu-
meration of all paths leads to the path explosion problem. In contrast, HYBRO uses
a coverage driven approach to mutate a guard and give a symbolic expression to the
SMT solver. In HYBRO, the instrumented code is also used to record branch cov-
erage in the RTL CFG. At the stage when a guard is picked for mutation, if all the
branches in the CFG that depend on the mutated guard have already been covered,
a different guard is picked from the symbolic expression. The process terminates
when there are no more guards that have not been mutated in the constraint stack.
HYBRO uses the guidance provided by branch coverage in eliminating repetition
of paths. This makes the analysis much more efficient as compared to STAR.
Additionally, in this chapter, we also present two optimizations that increase the
efficiency of HYBRO. Both of them draw on the static analysis and dynamic analy-
sis technology. The first optimization is dynamic UD(Use-Definition) chain slicing.
The UD chain is a data structure consisting of a use(U) of a variable and all defi-
nitions(D) of the variable that can reach the use without any other intervening def-
initions. This approach removes redundant constraint in the path constraints. The
second optimization involves resolving local conflicts when making guard muta-
tion. The successful detection of conflict can reduces calls to the SMT solver [57].
Although HYBRO tries to exhaustively stimulate all reachable branches in the
CFG, it does not guarantee complete coverage. It can be viewed as a best effort
process that practically produces excellent coverage. An important advantage of
HYBRO is that it produces controllability in the input vector generation process,
allowing the process to be guided to uncovered regions of the design. Once inside
a region, HYBRO will explore many branches in the region.
Our experimental results show high structural coverage as well as functional cov-
erage within reasonable time as compared to the STAR algorithm. Additionally, the
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two optimizations can speed up the HYBRO by 1.6-12 times on various bench-
marks.
To attack the path explosion problem and also sustain the algorithm complete-
ness of STAR, we present symbolic state caching solution to ameliorate the path
explosion problems faced by STAR, thereby scaling this technology further. The
unrolling of the “always” processes, despite having an infinite cycle of evaluations,
has finite number of reachable states. In the concrete execution phase, the reached
state in a cycle along the concrete path is represented as a set of values of state (reg-
ister) variables in that cycle. When we symbolically execute such a concrete path,
we obtain the reached symbolic state in the corresponding cycle. Such a symbolic
state is represented as constraints on the register variables. These constraints are in
terms of primary input variables in previous cycles. When considering a sequential
path for test generation, we analyze the reached symbolic state in every cycle that
the path goes across. If a path (subpath) reaches a symbolic state that has already
been reached, then we do not need to generate tests for that path (subpath).
We outline how we enumerate paths and analyze their corresponding symbolic
states. Any enumerated sequential path starts from an initial cycle and extends up
to the sequential depth. A symbolic state is reached in every cycle. STAR follows
a depth-first order to mutate guards. In other words, a guard is mutated from the
last unrolled cycle to the initial cycle. When mutating a guard between cycle k and
the last unrolled cycle, the subpath from the initial cycle to cycle k as well as the
reached symbolic state at cycle k are kept unchanged. Only when all subpaths after
cycle k have been enumerated can the guards in cycle k be mutated. In this situation,
we consider the reached symbolic state at cycle k to be the explored symbolic state,
which means that all subpaths following this symbolic state have been enumerated
before.
The explored symbolic state at cycle k is now recorded. When enumerating a
new path, we check the reached symbolic state in every cycle against the previously
recorded explored symbolic states. If a reached symbolic state is identical to any
explored symbolic state and the cycle (r) of the reached symbolic state is not less
than the cycle parameter(k) of the explored symbolic state, all subpaths starting
from this reached symbolic state will not reach any new symbolic state and can
be pruned. If r < k, the subpath starting from cycle r will be longer than the
subpath starting from cycle k, and a new symbolic state can possibly be reached.
We specifically refer to this recording method as explored symbolic state caching.
It can help to prune paths and thus circumvent the path explosion problem.
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The challenging parts of the explored symbolic state caching method pertain to
(a) representation of the symbolic states and (b) comparison of two symbolic states.
If the symbolic states are represented as extracted constraints, an SMT solver can
be used to compare two symbolic states. As mentioned earlier, a subpath from
the initial cycle to cycle k reaches a symbolic state at cycle k. In other words,
this subpath can determine the symbolic state. The taken branches on the subpath
starting from initial cycle can uniquely represent that subpath. We can then use
the set of taken branches on the subpath to represent the corresponding symbolic
state. However, not all taken branches on the subpath are needed to represent that
symbolic state. If the definition in a taken branch are not used in the symbolic state
constraint, the taken branch is not used to represent the symbolic state. We use a
backward tracing method to identify all necessary taken branches. After we have
determined the set of taken branches to represent a symbolic state, the comparison
of two symbolic states is reduced to comparison of two sets of taken branches.
In this chapter, we further propose an optimization that will increase the perfor-
mance efficiency and reduce the memory consumption of comparing two sets of
taken branches. The branches in a cycle are organized as one bitmap of that cycle,
where one bit corresponds to one branch. If the branch is used to represent sym-
bolic state, the corresponding bit is set. Finally, a reached symbolic state in cycle k
is represented as a set of bitmaps in several continuous cycles ending at cycle k. If
two sets of bitmaps are identical, their represented symbolic states will be the same.
In our implementation, we also apply the two optimizations from HYRRO, which
further improve the efficiency of constraint solving.
Our experimental results show a significant improvement over the original STAR
algorithm. We report high structural coverage as well as functional coverage within
reasonable time, as compared to STAR. The caching of explored symbolic states can
effectively avoid the exploration of repetitive subpaths. The number of repetitively
covered branches is less than 6% of that in original STAR. Also, our method is able
to detect up to 11850 explored symbolic states on different benchmark designs. We
also show that the tests generated using our method have much higher coverage
than those generated using constraint random test generation method.
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3.2 Positioning of Our Work
We discuss work that is related to different aspects of our explored symbolic state
caching method from the perspectives of both hardware validation and software
testing. Despite the differences in semantics and in actual results, software and
hardware techniques for verification, test, and validation have often been mutu-
ally inspired [53], [59]–[61] demonstrate the application of predicate abstraction
from software in hardware designs, while [5], [62] present successful hardware
techniques that have been used to inspire software model checking. We then de-
scribe the challenges in applying an idea that has worked in software testing in our
context.
Our work is mainly inspired from software concolic testing. We treat hardware
RTL design as a software program as in [39], [40]. This is different from traditional
testing or simulation techniques in hardware that view RTL as an abstraction of
gate level semantics, and therefore view RTL constructs as aggregates of bit level
operations. We view an RTL object as a software language construct, facilitating
static analysis of the source code without giving it a gate/transistor level interpreta-
tion until we actually need to. To the best of our knowledge, the integration of the
explored symbolic state caching method and symbolic execution in the context of
design validation has not been presented before.
3.2.1 Hardware Validation
In hardware, hybrid techniques that combine dynamic (simulation) with static anal-
ysis at the gate level have been used for formal verification [63]. [64]–[66] use cost
functions derived from static abstraction to guide random simulation.
Static analysis of RTL has been used for verification [39],[40],[53],[67] and man-
ufacturing level testing [68]. Symbolic simulation technology was initially used at
the gate level for formal verification [56], [69]. Recently, some researchers tried to
develop the RTL symbolic simulator [56],[70],[71]. However, our symbolic execu-
tion engine considers one feasible path each time, instead of the entire design, and
is more scalable to large designs. There has also been some prior work leveraging
the static structure of RTL to speed up model checking [72], [73].
Coverage-guided or specification-driven stimulus generation [15], [74]–[77] and
development of effective coverage metrics [78], [79] have been looked at in depth
before. For microprocessor verification, a graph-theoretic model is developed in
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[80] to capture the structure and behavior of pipelined processors, and test pro-
grams are generated to detect function faults in the model. Test generation in RTL
targeting at stuck-at manufacturing faults has been explored to reduce test genera-
tion time [81].
3.2.2 Software Concolic Testing
In software testing, extensive research has been done on the idea of combining con-
crete execution and symbolic execution to automatically generate tests [82]–[84].
Both concolic testing [83] and dynamic test generation [58] belong to this cate-
gory. Many tools based on symbolic execution have been developed to automati-
cally generate tests. These tools are very promising for finding bugs in real-world
software [82], [85]–[88].
3.2.3 Attacking Path Explosion
The problem of path explosion of symbolic execution in software testing has also
been approached in a variety of ways. One method uses heuristics to guide path
enumeration to hit uncovered statements in the code at the expense of completeness
[82], [89]. Another method, RWset [90], prunes redundant paths by tracking the
memory locations read and written by the checked code. The work in [58],[91],[92]
uses compositional methods to reduce the number of paths to be solved by the con-
straint solver. State merging is employed in [93] to improve the performance of
symbolic execution. Our approach distinguishes itself from these work in two re-
spects. First, our symbolic state caching approach is being done in the new context
of hardware RTL design validation. The HDL used to describe RTL designs is
semantically different from software languages. Second, we propose the use of
bitmap encoding of branches to represent symbolic states to attack path explosion.
3.2.4 Challenges of Applying Concolic Testing to RTL Designs
Our idea was inspired by concolic testing in software testing. Adapting it to RTL de-
sign validation has several challenges, since the semantics of HDLs used to describe
hardware RTL designs are different from that of a sequential software language.
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HDLs model the sequential design as multiple always/process blocks in Verilog
and VHDL. A clock signal is used to trigger these blocks in a synchronous design.
Non-blocking assignments to register variables in the current cycle take effect in
the next cycle.
Also, the multiple always/process blocks in RTL design are executed in a concur-
rent, non-deterministic manner during simulation. Different interleaving execution
orders of the blocks during simulation could non-deterministically produce differ-
ent results.
Finally, HDLs model non-terminating, reactive systems. An always/process block
is an endless loop in simulation. Unlike sequential software, no path is a simple
path. The number of paths will increase exponentially as the number of unrolled
cycles increases. From that perspective, the path explosion problem in hardware
RTL design is even more severe than that in software.
Hence, the adaption is conceptually nontrivial. In fact, the adaption is orthogo-
nal to software techniques, since the expected improvements and results are totally
different. Hardware is a finite-state system, and many paths repetitively cover the
same symbolic state.
3.3 STAR: Generating Input Vectors for Design
Validation by Static Analysis of RTL
In this section, we first introduce the data structure used in STAR, and then briefly
explain each step of STAR. Figure 3.1 shows the algorithmic flow of STAR.
Figure 3.2 (a)shows a Verilog RTL example design with instrumented code. For
each single statement or conditional expression in the design, the expression tree
structure exactly records the corresponding assignment or expressions for later con-
straint generation and is linked to corresponding CFG node. As shown in Figure
3.2, the conditional expression in line 11 is represented in the expression tree linked
to the branch node. All the nonblocking statements in line 24 are represented in the
expression tree structures that are linked to the corresponding CFG node i5. The
expression tree can also be used to build the use-define chain for the design since
it is easy to deduce the used variable and defined variable from expression tree.
For example, in a non-assignment expression, all leaf node variables are the used
variables in the expression.
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Concrete  
execution 
for  cycle t 
Constraint  
extraction 
Constraint 
mutation 
Constraint 
 solver 
SMT 
No 
Input pattern 
Next input pattern 
Yes 
Is constraint 
stack empty 
exit 
    t ≦n (0,1…n) 
Record concrete  
path in cycle t 
Code instrument 
static analysis 
Start 
Symbolic 
execution  
for cycle t 
t ≧0 (n…,1,0) 
No 
Yes 
Figure 3.1: The algorithm flow of STAR. Parameter n specifies the sequentially
unrolled depth.
3.3.1 Code Instrumentation and Static Analysis
As shown in diamond in CFG in Figure 3.2 (b), all the instrumented branch vari-
ables keep track of the concrete simulation path at each cycle by sustaining an array
which is indexed by cycle number. At the end of each cycle, the instrumented
branch variables are compared with their value in the last cycle. The updated vari-
able means the corresponding branch is taken, which is recorded in corresponding
element in the array. When the concrete simulation is done, the symbolic execution
can exactly follow the executed concrete path.
The instrumentation process is automatically done by a Verilog parser. The RTL
design is directly instrumented with source code that is meant to trace a concrete
execution path. In Figure 3.2, the instrumented code has been underlined. The
values of i0 will change if reset evaluates to 1 during simulation, and the value of
i1 will change if reset evaluates to 0 during simulation. A change in the value of
either i0 or i1 indicates which branch was executed by the concrete simulation.
After the construction of the CFG and expression tree for the given RTL, the
CFG and expression tree are statically analyzed to obtain the UD chain. The UD
chain is mainly used to determine whether a variable is used in a branch condition
expression.
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input d,e,f,reset,clk;
output out;
reg state, c
integer i0,i1,i2,i3,i4,i5;
1. always@(posedge clk)
2. if(reset) begin 
3. i0<= i0+1;
4. c<=d; out<=d&c;
5. state<=s1; end
6. else  begin
7. i1<=i1+1;
8. case(state)
9. s1: begin
10. i2<=i2+1;
11. if(c>(d+e))
12. begin 
13. i3<=i3+1;
14. c<=e; out<=c&d;
15. state<=s2;end
16. else
17. begin 
18. i4<=i4+1;
19. c<=f; out<=c&f;
20. state<=s3; end
21. end
22. s2: begin
23. i5<=i5+1;
24. out<=e&f; state<=s1;
25. end endcase end
26. endmodule
if(reset)
i0 i1
case(state)
i2 i5
i3 i4
exit
<= <=
state s1 out &
e f
(c)
(b)
(a)
if(c>d+e)
>
c +
d e
Figure 3.2: An RTL example with instrumented code and its corresponding CFG
and expression tree. The broken line indicates the control dependency.
3.3.2 Concrete Execution for Multiple Cycles and Recording of
Concrete Path
A concrete input pattern is given as a stimulus. The first time, this stimulus is gener-
ated at random. For every subsequent iteration of the algorithm, the concrete input
patterns are generated by the SMT solver automatically. The concrete stimulus is
applied on the design. If any input variable does not get an assignment by SMT
solver, a random value will be used in simulation. During the concrete simulation,
the CFG branch node of the instrumented code records the concrete path.
3.3.3 Symbolic Execution to Extract Path Constraints
In this step, the concrete path recorded in the control flow graph is symbolically ex-
ecuted to generate path constraints. The symbolic execution engine walks the CFG
in the design one by one at every cycle. In each CFG, it only follows the concrete
simulation path. At each branch node in each cycle, the engine decides the taken
path by looking up the corresponding element in the array. At each node in the path,
the corresponding expression tree is traversed and output as symbolic expression.
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As shown in Figure 3.2 (b), the engine arrives at the CFG branch node if(c>d+e)
in cycle i and traversing of linked expression tree can generate the following con-
straint: c[i]>d[i]+e[i].
For nonblocking assignments to register variables in the path, the assigned regis-
ter variable will take effect in next cycle. Therefore, the cycle index should be set
to the next cycle number. Taking the assignment out<=e&f in node i5 for example,
the generated constraint will be out[i+1]==e[i]&f[i]. Finally, the conjunction of
all generated symbolic expressions forms the corresponding path constraints.
3.3.4 Constraint Mutation
After the generation of one path constraint, we need to mutate the guard to enumer-
ate another path. In order to systematically enumerate all possible paths, we use a
depth-first order to mutate guards. A constraint stack stores all extracted constraints
according to CFG traversal order. It should be noted that a guard will not be consid-
ered as candidate guard if it is mutated last time. A mutate flag is used to indicate
whether a guard has been mutated before. When a guard is popped out from the
constraint stack, its mutate flag is reset. When a guard is mutated, its mutate flag is
set. This flag can guarantee that the same path cannot be enumerated twice. When
there is no candidate guard, all possible paths are enumerated, and STAR exits.
3.3.5 Constraint Solving and Next Pattern Generation
The mutated constraint is passed through an SMT solver. If a satisfiable assignment
is generated, it will be used as the next concrete input pattern. If the SMT solver
reports an unsatisfiable result, it means that the mutation leads to an infeasible path.
A new guard in the constraint stack is chosen for mutation. If some inputs have
been removed from the stack in the guard mutation phase, they will not be a part
of the constraint. They might need to be randomly generated in the next concrete
pattern. However, the random generation, along with the existing constraints, will
direct the entire test generation into another region of the CFG. The entire algorithm
will be repeated for the new region.
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3.4 Path Explosion in STAR
The symbolic execution engine enumerates all possible sequential paths in the de-
sign to generate tests for sequential behavior. However, the number of sequential
paths in an RTL design will increase exponentially with the number of branches in
the RTL code and the sequentially unrolled depth. Each guard mutation in any cycle
will lead to a new sequential path of the RTL design. In the RTL example shown in
Figure 3.2, there are 4 paths in each cycle, and there will be 45 possible paths if the
sequentially unrolled depth is 5. Because of path explosion, it is difficult to apply
STAR for large designs.
In this chapter, we present two different methods to attack the path explosion
issue and thus improve the scalability of STAR. The first one is HYBRO, which
uses branch coverage to guide the constraint mutation. HYBRO only mutates the
guard leading to the uncovered area in each iteration. HYBRO is an incomplete
method and cannot guarantee to cover all paths of RTL design. The second one is
symbolic state caching method. It caches the previously explored symbolic state
and try to avoid the exploration of repetitive state space in future.
3.5 Method I: Branch Coverage Guided Input
Generation Approach (HYBRO) to Attack Path
Explosion in STAR
concrete  
execution 
for  cycle t 
slicing and 
constraint  
extraction 
constraint 
mutation 
constraint 
 solver 
SAT 
No 
input pattern 
next input pattern 
Yes 
no constraint in  
stack for mutate 
exit 
No 
Yes 
    t ≦n (0,1…n) 
record concrete  
path and covered  
branch in cycle t 
code instrument 
static analysis 
start 
symbolic 
execution  
for cycle t 
t ≧0 (n…,1,0) 
No 
detect local 
conflict? 
Yes 
uncovered  
branch? 
Yes 
No 
Figure 3.3: HYBRO algorithm flow. The blocks in blue represent the new phases
in HYBRO method.
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Figure 3.3 shows the algorithmic flow of HYBRO. We describe the new phases
of the algorithm over STAR.
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Figure 3.4: Branch coverage guided search approach in HYBRO. A comparison to
the STAR algorithm is shown.
3.5.1 Recording Branch Coverage
A concrete input pattern is given as stimulus. For the first time, this stimulus is
generated at random. For every subsequent iteration of the algorithm, the concrete
input patterns are generated automatically. The concrete stimulus is applied for a
predetermined number of cycles. Every time a branch executes in the concrete in-
put simulation, the edges corresponding to the instrumented code in the CFG are
marked as covered. In the concrete execution shown in Figure 3.4, the correspond-
ing concrete pattern is reset[t] = 1, d[t] = 1, e[t] = 1, f [t] = 0; reset[t + 1] = 0,
d[t + 1] = 0, e[t + 1] = 0, f [t + 1] = 1. The bold edges correspond to the con-
crete execution path in the CFG. In the first cycle reset = 1 is applied, so the edge
leading to i0 is marked as covered. This is shown by the large dot on the arrows.
In the second cycle reset = 0 is applied, and the branches leading to i1, i2 and i3
are marked as covered. The branch leading to node i4 is marked as covered from a
previous iteration of the algorithm.
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3.5.2 Dynamic UD Chain Slicing in Path Constraint Extraction
In this step, the concrete path identified in the control flow graph is symbolically
executed. For the concrete path executed over multiple cycles, the corresponding
symbolic execution will also involve variables across multiple time cycles. For the
example concrete path, the symbolic execution will yield the following expression.
In cycle t: reset[t] = 1
∧
c[t+ 1] = d[t]
∧
out[t+ 1] = d[t]&c[t]
∧
state[t+ 1] = s1.
In cycle t + 1: reset[t + 1] = 0
∧
state[t + 1] = s1
∧
c[t + 1] > d[t + 1] + e[t +
1]
∧
c[t + 2] = e[t + 1]
∧
out[t + 2] = c[t + 1]&d[t + 1]
∧
state[t + 2] = s2. The
state[t+ 1] = s1 appearing in cycle t corresponds to the non-blocking assignment
in line 5 in Figure 3.2 (a). Its appearing in cycle t + 1 corresponds to the guard in
line 9 in Figure 3.2 (a).
The regular constraint extraction mechanism would be to simply reuse the sym-
bolic expression. However, we introduce an optimization strategy here that makes
use of the UD chain. We traverse the CFG from the last time cycle backwards to the
first time cycle in current dynamic execution to apply this optimization. For every
variable in every guard in a cycle we refer the UD chain to see where it was defined.
Among all possible definitions for a used guard variable found by static analysis,
we only consider the one that has been executed by the concrete input vector. We
mark all the definitions transitively from the last cycle to the first cycle. At the end
of this analysis, if a definition has been marked, it must be required by a guard in a
subsequent frame. Otherwise, it is discarded from the constraint.
The constraint is extracted into the constraint stack such that every element of
the stack corresponds to a term that is a conjunct in the symbolic expression. For
example, in Figure 3.4 the constraint is pushed into the constraint stack such that
each element is annotated with the cycle number and the lowest cycle number is at
the bottom of the stack. Since UD chain slicing analyzes the CFG from last cycle
to first cycle, the constraint stack elements need to be popped and then re-pushed
into the stack. The UD chain slicing optimization is intended to make the size of
the constraint smaller. In Figure 3.2 (a), there are four definitions in the constraint
in cycle t for the used variable c in line 11 in cycle t + 1. They are c <= d in line
4, c <= e in line 14, c <= f in line 19 and an implicit definition c <= c in i5.
However, only c <= d in line 4 in cycle t is extracted as a constraint since it is in
the concrete path. In addition, the definition out[t+ 1] = d[t]&c[t] can be removed
from the constraint since variable out is not used in the following cycle.
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3.5.3 Branch Coverage Guided Constraint Mutation
A constraint is said to be mutated if any of its guards is inverted/mutated. In this
step, the guard at the top of the constraint stack is selected as a candidate for mu-
tation. The candidate guard is mutated and then analyzed using the CFG that was
marked by branch coverage as follows. If the mutated candidate guard g corre-
sponds to a control node in the control dependency graph, and all the branches
leading to the nodes that are control dependent on g have already been covered,
then g is discarded from the constraint stack. If any of the nodes dependent on g
can be executed by branches that have not yet been covered, g is retained. Intu-
itively, if B is control dependent on A, it means that some path in the program that
goes through A can bypass B, and A is the point in which this divergence can occur.
So, it suffices to look at the control node that dominates the other nodes for doing
a branch overage analysis. The branch coverage analysis is performed for only one
cycle at a time. The cycle that is considered for a guard corresponds to the anno-
tated in the guard variable. So, in the example, only the (t+ 1)th unroll is analyzed
for control dependency and branch coverage.
In Figure 3.4, the guard c[t+1]>d[t+1]+e[t+1] is the mutation candidate. Def-
initions/Assignments in the constraint are not considered mutation candidates. The
guards in the constraint are shown by the shaded elements of the stack. These will
be mutation candidates. The candidate guard is mutated to c[t+1]≤d[t+1]+e[t+1].
The mutated guard now corresponds to the node i4. We first check if i4 dominates
other uncovered conditional nodes (including itself). However, i4 is marked as
covered in previous iteration of the algorithm. So this guard is removed from the
constraint in our approach. In future cycles (t+2 and beyond) of the algorithm, i4
might dominate other control nodes according to the control dependency graph in
Figure 3.2 (b). If there are control dependent nodes that are not yet covered, the
current mutated candidate guard will be retained.
As shown in Figure 3.4, the STAR algorithm would have retained this guard,
irrespective of it being along a branch that has been covered. This would result in
repetitive coverage of the paths that execute control nodes that are dependent on
i4 in all future iterations as well. Our approach manages to avoid repetitive path
traversal for input pattern generation by using the notion of branch coverage.
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Table 3.1: The coverage, running time, number of patterns and repeated branches
reported by HYBRO.
Bench- HYBRO
mark Cycles Bran Cov Path Cov Assert Cov Runtime
b01 10 94.44% 94.44% 95% 0.07s
b06 10 94.12% 93.10% 100% 0.10s
b10 10 87.10% 72.73% 4.71% 4.56s
b10 30 96.77% 81.82% 68.58% 52.14s
b10 50 96.77% 81.82% 93.65% 180.42s
b11 10 78.26% 78.26% 43.97% 0.28s
b11 50 91.30% 91.30% 100% 326.85s
b14 15 83.50% 13.36% 100% 301.69s
or1200-0 50 93.75% 77.78% 100% 37.73s
or1200-0 100 93.75% 77.78% 100% 191.82s
or1200-1 50 96.30% 79.07% 94.12% 21.90s
or1200-1 100 96.30% 79.07% 100% 92.15s
or1200-2 10 100% 100% 100% 302.67s
or1200-3 5 91.53% 90.20% 96.67% 19.07s
or1200-3 10 96.61% 96.08% 100% 287.62s
3.5.4 Local Conflict Resolution
There are two kinds of local conflict when making guard mutation. First, the same
guard occurs across multiple processes in the same cycle in RTL. If this guard is part
of the constraint stack and gets mutated, this will result in a conflict with the same
guard that is present lower in the stack. Similarly, if the previous definition(s) of a
used variable in a guard are assigned a constant value, the mutation of that guard to
another value will give rise to a conflict. We detect syntactically equivalent guards
shared across multiple processes in a single cycle when doing static analysis. If such
a shared guard is a candidate for mutation, it is directly popped out from the stack.
Another local conflict occurs when all used variables in current mutated guard are
assigned a constant value in the variable’s definition of current path. For example,
before the mutation of guard a>b, we first trace the definition of a and b through
UD chain. If both of the definitions assign a constant value to a and b, the mutation
of a>b will definitely lead to a local conflict. This case often takes place for case
statement in the design. In the example shown in Figure 3.4, if the guard variable
state is a candidate for mutation, we can pop out the guard from the constraint
stack since state is assigned a constant in its definition. These local conflicts are
supposed to be detected in the SMT solver phase. However, as an optimization, we
detect such conflicts before we pass the constraint to the SMT solver.
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3.6 Experimental Evaluation of Method I
We have implemented the HYBRO algorithm and all optimization strategies with
C++, which interact with VCS simulator through the direct programming inter-
face(DPI) and Yices [57] constraint solver with its C Library Interface. All the
following experiments are performed on a four Intel i5 2.67GHz processor cores
machine with 16GB of memory running Linux. We present a set of experimental
results on some examples of RTL model from ITC99 and OpenRISC1200 [1]. Four
OR1200-x designs are instruction cache controller, data cache controller, Wishbone
bus interface and exception handling logic.
3.6.1 Structural Coverage Evaluation
The first experiment in Table 3.1 shows the coverage rate for the generated test
patterns using HYBRO. It can be observed that HYBRO can achieve very high
structural coverage as long as the unrolled cycle number is enough. For most of
these designs, all the feasible branches in the design are fully covered even if the
tool does not report 100% coverage due to the infeasible paths. For example, there
may be unreachable default branch for case statement in a design.
The unrolled cycle number is an important parameter to improve the coverage
in HYBRO. This parameter is determined by the coverage feedback. If the cover-
age is not high, it means the uncovered branches are not reachable in the unrolled
cycles. We can increase the unrolled cycle number. The b10 and b11 circuit demon-
strate this relationship between coverage and unrolled cycle number. When the
unrolled cycle number increases from 10 to 30, all the feasible branches are fully
covered. However, for or1200-2 and or1200-3 designs, 10 cycles is enough to cover
all branches. The running time exhibits the applicability of HYBRO for practical
circuit. There is no memory bottleneck since HYBRO does not store any states of
the circuit.
The only exceptionable design is b14 circuit. In this design, several uncovered
branch conditions in the design depend on the overflow of a big counters. As a
result, it becomes difficult to satisfy these branch conditions.
A very interesting benefit from HYBRO is that it can identify and report infeasi-
ble paths. This is highly valuable to the verification engineer. In addition, HYBRO
can also be used to check properties on each path.
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Table 3.2: Comparison between HYBRO and STAR and HYBRO optimization
detail. All runtimes are in seconds. UD chain slicing column represents the
percentage of reduced constraint numbers. Local conflict resolution column
represents the number of detected conflict when mutating constraint. The speedup
column is the running time speedup of HYBRO with two optimizations over
HYBRO without two optimizations. The length of each generated patterns is equal
to the unrolled cycle number.
Bench- Cycles STAR HYBRO HYBRO Optimization detail
mark Runtime Num. of Repeated Runtime Num. of Repeated UD Chain Local Conflict Speedup
Patterns Branches Patterns Branches Slicing Resolution
b01 10 1.64s 1024 1249 0.07s 20 24 56.10% 69 12.5
b10 15 >3600s - - 10.8s 430 498 34.60% 472 8.01
b11 15 293.00s 84342 111736 1.12s 302 394 12.64% 1169 4.47
or1200-0 10 >3600s - - 1.72s 117 185 2.30% 42 1.68
or1200-3 10 >3600s - - 287.62s 1141 2640 10.67% 3933 1.62
3.6.2 Functional Coverage Analysis
We also demonstrate that the input patterns generated by HYBRO can provide high
functional coverage although the entire analysis in HYBRO is on RTL structure.
The RTL code structures reflect the design specification and HYBRO is able to
follow these structures to generate meaningful patterns from the perspective of in-
teresting functionality.
We use the assertion tool GoldMine [29] to generate assertions for several de-
signs. The generated tests are also applied on the design to evaluate the assertion
coverage through simulation. The assertion is normally used to check whether the
design has correctly implemented the specification. The triggered assertion cover-
age rate actually reflects the quality of simulation patterns. The assertion coverage
report of our generated test patterns by HYBRO is shown in the assertion coverage
column of Table 3.1, from which we can conclude that HYBRO is able to compre-
hensively capture the design function.
Comparing with random method, HYBRO has the advantage to generate all
meaningful input to cover all possible design behavior instead of exhausting all
value of input. The generate process relies on the hint from RTL structure. Com-
paring with widely used constraint-random generation method, HYBRO doesn’t
have to manually build the constraints.
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3.6.3 Optimization Effect
The second experiment shown in Table 3.2 is a comparison between HYBRO and
the STAR algorithm [44]. We set the maximum runtime to one hour. It can be ob-
served that STAR suffers from path explosion for most of the designs. This is shown
by high runtime and large number of patterns. The runtime will increase exponen-
tially as the unrolled cycle number increases in STAR. Therefore, the unrolled cycle
number in this experiment is very small when applying STAR. It is unscalable for
big practical design. For the same circuit, however, the runtime for HYBRO is very
small. The runtime of HYBRO does not increase exponentially with the unrolling
cycle number. We can see that the number of repeated branches is very high in
STAR, whereas in HYBRO, the average number of repetitively covered branch is
less than 5% of that in STAR.
The optimization detail column in Table 3.2 shows the optimization effectiveness
of UD chain slicing and local conflict resolution. UD chain slicing reduces the
number of constraints sent to SMT solver since unused variable definition will be
excluded from current constraints. Local conflict resolution reduces the number of
calling to SMT solver since it relies on the static analysis information to check the
conflict in constraints stack instead of sending them to SMT solver. We specifically
run HYBRO with the two optimizations and without the two optimizations. It can
be observed that the optimization can speed up HYBRO by 1.6-12 times on various
circuits.
3.7 Method II: Symbolic State Caching to Attack Path
Explosion in STAR
3.7.1 Path Enumeration and Reachable State Space
The execution of a simple RTL path in each cycle leads to the design’s transition
from one state to another. A sequential path will generate continuous state transi-
tions. In every cycle, different states are reached by following different sequential
paths starting from the initial cycle, and we say these states are reached states in
that cycle. In the example shown in Figure 3.5, the letters A–O represent simple
paths of each cycle. There are two possible reached states in cycle t − 3: S1 and
S2. The simple paths in cycle t − 2 can generate the following state transitions:
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Figure 3.5: RTL path enumeration and state space exploration.
S1 → S3, S1 → S4, S1 → S5, S2 → S5, and S2 → S6. Figure 3.5 also shows
two sequential paths, p1 and p2, and their corresponding state transitions along the
paths.
In STAR, we unroll the RTL design for a specified number of cycles and enumer-
ate all feasible sequential paths for test generation. By using the constraint stack,
we keep track of each guard and cycle number to avoid the enumeration of repeti-
tive paths. In Figure 3.5, provided that the unrolled depth is t + 1 and the current
state at cycle t − 3 is S1, we will enumerate all sequential paths according to the
following order:
1. · · ·A→D→G→I;
2. · · ·A→D→G→J ;
3. · · ·A→D→H→K;
4. · · ·A→D→H→L;
5. · · ·B→E→G→I;
6. · · ·B→E→G→J ;
7. · · ·B→E→H→K;
8. · · ·B→E→H→L;
9. · · ·C→F→G→I;
10. · · ·C→F→G→J ;
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11. · · ·C→F→H→K;
12. · · ·C→F→H→L;
The “· · · ” in the above sequential paths represents the common subpath between
the initial cycle and cycle t − 1. STAR combines the concrete execution and sym-
bolic execution to generate input patterns for each sequential path. During concrete
execution of each such sequential path, the reached states in the path are explicit
states, since all registers are evaluated to concrete values. During symbolic ex-
ecution of the sequential path, the states reached in each cycle are represented as
reached symbolic state. Each symbolic state represents a set of concrete states satis-
fying the symbolic state constraints. A reached symbolic state has a cycle parameter
specifying the cycle where the symbolic state is reached.
3.7.2 Explored Symbolic States
Although STAR does not repetitively enumerate the same sequential path, the same
symbolic state may be reached again and again by different sequential paths. In
the example shown in Figure 3.5, the symbolic state S7 at cycle t − 1 is reached
by three different sequential paths: A→D, B→E, and C→F . When STAR ex-
plores sequential path · · ·A→D· · · , all subpaths following the symbolic state S7
will be enumerated. State S7 is actually identified as explored symbolic state in
cycle t− 1 when “· · ·A→D→G→I”, “· · ·A→D→G→J”, “· · ·A→D→H→K”,
and “· · ·A→D→H→L” are all enumerated for test generation. When subpath
· · ·B→E is being followed, all the same subpaths from symbolic state S7 are enu-
merated again.
Given that a previously explored symbolic state in cycle k is reached again in
cycle r (r >= k) through a different sequential path, it is not necessary to enumerate
all subpaths following that explored symbolic state. In the example shown in Figure
3.5, when sequential path B→E is being enumerated after guard mutation, it is
no longer necessary to enumerate all subpaths starting from symbolic state S7. It
should be noted that r should be no less than k. In the case that r < k, the subpaths
from cycle r to the end of the unrolling cycle will be longer than the subpaths from
cycle k to the end of the unrolling cycle, and new states may be reached. Therefore,
all subpaths following the explored symbolic state in cycle r are still required to be
enumerated for test generation. In the example shown in Figure 3.5, the unrolled
depth is t + 1. The state S7 is reached in cycle t− 1 and t. Assuming that we first
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identified S7 as explored symbolic state at cycle t, there are two possible transitions
in cycle t + 1: S7 → S9 and S7 → S10, the k is equal to t. It will not reach S11,
S12, and S13 since the unrolled depth is t + 1. Now if the S7 is reached again in
cycle t − 1 later and r is equal to t − 1, it does not satisfy r >= k. We should
continue to explore all possible subpaths starting from S7 at cycle t − 1. We can
then reach S11, S12, and S13, which are not reached before.
Our main idea is to record/cache the explored symbolic state during path enu-
meration. If all guards after the current cycle are popped out from the constraint
stack, all subpaths following the reached symbolic state in the current cycle have
been explored. We can use symbolic execution to generate the constraints for ex-
plored symbolic state and reached symbolic state. When a new path is enumerated,
the reached symbolic state in every cycle is checked against the previously recorded
explored symbolic states. If the state in the current cycle is an explored symbolic
state, all constraints after the current cycle in the constraint stack are popped out
and will not be mutated for generating a new path. In other words, all subpaths
following the explored symbolic state are pruned.
The pruning of subpaths has no impact on functional coverage of RTL design.
All pruned subpaths are redundant from the perspective of validation test gener-
ation. Given an explored symbolic state S at cycle i, all subpaths starting from
symbolic state S at cycle i to the unrolled cycle are explored. In other words, we
have generated all stimuli to explore these subpaths before. When the state S is
reached again, we no longer need to generate such stimuli. Even if we input the
symbolic constraints of these subpaths to SMT solver, SMT solve still generates
exactly the same assignments as before for these subpaths.
3.7.3 Caching Explored Symbolic State
The symbolic execution engine that we have built can be used for calculating sym-
bolic constraints for reached symbolic states in the concrete path. Note that ex-
plored symbolic states also belong to reached symbolic states. Given a cycle num-
ber and a concrete sequential path, the symbolic execution engine is able to extract
constraints for the reached state in any given cycle. These constraints are in terms of
primary inputs in previous cycles. However, there are two problems if we represent
explored symbolic state symbolically:
1. How can we efficiently cache the explored symbolic state?
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2. How can we efficiently compare a reached symbolic state with the cached
and explored symbolic state?
Directly recording all constraints for a symbolic state is not memory-efficient,
and it is difficult to compare the constraints of two symbolic states. An SMT solver
can be used to compare two symbolic states. However, it is highly inefficient, since
each pair of states will call the SMT solver once. We propose to use a set of taken
branches to represent the symbolic state. When extracting constraints for symbolic
state, symbolic execution traverses the CFG only along the concrete path. The taken
branches on the concrete subpath suffice to determine the generated constraints for
the reached symbolic state. Intuitively, we can use taken branches to represent
reached symbolic state. After we have identified all taken branches, the set of taken
branches is then cached to represent the reached symbolic state. The comparison of
two symbolic states is reduced to the comparison of two sets of taken branches.
It should be noted that not all taken branches on the corresponding subpath are
needed in order to represent a symbolic state. For example, some branches lead to
a constant assignment to a variable, which does not influence the symbolic state.
We use a backward tracing method to identify all necessary taken branches. For a
reached symbolic state at cycle k, we transitively trace the executed assignment
to register variables at cycle k backwards until primary inputs or constants are
reached. That tracing process exactly follows the corresponding subpath. The taken
branches, on which any traced assignment is control dependent, are retained to rep-
resent the reached symbolic state. In general, this tracing process does not have to
go back to the initial cycle because (1) a constant is assigned to a variable on the
subpath, (2) the primary inputs in the intermediate cycle may be used to define a
variable on the subpath.
The use of branches to represent symbolic state is a conservative method. It
means that two symbolic states may be identical although their sets of taken branches
in concrete paths are different. The comparison between two symbolic states re-
quires an SMT solver, as mentioned earlier. In this sense, our method is not able to
completely prune the paths starting from previously explored symbolic states. Two
symbolic states represented by two different sets of branches can be the same states,
a case that our method is not able to detect.
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Figure 3.6: Bitmap encoding of symbolic state. S7 is cached as explored symbolic
state when path p1 is being explored. S7 is reached again in path p2.
3.7.4 Encoding of Explored Symbolic State
In order to efficiently store and compare sets of taken branches, we organize the
taken branches of a reached symbolic state as bitmaps. Each cycle has a branch
bitmap. If the branch is used to represent the symbolic state, its corresponding bit
in the bitmap is set. A reached symbolic state in cycle t can be represented by
several bitmaps of continuous cycles ending at cycle t. When we check a reached
symbolic state against previously explored symbolic state, the branch bitmaps of
the reached symbolic state are also identified through use of the backward tracing
method. The branch bitmaps of the reached symbolic state are then compared with
the bitmaps of cached explored symbolic state.
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Figure 3.7: The algorithm flow of STAR with explored symbolic state caching.
The blocks in blue represent the steps of our explored symbolic state caching
method.
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When comparing a reached symbolic state at cycle r with an explored symbolic
state at cycle k, we require r ≥ k. Without that requirement, the subpath starting
from the reached symbolic state at cycle r would be longer than any subpath starting
from the same explored symbolic state at cycle k. New symbolic states may be
reached by following a subpath starting at cycle r. Therefore, we should not prune
the subpaths starting from cycle r.
In the example shown in Figure 3.6, the explored symbolic state is S7 of cycle
t in sequential path p1. The branch bitmaps are also generated for cycle t − 1 and
cycle t− 2. When we explore the sequential path p2, we can check all the reached
symbolic states in each cycle and compare them with cached and explored symbolic
states. The symbolic state S7 was previously cached, and the corresponding cycle
t + 1 is larger than the cached symbolic state’s cycle number t. We can prune all
the subpaths starting from S7 in sequential path p2. All guards after cycle t are
directly popped out from the constraint stack, and the guards in cycle t are chosen
for mutation.
3.8 Experimental Evaluation of Method II
According to the flow shown in Figure 3.7, we have implemented the explored sym-
bolic state caching in STAR, and also all optimization strategies, with C++, which
interacts with VCS simulator through the direct programming interface(DPI) and
with Yices [57] constraint solver through its C Library Interface. All the following
experiments are performed on a machine with four Intel i5 2.67GHz processor cores
with 16GB of memory running Linux. We present a set of experimental results for
the RTL models from ITC99 and OpenRISC1200 [1]. The OR1200-0/1/2 designs
are instruction cache controller, data cache controller and Wishbone bus interface.
1
3.8.1 Comparison with Original STAR
The second experiment, for which the results are shown in Table 3.3, compared the
enhanced STAR with the original STAR algorithm. We set the maximum runtime to
1We refer to the work in this chapter that augments STAR with explored symbolic state caching,
bitmap encoding of taken branches and the two optimizations as the enhanced STAR in the exper-
imental results.
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Table 3.3: Comparison between the enhanced STAR introduced in this paper and
the original STAR. All runtimes are in seconds. The length of each generated
pattern is equal to the unrolled depth. The runtime limit is set as one hour. The
original STAR is not scalable for most designs.
Bench- Cycles Original STAR Enhanced STAR
mark Runtime Num. of Repeated Runtime Num. of Repeated
Patterns Branches Patterns Branches
b01 10 0.76s 512 563 0.07s 32 35
b06 10 175.77s 131072 205156 0.45s 362 566
b10 10 237.01s 70593 76134 0.80s 248 236
b11 50 >3600s - - 3.66s 367 1684
b11 100 >3600s - - 16.47s 745 6941
b14 10 >3600s - - 1020.46s 61836 15065
or1200-0 50 >3600s - - 20.28s 226 2035
or1200-0 100 >3600s - - 88.94s 375 7532
or1200-1 100 >3600s - - 11.22s 87 957
or1200-2 10 >3600s - - 815.40s 15596 67941
one hour. It can be observed that STAR suffers from path explosion for most of the
designs. That is shown by long runtime over 1 hour. The runtime will increase ex-
ponentially as the unrolled depth increases in STAR. Therefore, the unrolled depth
in this experiment was very small in original STAR. Thus, the original STAR is
unscalable for big, practical designs. For the same circuit, however, the runtime
for enhanced STAR was very small. The runtime of enhanced STAR does not in-
crease exponentially with the unrolling cycles. The average number of branches
repeated by the generated test set is used as a measurement to approximately reflect
repetitive covering of the same design function. It can be observed that the number
of repeated branches is very high in the original STAR, whereas in the enhanced
STAR, the average number of repetitively covered branches is less than 6% of that
in original STAR.
3.8.2 Optimization Effectiveness of Enhanced STAR
The optimization detail column in Table 3.4 shows the optimization effectiveness
of UD chain slicing and local conflict resolution. The explored symbolic state
caching’s effect is also shown in the “caching” column. UD chain slicing reduces
the number of constraints sent to the SMT solver, since unused variables’ defini-
tions will be excluded from current constraints. Local conflict resolution reduces
the number of calls to the SMT solver, since it takes advantage of the static analysis
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Table 3.4: The “UD chain slicing” column represents the percentage of reduced
constraint numbers. The “local conflict resolution” column represents the number
of conflicts detected during the mutation of constraints. The “caching” column
represents the number of detected explored symbolic states.
Bench- Cycles Optimization detail
mark UD chain slicing Local conflict resolution Caching
b01 10 56.7% 31 24
b10 15 43.4% 224 515
b11 100 5.24% 1245 720
or1200-0 100 0.2% 759 370
or1200-1 100 0.22% 280 86
or1200-2 10 23.4% 178 11850
Table 3.5: The coverage, running time, number of patterns and repeated branches
reported by the enhanced STAR. The generated tests by our enhanced STAR have
high structural coverage as well as functional coverage. The enhanced STAR is
also compared with constraint-based random test generation method. The tests
generated by the enhanced STAR have much higher coverage than the tests
generated by constraint based random test generation method.
Bench- STAR with explored symbolic state caching (Constraint-based) random test generation
mark Cycles Bran Cov Path Cov Assert Cov Cycles Bran Cov Path Cov Assert Cov
b01 10 94.44% 94.44% 95.00% 10(x1000) 94.44% 94.44% 95.00%
b06 10 94.12% 93.10% 100% 10(x1000) 94.12% 93.10% 100.00%
b10 10 87.10% 72.73% 5.85% 10(x1000) 83.87% 69.70% 1.34%
b10 50 96.77% 81.82% 96.15% 50(x1000) 93.55% 78.79% 7.17%
b11 50 91.30% 91.30% 12.31% 10(x1000) 82.61% 82.61% 1.01%
b11 100 91.30% 91.30% 25.88% 100(x1000) 82.61% 82.61% 1.01%
b11 150 91.30% 91.30% 35.93% 150(x1000) 82.61% 82.61% 1.51%
b14 10 83.50% 45% 100% 10(x1000) 44.17% 0.30% 66.67%
or1200-0 50 93.75% 74.07% 97.89% 20000 12.50% 7.41% 17.61%
or1200-0 100 93.75% 77.78% 100% - - - -
or1200-1 50 96.55% 76.74% 72.55% 20000 12.00% 5.56% 0%
or1200-1 100 96.55% 79.07% 92.16% - - - -
or1200-2 10 100% 100% 100% 20000 36.14% 50% 38.57%
to check the conflict in the constraints stack instead of sending them to the SMT
solver. The UD chain slicing can reduce the number of constraints by 0.2%–56.7%.
Shown in the “local conflict resolution” column, this optimization is able to find lo-
cal constraint conflicts and successfully avoid unnecessary calls to the SMT solver.
For explored symbolic state caching, it can be observed that there are 24–11850
symbolic states on different designs identified as having been explored before.
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3.8.3 Coverage Evaluation
Structural Coverage Evaluation
The first experiment in Table 3.5 shows the coverage rate for the generated test
patterns by the enhanced STAR. It can be observed that the enhanced STAR can
generate tests that achieve very high structural coverage as long as the unrolled
depth is enough.
The unrolled depth is an important parameter for improving coverage in STAR.
It can be determined by design engineers or by coverage feedback. If the coverage
is not high, it means that the uncovered parts are not reachable within the unrolled
design. We can increase the unrolled depth. The b10 and b11 circuits demon-
strate that relationship between coverage and unrolled depth. When the unrolled
depth increases from 10 to 30, all feasible branches are fully covered. However, for
or1200-2, 10 cycles is enough to cover all branches. The running time demonstrates
the applicability of the enhanced STAR for practical circuits. There is no memory
bottlenecks even if we store the explored symbolic state in the form of bitmaps.
It is worthy of mentioning that infeasible paths can be identified during path
enumeration. This is highly valuable to the verification engineer. In addition, the
enhanced STAR can also be used to check properties on each path.
Functional Coverage Analysis
We also demonstrated that the input patterns generated by the enhanced STAR can
provide high functional coverage although the entire analysis is on the RTL source
code. The RTL code structures reflect the design specifications and STAR is able
to follow these structures to generate meaningful patterns from the perspective of
interesting functionality.
We used the assertion generation tool GoldMine [29] to generate assertions for
several designs. The generated tests from the enhanced STAR were applied to the
design to evaluate the assertion coverage during concrete execution. The asser-
tions are normally used to check whether the design has correctly implemented the
specification. The triggered assertion coverage rate reflects the quality of simula-
tion patterns. The assertion coverage report on the tests generated by the enhanced
STAR is shown in the “assertion coverage” column of Table 3.5. From the results,
we can conclude that the enhanced STAR is able to generate tests that comprehen-
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sively capture the design specification.
In comparison with random generation method, the enhanced STAR has the ad-
vantage of being able to generate all meaningful input to cover all possible design
behaviors, instead of exhausting all possible values of inputs. The generate process
relies on the hints from the RTL structure. Unlike widely used constraint-random
generation method, our enhanced STAR doesn’t have to build the constraints man-
ually.
3.8.4 Comparison with Constraint-based Random Test Generation
Method
In this experiment, we compare the enhanced STAR with constraint-based random
test generation method. We use both methods to generate tests and compare the cor-
responding structural and functional coverage values. Constraint-based random test
generation method is widely used in simulation based verification. It requires the
user to express the legal/valid input requirements in the form of constraint in verifi-
cation testbench. The generator employs a constraint satisfaction technique to solve
the complex constraint and produce input stimuli satisfying the input requirements.
For OpenRISC design, we adopt the constraint-based random test generation test-
bench from the opencore website [1]. For ITC99 benchmark, we generate tests by
randomizing the input variables in RTL designs since we did not find published test-
bench for these designs. We generate 1000 random patterns with different number
of cycles for ITC99 benchmark.
We evaluate the structural coverage as well as functional coverage of both meth-
ods. From the experimental results shown in Table 3.5, it can be observed that the
tests generated by the enhanced STAR always has higher coverage than the tests
generated by other random method. Especially, for the design b14 with a lot of
control branches, it is very difficult for random methods to generate high coverage
tests. Also for constraint based random tests, we found that it always trigger a small
number of paths repeatedly while it is not able to generate tests to cover the whole
design. However, the enhanced STAR is able to generate high coverage tests.
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3.9 Summary
We have presented a scalable, efficient input vector generation strategy that provides
very high structural and functional coverage. The main novelty of this technique
is in the hybrid analysis between concrete simulation data and static analysis of
the RTL code and the heuristical branch guided path exploration. We believe that
this technique is highly powerful and can be applied to large scale contemporary
designs.
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CHAPTER 4
TOWARD COVERAGE CLOSURE: USING
GOLDMINE ASSERTIONS FOR
GENERATING DESIGN VALIDATION
STIMULUS
4.1 Introduction
Simulation-based verification relies on simulating the directed tests or constraint-
random generated tests on the design and then checks the response against specifi-
cation1. Although directed tests capture much of the desired system behavior, they
do not suffice in checking for unintentional erroneous behavior. A phase of ran-
dom input vector generation is employed with an intention to capture infrequent or
unexpected design behavior. Due to the practical infeasibility of exhaustive simu-
lation, the termination point of random simulation is very nebulous. Contemporary
industries often use a numeric value like a few million simulation cycles before
concluding the random simulation phase. Evidently, such a methodology is unsys-
tematic and inconclusive.
In order to evaluate the comprehensiveness of the simulated tests and the degree
to which the design has been simulated, coverage metric is utilized in simulation
to provide a quantitatively measurement. Multiple types of coverage metric are
available in state of art: code coverage, structural coverage and functional coverage
[4]. Despite various coverage metrics, there is no assurance that there are no gaping
holes in the design behavior. Coverage closure, or the process of determining the
completeness of functional coverage of input vectors, is therefore one of the most
daunting challenges of the present day validation environment.
In this chapter, we propose a methodology for attaining coverage closure of de-
sign validation. The methodology is based on GoldMine, an automatic assertion
generation tool that was introduced in [29]. GoldMine uses data mining and static
analysis to generate assertions. A Register Transfer Level (RTL) design is simulated
and the simulation traces are passed as data to GoldMine. GoldMine uses decision
1The word test in this thesis refers to the simulation of functional stimuli on the design instead
of manufacturing level testing.
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tree based supervised learning algorithms to mine rules from the simulated test data.
Each learned rule is considered as a candidate assertion. In order to determine if a
candidate assertion is true for all inputs or not, the candidate assertions is passed
with the design to a formal verification engine. If the formal verification passes a
candidate assertion, it is a system invariant. If not, it generates a counterexample.
We showed generation of complex and useful propositional (combinational) as well
as sequential (temporal) assertions by GoldMine.
We incorporate feedback from the counterexamples generated by GoldMine to
refine the simulation data that was used to generate assertions. The test data refined
by counterexamples is now used to run another pass of GoldMine. The counterex-
amples from assertions that fail formal verification are again fed back into the input
test suite. This iterative refinement continues until a pass of GoldMine where all the
assertions pass the formal check. The test suite that remains at that point, along with
the passing assertions, is the output of our method. We introduce a variation on the
original decision tree data structure that is built incrementally with every iteration.
An incremental decision tree per output adds information from a counterexample
for every failed assertion on its leaf nodes.
Let us now look at how this counterexample guided automatic assertion/test gen-
eration process attains coverage closure. Firstly, in GoldMine, we stipulate that
only 100 per cent confidence candidate assertions need to be considered for formal
verification. Even a single contradicting example in the simulation data is enough
to discard a candidate assertion. This ensures that a failing assertion that produced
a counterexample is never reproduced by GoldMine in successive iterations. Since
every counterexample provides a trace through the system and the addition of new
variables, the corresponding input vector tests for as yet uncovered behavior. Every
iteration, therefore, increases coverage of the test suite. This results in a monotonic
decrease in the design space uncovered by the tests with successive iterations. In
stark contrast to random or directed testing, where arbitrary long phases of cover-
age stagnation can occur, our method always makes forward progress with respect
to test coverage.
Secondly, the limiting condition for this algorithm to converge is when there are
no failing assertions. At this point, for every decision tree corresponding to a design
output, all the assertions in the leaf nodes are true. This provides a deterministic
metric of progress for test development. Until all the assertions for a given output
pass, the test suite can be improved upon.
Thirdly, our method also provides an alternative notion of coverage- one that is
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output-directed. If all the leaves of a decision tree have true assertions, it implies
that the (incremental) decision tree now captures the complete functionality of that
output. The decision tree that was predicting design behavior by observing dynamic
data has completely captured the output logic function at the convergence point. We
provide a proof intuition for the correctness and convergence of our algorithm. The
final decision tree partitions the input space of target output into several equivalent
classes. Each equivalent class will be covered by at least one test pattern. Addition-
ally, since the decision tree extracts information from dynamic, simulation data, it
generates only the reachable state of an output in sequential design and it is not
possible to reach illegal or unreachable states in our method. At the point of con-
vergence, the input test patterns along with the GoldMine assertions represent the
validation artifacts required for achieving coverage closure. We consider the vali-
dation task complete when the entire functionality of all outputs in the design have
been captured, i.e. all the assertions for the outputs are true.
4.2 Counterexample-Based Incremental Decision Trees
The decision tree is a structure that captures the design model from the perspec-
tive of observable behavior. An assertion can be false due to two reasons- either
some behavior has not been observed by the decision tree due to insufficient data,
or some inference has been made erroneously due to selecting a correlated, but not
causal splitting variable. A counterexample trace exposes both these situations by
introducing scenarios that involve at least one new variable. If this new scenario is
now included in the input pattern data observed by the decision tree, firstly it pre-
vents the generation of the same spurious assertion. Secondly, it guides the decision
tree to navigate regions of input space that have not been considered/observed so
far. A beneficial side effect of this process is the increase in coverage of the input
simulation data steadily with every iteration.
In order to disprove an assertion, the new data instance consists of all antecedent
variables of the assertion and some new additional variables. The antecedent vari-
ables’ values are also identical to that in the false assertion and the implied vari-
able’s value is different from that in the false assertion. This characteristic of a
counterexample enables a natural way to add it as new data instance to incremen-
tally build a decision tree instead of rebuilding a decision tree from scratch every
iteration.
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Figure 4.1: Flow of counterexample-based incremental decision tree algorithm for
generating validation stimulus in GoldMine.
1. Incr_Decision_Tree_Building(TreeNode Node)
2. begin
3. if(Error(Node)==0) begin
4. if(Formal_verfn(Node.assertion)==true)
5. return;
6. else begin
7. Ctx_simulation();
8. Recompute_error(Node);
9. end
10. end
11. Node.left=New_node();
12. Node.right=New_node();
13. Select_splitting_variable();
14. Incr_Decision_Tree_Building(Node.left);
15. Incr_Decision_Tree_Building(Node.right);
16. end
Figure 4.2: Incremental Decision Tree Algorithm. The dotted lines represent parts
that are different from GoldMine’s decision tree building approach.
In order to keep track of the improvisation of the decision tree for a given out-
put, we devised an incremental version of the decision tree. The iterative algorithm
using GoldMine (depicted in Figure 4.1) incrementally builds a decision tree for
an output until it reaches the goal of generating only true assertions (no counterex-
amples). The full set of correct assertions, plus the new test patterns created from
counterexamples during iterations, comprise the tangible outputs of the algorithm.
In the recursive incremental decision tree algorithm described in Figure 4.2, the
parts different from GoldMine (lines 4, 7, 8) are outlined. Figure 4.3 shows the a
regular decision tree and an incremental version of it.
A decision tree corresponds to a design output. The formal verification in line 4
is employed to check the correctness of assertion whenever a leaf node is reached
during the incremental building of decision tree. If a candidate assertion is true
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Figure 4.3: Difference between a regular decision tree and an incremental decision
tree for an output z and Boolean inputs a, b and c. The counterexample trace is
included in the bottom row of the trace data.
on design, the algorithm returns as in the regular decision tree. In the example,
assertions A1 and A2 generated from original simulation traces are true on the
design. If the checked assertion is false/spurious, a counterexample is reported by
formal verification. A counterexample, a = 0, b = 1, c = 0 and z = 1, is generated
to contradict the assertion A0 on the decision tree on the left.
The Ctx simulation() function simulates the input pattern created by the coun-
terexample. This lends concrete values to all the splitting variables in previous
iterations of the decision tree in the new simulation run.
Since the counterexample follows the same path as the failed assertion, the de-
cision tree continues splitting when it reaches the leaf node corresponding to that
false assertion. All other paths of the decision tree are kept unchanged. Due to the
new data instance, the mean and error values for each node need to be recomputed
using the Recompute error() function. The error value of the leaf node will no
longer be equal to zero. In the example, the incremental decision tree continues to
split on the leaf node corresponding to false assertion A0 in the regular decision
tree. It can also be observed that the mean and error value are recomputed in this
iteration on the path from the root to the leaf. The algorithm exits when all the
assertions at the leaf nodes of an incremental tree are true.
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4.2.1 Stimulus Generation for Sequential Behavior
During the building of a decision tree, the design should be unrolled until the mining
window length, as defined in Section 2.2.1. The simulation trace used for assertion
mining may have internal register state visible. It may be desirable to have asser-
tions form a single-cycle flat picture of the design, where assertions on the outputs
are functions of internal state values and primary inputs. Assertions can also be
formed for the internal state variables themselves, as functions of other state regis-
ters and inputs. Such a view of the design gives a “next cycle” model, where the
assertions describe internal registers and primary outputs in a similar manner. On
the other hand, it may be desirable to have temporal assertions on the design that
capture only input-output behavior over some number of cycles.
We can generate assertions of both types with this algorithm, based on the mining
window length and visible state provided. Although the assertion spans sequential
behavior over a given length, the generated counterexample may be longer than the
mining window length. This may be to expose sequential behavior where an inter-
mediate state variable can be driven to a specific value over several cycles starting
from the primary input. In this case, the incremental decision tree algorithm con-
siders only the state variables until the farthest back temporal stage, i.e. unrolled
until the mining window length. The concrete values of these variables can be ac-
quired through simulation of the counterexample by the data generator. The result
is a temporal assertion that spans the mining window length, bolstered by single-
cycle assertions using internal state registers to describe the behavior. We discuss
an example of sequential logic coverage in Section 4.5.
The length of mining window will limit the generated form of assertions, but it
has no impact on the full coverage of generated assertions or tests on the whole
design. By using mining window, only primary inputs and state variables until the
farthest back temporal stage in mining window are considered as decision variables
for a target output. However, these state variables are also individually set as tar-
get outputs for assertion generation. As a result, the relations between variables
outside mining window and target output are connected by the assertions on these
intermediate state variables. In other words, we can use all assertions generated
for all primary outputs and state variables within mining window to form longer
assertions. Similarly, we will also generated tests for these state variables. There-
fore, from the perspective of all primary outputs and state variables, full coverage
of generated tests and assertions on the whole design can be guaranteed.
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4.2.2 Final Decision Tree
Our counterexample based incremental decision tree building algorithm is a pro-
cess of approximation and refinement of an output function. If the complete func-
tionality of an output was available to the decision tree in the form of simulation
data, it would completely represent the output function. Such a truth table (or state
transition relation for sequential designs) would result in a complete decision tree.
However, such an exhaustive enumeration of input patterns is not feasible to obtain
as test data. Therefore, the decision tree tries to approximately predict the logic
function of an output with available data. Faulty predictions are exposed and used
for corrective purposes through counterexamples. This makes future predictions
more accurate. The point where all the predictions are accurate is where all the
assertions of the decision tree are true. At this point of convergence, this final de-
cision tree represents the complete functionality of an output in the design. It is
important to note that final decision trees include only the legal, reachable states of
the design. The reachability analysis of decision tree is presented in Section 4.3.
The input patterns required to generate such a final decision tree are actually suffi-
cient for completely covering the functionality of that output. This coverage notion
is formally presented in Section 4.4.
4.3 Algorithm Completeness and Convergence
Analysis
In this section, we prove that our counterexample based test generation algorithm
converges and at the point of convergence for any output, the corresponding deci-
sion tree for that output represents the complete functionality of that output.
We present some definitions that are required for proving the mentioned claims.
Let us consider an RTL design whose state transition graph (Kripke structure [94])
model is depicted by M . We will use M synonymously for the design as well
its model. Let there be N inputs in M . An input pattern is a unique assignment
of values to inputs of M . Input patterns can be combinational (single cycle) or
sequential (across multiple cycles). An input pattern set is a set of all such input
patterns in use for a design validation effort.
The input pattern set for M forms the data for the decision tree algorithm. We
define decision trees as used in our context.
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Definition 1 A decision tree Dzfor an output z is a binary tree where each node
corresponds to a unique splitting variable that is statistically correlated to z. A
path for a decision tree is a sequence of nodes from the root node to a leaf node.
In general, decision trees need not be binary trees, but since our variables are in
the Boolean domain, there are only two possible values of each (one-bit) variable.
A decision tree is a data structure used in predictive modeling to map observations
about a variable of interest to inferences about the variable’s target value. In our
case, every output of M is a variable of interest. Every output has a corresponding
decision tree that makes inferences about the output’s target value (true and false).
These inferences are made at the leaves of the decision tree, where the branches
leading from the root to the leaf represent conjunctions of splitting (correlated)
variables. These inferences are also considered likely or candidate assertions for
the concerned output.
Definition 2 A candidate assertion AC of Dz is a proposition consisting of an an-
tecedent and a consequent. The antecedent is a Boolean conjunction of propositions
(variable, value) pairs along a path in Dz. The consequent is also a proposition:
(z, value) pair where the value of output z is the mean value on the path’s leaf
node.
In the next phase of GoldMine, model checking [5] 2 is used to compute the
truth or falsehood of a candidate assertion. In case a candidate assertion is false, a
counterexample or simulation trace through the design is generated, that exemplifies
the violation of the assertion.
Definition 3 A true assertion AT is a candidate assertion such that M |= G(AT ).
In other words, true assertion AT globally holds on model M .
Definition 4 The support of a Boolean conjunction y, which is denoted as support(y),
is the set of variables in y.
Definition 5 If M |6= G(AC), the conjunction of variable value pairs in the coun-
terexample is represented by χAC such that support(χAC ) ⊃ support(AC).
2We categorize the formal verification algorithms in SMV and Cadence IFV under the umbrella
of model checking for this discussion.
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Since the counterexample represents a valid simulation trace through the design
that is not yet a part of the current input pattern set, it is added to the input pattern
set. An incremental version of the decision tree is used in order to keep track of the
coverage. The incremental decision tree maintains the ordering of variables as the
decision tree from a previous iteration for all the variables until the leaf nodes. If
the counterexample in the current iteration coincides with a path in the incremental
decision tree, the variable(s) added by the counterexample will now be used as the
splitting variable(s) at the leaf nodes of the incremental decision tree.
Definition 6 An incremental decision tree Iz for an output z and a previous deci-
sion treeDz, is a decision tree such that the variable ordering of all variables inDz
is preserved until a leaf node. Every variable v in support(χAC ) − support(AC)
becomes a splitting variable at the leaf node of Iz along the path of AC .
Definition 7 The final decision tree F z is an incremental decision tree such that
for all assertions AC of F z, M |= G(AC).
Definition 8 The logic cone of an output z in M is the set of variables that affect
z.
The logic cone is deciphered by computing the transitive closure of all variables
pertaining to an output. In GoldMine, we do a logic cone analysis for every output.
The decision tree for an output is therefore restricted to the variables in its logic
cone, or the relevant variables with respect to that output.
Theorem 1 It takes finite iterations to reach F z for any given Iz.
Proof: Let us run the incremental algorithm for k iterations, then the maximum
number of new nodes added to Iz is 2k. The maximum total number of nodes in
Iz after k iterations is 2k+1-1. Let n ⊆ N be the number of variables in the logic
cone of z. The maximum size for Dz by construction and by definition of binary
trees is 2n+1-1. Therefore, 2k+1-162n+1-1. This bounds the size of the incremental
decision tree.
It may be noted that since we are restricting the decision tree for an output to
focus only on the relevant variables, the maximum size of the decision tree is not
exponential in the size of the entire set of inputsN , but in n. In practice, we observe
that n << N .
Theorem 2 The final decision tree F z corresponds to the entire functionality of z.
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Proof: Assuming a final decision tree F z does not correspond to the entire func-
tionality of z, then there is at least one input pattern to reach a state of z that does
not correspond to a path in F z, so at least one AC of F z should be such that
M |6= G(AC). But this is false by definition of F z. Therefore, the assumption
is contradicted.
The above theorems make a powerful statement about the coverage of our method.
When all the assertions are true, the complete functionality of an output is captured.
These theorems are applicable to both combinational and sequential behaviors. For
sequential behavior, we can unroll the circuit for mining window length and each
variable in different cycle is annotated with cycle index. Therefore, it can also be
viewed as a combinational logic. The only difference is that the number of input
variables in logic cone of target output will linearly increase with the mining win-
dow length.
Specially for sequential design, the final decision tree is able to include only
reachable states and all generated assertions are non-vacuous. Reachable states
are the union set of all possible states that can be reached from initial states. In
general, reachable states are a subset of whole state space due to the constraints
on state variables. We will formally prove these features of final decision tree in
Section 4.8.
4.4 Coverage Analysis
In the simplest terms, what we want from a coverage effort is exposure of the en-
tire legal, reachable design behavioral space to examination so that this space can
be validated against a statement of desired behavior. We posit that our algorithm
using GoldMine and iterative refinement of the decision tree achieves exactly that
property: when the final decision tree for an output has been constructed, the in-
put patterns or assertions generated by decision tree are artifacts that represent the
complete functionality of that output. Our notion of coverage, then is output di-
rected, as opposed to traditional assertion based coverage or code structure based
coverage [95]. For each such target output, we consider the truth table description
of the output behavior where each input combination corresponds to a value for the
output. The coverage referred to per output, then, is the input space coverage, i.e.
the number of truth table entries covered. The entire input space of a target output
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is divided into several classes. We assert that the generated GoldMine tests are able
to cover each class at least once. With respect to this notion of coverage, we can
achieve functional coverage closure for every output in the design.
4.4.1 Coverage Definition
We provide some definitions that elucidate our notion of coverage for tests. The
coverage notion of our generated tests is based on all entries in the truth table of a
target output. We define a test to have input space coverage if it corresponds to an
entry in the truth table of the target output. The complete functionality of a target
output is exactly represented by the truth table.
Now let us take a look at the mechanics of how the GoldMine test generation
process is able to partition the input space of a target output. The decision tree
in every iteration partitions the input data set (tests) until it can find a “fit”, i.e. it
reaches the leaf node. The partitions are created on the basis of data values per
variable. Since the data values are Boolean for single bit variables, the partitioning
criteria be thought of as propositions (true/false values of a variable). Every branch
in the decision tree partitions the input data on the basis of a proposition being true
or false. Every successive level of the tree partitions the input space further, until it
reaches a leaf node. In terms of propositions, the “path constraint” in a tree leading
from the root to a leaf is a conjunction of the corresponding propositions from root
to leaf node. Each path from the root to the leaf node, then, represents a partition of
the input test set. When this decision tree is grown incrementally, the final decision
tree will partition the final set of tests. Then, every path from root to leaf divides
the tests into an equivalence class, such that the path constraint is the same for all
the tests in the class.
The decision tree is not deterministic in its decisions. It makes optimistic deci-
sions in the dataset, and predicts that a certain splitting variable is related to the tar-
get output. If this optimistic prediction is true, then it uncovers a relationship among
input variables and the target output. This relationship usually has fewer variables
than the tests from which it was derived. Hence the tests created by feeding back
the true assertion relationships into the test suite are more compact than the tests
used initially. This is the reason why the test suite at the end of the final decision
tree generation is not just complete, but much more compact than the entire truth
table representation for the target output. For example, if in the function z = a ∧ b
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the initial test set is < a = 0, b = 0 >, < a = 1, b = 0 > and < a = 1, b = 1 >.
The decision tree will make an optimistic prediction that a = 0 ⇒ z = 0. This
true assertion leads to the test < a = 0, b = X >, that now covers the table entries:
< a = 0, b = 0 > and < a = 0, b = 1 > for output z.
Due to the optimistic prediction, the path constraint between the root and leaf
node can correspond to multiple truth table entries. In the above example, the
constraint a = 0 corresponds to two truth table entries < a = 0, b = 0 > and
< a = 0, b = 1 >. We established above that the input test set is partitioned by a
path constraint. Therefore, the path constraint of a leaf node represents a set of tests
as well as a set of truth table entries. We can then say that in a final decision tree for
a target output, the tests represented by a leaf node completely cover the truth table
entries that correspond to the path constraint of the leaf node. This is our notion of
coverage.
The final decision tree partitions the input test data into several equivalence
classes. Each leaf node corresponds to a set of truth table entries. This partition
is exclusive or the set of truth table entries at one leaf node does not intersect with
any other leaf node; and complete, or the union of all sets of entries on all leaf
nodes of the tree consists of the full truth table. We prove these two properties.
Consider a design M with input alphabet Σ and outputs O. Let a target output
be z ⊂ O, and I ⊂ Σ where I is the set of variables in the logic cone of z. Let the
input test set for the final decision tree Dz for z be τ , which includes initial tests
and the generated counterexamples during incremental process. Let N be the set of
leaf nodes and E the set of edges in Dz.
In a decision tree, each edge is associated with a unique true or false proposition
with respect to a variable in I . Each proposition is a (variable, value) pair. Each
node of the decision tree can be reached by following a path (sequence of edges)
starting at the root.
Definition 9 The conjunction of propositions on every edge from the root of a de-
cision tree to a target node is the path constraint of that node. We denote the path
constraint of a node n as Pn.
If n is a leaf node, Pn is the same as the antecedent of a GoldMine assertion and
does not include the consequent (Definition 2).
The output function f such that z = f(I) can be represented as a truth table.
Each truth table entry is a unique set of values for variables in I . Let Θ be the set
of all truth table entries for f . The set of variable assignments in a truth table entry
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can be examined for consistency (or satisfiability) with respect to a path constraint
in the decision tree.
Definition 10 A truth table entry θ is said to be consistent with a path constraint
Pk if for all common variables v, the values in θ and P are equal. Then, for every
variable in θ that belongs to I \ v, the value is X .
Let θn be the set of all such truth table entries that are consistent with path con-
straint Pn for a leaf node n of Dz. We can say the truth table entries θn correspond
to node n.
Lemma 1: The path constraint of a leaf node is unique.
Let us assume the path constraint is non-unique. Consider two leaf nodes i and j,
such that i 6=j. Then by the definition of path constraint, the conjunction of proposi-
tions from root to node i would coincide with the conjunction of propositions from
root to node j. Given that every edge has a unique proposition, this cannot happen
unless i and j are equal. So there is at least one edge that diverges to reach the other
leaf node.
We want to show that the truth table entries corresponding to two different nodes
are not coincident. Or, that a truth table entry can correspond to exactly one leaf
node.
Theorem 3 ∀ leaf nodes i, j ∈ N and i 6= j, θi ∩ θj = ∅.
Proof intuition: Let us assume that θi ∩ θj 6= ∅. Then, there exists an entry e
such that e ∈ θi and e ∈ θj for different i,j. This means that e is consistent with
Pi as well as Pj (from Definition 10). From Lemma 1, this means that i and j are
coincident. Hence, there is a contradiction.
We now want to show that the union of the truth table entries corresponding to
all the leaf nodes in the final decision tree is exhaustive.
Theorem 4 Let θi be a subset of the entries in Θ. For a final decision tree Dz for
output z,
Θ =
⋃
i∈N
θi. (4.1)
Proof intuition: By construction,
⋃
i∈N θi⊆Θ. To show equality, we need to show
that
⋃
i∈N θi⊇Θ, i.e. given any entry e in Θ, ∃ i∈N and e∈θi. We need to show
that each truth table entry corresponds to a leaf node in the decision tree. For any
entry e, we can find if it is consistent with a path constraint Pk of a leaf node the
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final decision tree. If it is consistent with Pk, then it corresponds to the leaf node k.
If it is inconsistent with Pk, then there is at least one variable that has contradicting
values between e and Pk. From the construction of a decision tree, the contradicting
value would be along an edge on a different path than that leading to k. This means
that e would be consistent with that path, and therefore correspond to its leaf node.
From the theorems above, we see that the final decision tree divides the truth
table entries into several equivalence classes. Each equivalence class is a set of
table entries and corresponds to one leaf node in the tree. Within each equivalence
class, the table entries all have the same value on z.
Each test in τ used for decision tree building is a vector of assignments to all
variables in I . If we simulate this test on the design, we can also generate a concrete
value on z. It should be noted that some input variables may be X in initial tests
or counterexamples. The decision tree algorithm randomly assigns a concrete value
on these don’t care variables.
Definition 11 The test in τ is said to be consistent with path constraint Pn if for all
common variables v, the values in the test and Pn are equal.
Let τn be the set of tests that are consistent with path constraint Pn for a leaf node
n of Dz. we can also say the tests τn corresponds to node n.
Definition 12 Given a leaf node i in a final decision tree Dz for an output z, the
truth table entries θi corresponding to i, form an equivalence class such that all of
them have the same value for z. The set of tests τi corresponding to node i is said
to completely cover this equivalence class.
In principle, we can virtually view truth table entries as the input space of target
output, the final decision tree automatically divides the input space into classes.
Each class can be thought as a design behavior of target output. There is at least
one generated test to cover each class. The above theorems and definitions are also
applicable to sequential logic and all truth table entries of z would only include
the reachable entries where assignments to state variables are reachable from initial
states.
The input space (truth table) coverage of the tests on one leaf node is equal to the
percentage of truth table entries on that node. We only need to know the number(m)
of variables included in the antecedent of corresponding assertion. We denote the
total number of input variables in logic cone as n. Then the coverage will be calcu-
lated as 2(n−m)/2n=1/2m. In previous example, the coverage of < a = 0, b = X >
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is 50%. The total input space coverage of tests on all leaf nodes with true assertions
is just the sum of coverage on every such leaf node due to the exclusive property.
4.4.2 Coverage Closure
GoldMine’s counterexample based approach for test generation ensures a mono-
tonic decrease of the uncovered design space with each iterative refinement. In
each iteration, the generated counterexample is able to cover a new design func-
tion which has not been covered before by previous patterns. The newly activated
function can be in the form of conditional expression, branch or assignment state-
ments in the RTL design. Moreover, the existence of a final decision tree as a goal
provides a deterministic metric of progress through the refinement process. This is
a significant improvement over random testing, whose coverage graph can be ar-
bitrarily shaped, often resulting in plateaus where no progress is being made. In
fact, due to the frequent lack of feedback in the random test generation process, it
is difficult to acquire a satisfactory functional coverage picture in this process.
× × × ×
×
× × ×
× × × ×
×
× ××
× × × ×
× × × ×
× × × ×
× × ××
Ctx
_a
_1
Ctx
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_2
Ctx_b_1Ctx_b_2
(a) (b)
(c)
: coverage hole
× : covered space
: true assertion
× × ×
×
: false assertion
Figure 4.4: The coverage of input patterns in the functional design space for an
output.
A pictorial example of this process is shown in Figure 4.4. The state space for
a single output can be visualized as a discrete 2D plot, where the functional points
covered by the starting input test patterns are marked. Each GoldMine assertion
generated includes a set of variable-value pairs according to their statistical support
in the patterns.
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Every assertion is therefore shown to span a group of points in the output state
space by rectangular boxes. This grouping by assertions into “regions” in the output
space is similar to a Karnaugh map notation, but this includes sequential behavior
as well. For the assertions that are true, the design region has been covered by
the input test patterns in that iteration. For the ones that are false, there is always
at least one additional design point that was uncovered by the input test pattern.
This design point is exposed by a violation of the assertion. Each counterexample
(Ctx) acts a bridge between an uncovered design point in (a) and a covered design
point as in (b). However, the covered design point in (b) forms a part of the region
covered by an assertion, that generates a counterexample again. All previously true
assertions do not perturb the coverage process and are retained in every phase. As a
side effect, the original, general assertion is divided into multiple, more precise and
subtle assertions.
We notice here that the GoldMine test generation strategy goes from uncovered
regions in one iteration to covered regions in another, until it converges at all as-
sertions passing as in (c). This is distinct from a traditional validation flow, where
all the known regions are covered first, and an advancement is attempted toward
uncovered regions.
4.5 Example: Two Port Arbiter
In this section, we will demonstrate GoldMine’s incremental counterexample re-
finement using a 2 port arbiter. This arbiter uses round robin logic with priority on
port 0. In our example, we set the mining window length to two in GoldMine to
generate temporal properties of the port 0 access signal, gnt0. Each variable has
cycle annotations t − 1, t and t + 1. In this example, the target output for which
GoldMine generates assertions is gnt0(t+1). Besides primary inputs, state variable
until farthest back temporal stage(Section 4.2) gnt0(t − 1) is also included in the
logic cone. When the tool outputs assertions, for any given signal sig, sig(t− 1) is
transformed to sig, sig(t) is transformed to Xsig and sig(t + 1) is transformed to
XXsig.
The simulation data shown in Figure 4.5 represents a directed test that a valida-
tion engineer might write. We will show how the A-Miner makes inferences about
the design and is aided by the counterexample refinement to improve assertion and
directed test quality.
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always @ (posedge clk)
if (rst) begin
gnt0 <= 0;
gnt1 <= 0;
end else begin                                     
gnt0 <= (~gnt0 & req0) | 
(gnt0 & req0 & ~req1);
gnt1 <= (gnt0 & req1) | 
(~gnt0 & ~req0 & req1);
end
req0
(t-1)
req1
(t-1)
req0
(t)
req1
(t)
gnt0
(t)
gnt0
(t+1)
0 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 1
Figure 4.5: Arbiter: RTL and simulation trace.
In this example, we turn off the reset signal since we are interested only in normal
behaviors under the condition that reset is not asserted. It may be noted that in
cases where the reset behavior is interesting, we can generate assertions with the
reset signal in the antecedent, by artificially applying the reset signal once every
thousand cycles in the initial simulations. Our decision tree data structure starts
with a root node which contains all examples and the examples are partitioned into
likely behavior by the time they reach the leaf nodes. The initial structure of the
decision tree is represented in Figure 4.6.
M: 0.50
E: 0.50
M: 1
E: 0
M: 0
E: 0
req0(t-1)=1req0(t-1)=0
A0× A1×
True Assertion
False Assertion
√:
×:
gnt0
Figure 4.6: Initial decision tree
A0: ¬req0⇒XXgnt0
A1: req0⇒XX¬gnt0
The two candidate assertions generated above are proven false by formal verifi-
cation. A counterexample is produced for each failed assertion containing the series
of states that will contradict this assertion. We simulate these counterexamples and
add the results to our example set as show below. The decision tree continues to
grow since the error is greater than 0 for each node. This means that the confi-
dence is no longer 100% for A0 and A1. The A-Miner finds four more candidate
assertions based on the new data.
A2: ¬req0∧(X¬req0)⇒XX¬gnt0
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A0 Counterexample A1 Counterexample
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Figure 4.7: First iteration: Counterexamples and refined tree
A3: ¬req0∧(Xreq0)⇒XXgnt0
A4: req0∧(X¬req1)⇒XXgnt0
A5: req0∧(Xreq1)⇒XX¬gnt0
After one iteration shown in Figure 4.7, A2 and A3 are verified to be true. How-
ever, A4 and A5 both fail formal verification and a counterexample is produced for
each. We again simulate the counterexamples and add them to our data set. The
refined tree is shown in Figure 4.8.
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Figure 4.8: Second iteration: Counterexamples and refined tree
A6: req0∧(X¬req0)∧(X¬req1)⇒XX¬gnt0
A7: req0∧(Xreq0)∧(X¬req1)⇒XXgnt0
A8: req0∧(¬req1)∧(Xreq1)⇒XX¬gnt0
A9: req0∧req1∧(X¬req0)∧(Xreq1)⇒XX¬gnt0
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A10:req0∧req1∧(Xreq0)∧(Xreq1)⇒XXgnt0
A6, A7, A8, and A9 are verified as true. However, A10 is shown to be false
even though all primary inputs have been assigned. In this case, despite gnt0(t−1)
being in the logic cone of gnt0(t + 1), it is not included in the antecedent of the
assertion. This is due to the fact that the error function on gnt0(t − 1) does not
give a minimum value comparing with that on other variables. Consequently, the
decision tree algorithm would not pick up gnt0(t−1) for splitting. At this point, we
allow the A-Miner to search the state variables in the farthest back temporal stage
for a suitable split by incorporating the counterexample. In our example, we add
the signal gnt0(t−1) to the search. The A-Miner makes this split and produces the
full tree below and A11 and A12 are newly generated true assertions, as shown in
Figure 4.9.
M: 0.50
E: 0.50
…
M: 0
E: 0 M: 1E: 0
gnt0(t-1)=0 gnt0(t-1)=1
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(t)
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(t)
gnt0
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A10×
A12√A11√
A10 Counterexample
Figure 4.9: Third iteration: full tree
A11: req0∧req1∧(Xreq0)∧(Xreq1)∧(¬gnt0)⇒XX(¬gnt0)
A12: req0∧req1∧(Xreq0)∧(Xreq1)∧gnt0⇒XXgnt0
After the assertions are generated by incremental counterexample refinement, the
counterexamples can be added to the original directed test to improve coverage of
the test. The series of inputs for each counterexample is simply added to the current
input stimulation in the directed test. The improvement in expression coverage of
each counterexample iteration is shown in Table 4.1.
In this example, the generated assertions or tests cover the temporal behavior
within two cycles. However, these two cycles’ assertions can be used to form the
assertions covering behaviors outside mining window. For example, by using an-
tecedent conditions in A0 to replace the gnt0 in antecedent condition of A11, we
can compose an assertion spanning to four cycles.
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Table 4.1: Coverage of arbiter design
Counterexample Input space Expression
iteration Coverage(%) Coverage(%)
0 0 70
1 50 80
2 93.75 90
3 100 90
4.6 Experimental Results
To evaluate the quality of our method, we implement the incremental decision tree
building algorithm and generate validation stimulus and assertions for several de-
sign modules. These include some simple synthetic blocks we created to test var-
ious features, and some designs from the Rigel RTL design [96], the OpenRisc
design [1] and the SpaceWire design [97]. In the rest of the experiment part, we
will refer to our technique as counterexample based GoldMine tests. These designs
are used for the following experiments:
1. Study the coverage increasing with the number of counterexample iterations
2. Limit studies of the counterexample method
(a) Zero-pattern seed: Starting with no test patterns and iterate
(b) Full-coverage seed: Starting with patterns that already provided 100%
coverage using standard coverage metric
3. Bug finding: Injecting errors in RTL and using the generated assertions/stimulus
as a regression suite to detect the injected errors
4. Comparison to standard coverage: Using current standard coverage metric to
evaluate the test generated by our counterexample-based incremental method
We implemented the incremental decision tree algorithm using Java. Cadence
IFV is employed as the formal verification engine and NC-verilog is used for sim-
ulation to generate a database for data mining. All experiments are run on an Intel
Core 2 Quad Q6600 with 4GB of memory.
The runtime for this algorithm is proportional to the number of counterexample
generated. The size of the design, number of initial samples, and maximum number
of iterations all affect the number of counterexamples. In this experiment, most
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test generation complete in 1-2 hours on our implementations. Memory usage is
proportional to the number of examples and nodes. We can dynamically prune
nodes at the end of the iteration. The used memory of all tests is below the 2GB.
4.6.1 Coverage Increase by Counterexample Iteration
The first experiment demonstrates the increase in coverage by assertions as the
counterexample algorithm progresses, showing a monotonic increase in coverage.
The experiment is performed on SpaceWire codec state machine circuit and Rigel
write back stage design. The original test suite can be in the form of a directed test
or a completely random input stimulus test. In this experiment, we simply use the
initial random input patterns. In each iteration, any spurious assertions are refined
using counterexamples until the A-Miner has generated a true assertion. The input
space coverage and industrial standard coverage metric are used in this experiment.
The input space coverage of each true assertion referring to corresponding output
is calculated by considering the percentage of the truth table entries that is covered
by that assertion. We have summarized these coverage results in Figure 4.10 and
Figure 4.11.
In Figure 4.10, the input space coverage referring to each output was chosen to
measure the validation process. Since each assertion compactly covers multiple
concrete patterns of input space, we calculate the input space coverage referring to
an output by accumulating the input space coverage of all generated assertions on
that output. The results show a consistent increase in the input space covered by the
assertions in each iteration.
In Figure 4.11, we tested the line, conditional, branch, toggle and FSM coverage
of the counterexample generated tests. Redundant statements, unreachable states
and other RTL characteristics often limit some kind of coverage to achieve 100%,
but a steady increase in such coverage is an indicator of monotonic progress in the
quality of the assertion/tests generated by our algorithm.
We also notice that the coverage increases quickly in the early iteration and
slowly in the later iteration. However, in contrast to the tradition industrial flow,
our method can guarantee coverage gain in each step until full coverage is reached.
In the worst case, the maximum number of iterations required to reach full coverage
is equal to the number of input variables in the logic cone of corresponding output
since at least one variable is added to the original assertion as counterexample to
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Figure 4.10: Input space coverage of each output increasing over the number of
counterexample iteration on SpaceWire-FSM design.
Figure 4.11: Standard coverage increasing over the number of counterexample
iteration on SpaceWire-FSM design.
disprove the spurious assertion.
4.6.2 Zero Initial Patterns
The second experiment is a limit study showing that the counterexample algorithm
works even when no original directed or random test suite exists. The lack of any
patterns would begin the procedure with a simple assertion of the form “output
always 0”. Figure 4.12 shows the increase in coverage for each design as the algo-
rithm progresses. Even without initial test patterns, the counterexample method is
able to create a test suite that achieves good coverage with few iterations. This indi-
cates that this method may be a useful methodology to jump start a module design
environment by creating many tests that can then be run on the testbench to check
against the design specification.
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Figure 4.12: Coverage increasing by iteration starting from zero pattern on
SpaceWire-FSM design.
Table 4.2: Improvement on test suites that have high coverage according to
standard metrics. The initial test suites have achieved high coverage on some
standard metrics. Counterexample based GoldMine tests are still able to increase
the coverage on other standard metrics. Line, Condition(Cond), Toggle, FSM, and
Branch Coverage metrics are shown as standard coverage metrics.
Design Initial test patterns with high coverage GoldMine tests
Name Line Cond Toggle FSM Branch Line Cond Toggle FSM Branch
dcache ctrl 100% 78.87% 98.77% 100% 93.75% 100% 78.87% 98.77% 100% 100%
icache ctrl 100% 93.13% 99.11% 81.25% 96.55% 100% 93.13% 99.11% 93.75% 100%
write back 98.18% 30.24% 96.36% - 96.30% 100% 49.76% 98.46% - 100%
As an extreme case in this experiment, the output is indeed always 0. There
will be no test for this case using our algorithm since the first assertion has already
captured the output function. From the perspective of design, all the logic designs
for this output are redundant. We do not need to generate any tests to cover a
redundant logic.
4.6.3 Improvement on Patterns that Have 100% Coverage with
Standard Metrics
The third experiment explores how our counterexample based GoldMine test gen-
eration can improve the test sets that have high coverage according to standard
coverage metrics. The metrics we consider are line coverage, conditional coverage,
toggle coverage, FSM coverage and branch coverage [95]. It is well known that
any one of these metrics are not sufficient in expressing the extent of coverage of
input test patterns. To underscore the limiting case of this argument, we consider
test patterns that have 100% coverage according to at least one of the standard cov-
erage metrics. Our goal is to enhance these test suites by adding test patterns. This
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is particularly useful when a block is declared as having been covered completely
according to some tests, and detecting coverage holes is difficult. Table 4.2 shows
that the data cache controller, instruction cache controller, and write back modules
of the OpenRisc [1], whose tests report high line and branch coverage. Using our
GoldMine test strategy, we are able to enhance the tests to increase the FSM cov-
erage on data cache controller and instruction cache controller modules. For write
back module, we enhance the line, condition, toggle and branch coverage. This
experiment shows that (i) despite high coverage numbers using standard metrics,
there is still scope for improvement in the coverage and (ii) this improvement can
be detected and achieved using GoldMine tests.
4.6.4 Bug Detection by Generated Assertions/Stimuli
This experiment uses assertions to detect bugs in the design. We use a systematic
mutation-based method to test the assertions’ ability to detect bugs. The RTL code
is mutated and then all generated assertions are then formally check on the mutated
design model. The failed assertions detect a corresponding bug on the mutated de-
sign. We inject four types of errors [98]: operator replacement, variable to constant
replacement, constant replacement and relational operator replacement. For each
output, we inject the errors into its logic cone and then formally check all generated
assertions on mutated design. The experiment is conducted on the data/instruction
cache control and write back modules of OpenRisc [1]. For each injected error,
there are always many assertions that can detect the error. Table 4.3 shows the
number of injected errors and average percentage of generated assertions that can
detect these injected errors. It can be observed that our generated assertions/stimuli
effectively capture the potential bug in the design since every injected error will be
detected by an average of more than 33% of the generated assertions. Although
GoldMine targets at single output for assertion generation, the generated tests will
be simulated on the whole design and may have impact on other outputs. The bug
involving multiple outputs can thus be activated by our tests.
4.6.5 Comparison to Standard Coverage
In this experiment, we compare the counterexample generated test against directed
tests using standard coverage metric. Final coverage values for three Rigel’s CPU
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Table 4.3: Detecting of injected errors by assertions on OpenRisc module.
Output No. of No. of Percentage of assertions
Signal Assertions Injected Errors detecting errors
biu read 3260 4 60%
burst 1783 5 74.41%
dcram we 388 10 67.78%
first hit ack 29 9 33%
hitmiss eval 9 12 58.33%
wb cyc 42 20 56.43%
wb we 18 10 67.78%
wb adr 68 13 62.22%
Figure 4.13: Coverage comparison between directed test and counterexample
method on Rigel design.
pipeline designs are included, showing the coverage achieved by these two methods.
The directed test suite from Rigel is written by the designers.
Figure 4.13 shows comparisons to the GoldMine’s counterexample generated test
method and directed test method, applied to different designs. It can be observed
that our counterexample based test generation method can help directed test to con-
tinually improve coverage. For example, the condition coverage in fetch stage module
is improved from 63.33% to 95.3%.
4.7 Practical Limitation to Achieve 100% Coverage
Theoretically, the counterexample-based incremental method can reach 100% in-
put space coverage for all target designs. However, there are four implementation
limitations which can decrease the maximum coverage attained.
The first issue occurs if there is inconsistency of counterexample’s simulation
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traces between the simulator and the formal verifier. Occasionally, the generated
simulation traces by simulator do not follow the counterexample produced by for-
mal verifier. The solution to this problem is to have the formal verifier directly
produce the waveform of the counterexample. This ensures that the expected coun-
terexample will always show up in the waveform. The disadvantage of this method
is that the formal verifier must have the ability to directly produce a waveform, so
free tools such as SMV cannot be used.
The second issue preventing full input space coverage is that the implementation
only tries to generate sequential (temporal) assertions or combinational assertions.
It does not specifically differentiate combinational output and sequential output.
There are a couple of potential solutions to this problem. One is that the output can
be treated as a separate combinational output and sequential output. This should
result in full input space coverage for either the combinational version or the se-
quential version of the output.
The third implementation issue is that data mining used in GoldMine can be inef-
fective in certain designs leading to high runtime, more iterations and poor assertion
quality. For example, outputs that represent data path tend to not have optimal re-
sults. This happens because individual bits are used in the data mining process and
it is difficult to find relationships among a large number of bits. The solution to
this problem may be to use a higher level abstraction instead of data mining the
individual bits. We plan to resolve this issue in future work.
The final implementation issue is the limited capacity of the formal verification
tool. Even though there are many well designed formal verification tools, the state
space explosion problem can prevent the tool from giving a definite answer about
the validity of an assertion. This is what Incisive Formal Verifier refers to as an
explored assertion. The effect on GoldMine is that the explored assertion may not
be a true assertion and should not be added to the solution set. In current imple-
mentation, the explored assertions must be treated as failed assertions that cannot
be refined. The potential solution to this problem is using abstraction to reduce the
complexity of model checking.
4.8 Discussion about Final Decision Tree
In GoldMine, when all assertions on decision tree are true assertion, the decision
tree converges to final decision tree (FDT) and represents the function of target
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output.
As an alternative to FDT, binary decision diagrams (BDD) [99] is widely adopted
to compactly represent Boolean function. However, FDT is dynamically and incre-
mentally constructed from concrete simulation data while BDD is statically built
from logic function. This dynamic and incremental building characteristic gives
rise to FDT several unique characteristics in this special context of assertion/test
generation.
Due to the dynamic building characteristic, FDT is able to include the reachable
states in the function of target output and each generated assertion can be triggered
by at least one reachable state. In addition, as an implementation optimization, we
can prune the subtree with all true assertions on leaf nodes during the incremen-
tal construction process of FDT. In this section, we first compare BDD and FDT
in terms of reachable states computation and then give formal proofs of the FDT
characteristic of including reachable states and finally describe the dynamic pruning
process of FDT.
4.8.1 Reachable States of Sequential Design
For the target output in a sequential design, FDT actually reconstructs one logic
function from dynamic simulation data. The primary input and state variables
within the output’s logic cone consist of parameters of this logic function. Mean-
while, we can use BDD to represent the output’s logic function in design in terms
of the same parameters. The difference between these two logic functions lies in
the including of reachable states.
In sequential design, not all states are reachable from initial states. Using BDD to
compute reachability states involves the fix point computation [100]. Unfortunately,
this fixpoint computation always suffers from state space explosion. Without this
fix point computation, simply using BDD to build the function of target output is
not able to include the reachable states. If we view each path from root to terminal
node in BDD as one assertion, some assertions may correspond to unreachable
states and are thus vacuous. However, FDT is capable of automatically including
the reachable states constraints (theorem 5) and all generated assertions are non-
vacuous (theorem 6).
The advantage of FDT in this context comes from the using of dynamic simu-
lation data and formal verifier. The decision tree partitions the simulation traces
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based on splitting variables. Finally, each leaf node of FDT corresponds to at least
one concrete and reachable states.
Given one target output z = f (x1,x2...xm,s1,s2...sn) in sequential design, where
x1,x2,...xm and s1,s2...sn are input variables and state variables in the logic cone of
z, the set of reachable states of the design is represented as R(s1,s2 . . . sn), which
can be calculated using fixpoint computation [5]. Note that we simply discard other
state variables outside the logic cone of z. Each satisfiable assignment of R(s1,s2 . . .
sn) is a reachable state of the design. In symbolic model checking [5], the transition
relation and initial state are all encoded into BDD and fixpoint computation is done
based on BDD operation [101].
For the target output z, we denote the represented function by FDT as zfdt
(x1,x2,. . . xm, s1,s2 . . . sn). For each generated assertion, there are two kinds of
consequent: zfdt=0 and zfdt=1. We denote the set of assertions with output equal
to zero as A = {A1, A2 . . . Ap} and the set of assertions with output equal to one
as B = {B1, B2 . . . Bq}. We use the Ante operator to represent the antecedent of
assertion. The function zfdt can then be defined as:
zfdt(x1,x2,. . . xm, s1,s2 . . . sn) =
∨
16r6q
Ante(Br). (4.2)
Theorem 5 ∀ c∈{0, 1}, (f (x1,x2,. . . xm, s1,s2 . . . sn)=c)
∧
R(s1,s2 . . . sn)⇒ (zfdt
(x1,x2,. . . xm, s1,s2 . . . sn)=c).
Proof intuition: Given one group of concrete values on primary input and state
variables, if the concrete state does not satisfy R(s1,s2 . . . sn), the theorem is true. If
the concrete state satisfies R(s1,s2 . . . sn), what we should prove now is that f and
zfdt produce the same value c. (1) For the given input and state satisfying Ante(Br),
the value c predicted by zfdt is 1. If f compute c = 0 for the given input and state,
Br will be a spurious assertion on the design. This contradicts with the definition
of FDT: all assertions are true. (2) For the given input and state not satisfying any
Ante(Br), then there exists one assertion At to predict the value c to 0. Similarly, If
f compute c = 1 for the given input and state, At will be a spurious assertion on
the design.
The theorem 5 implies that FDT precisely represents the primary output function.
For each reachable state and any value on primary input, the FDT is able to produce
the same value as the output function in the design. For unreachable state, the FDT
is allowed to produce an arbitrary value. However, if we use BDD to represent f ,
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BDD is required to produce exactly the same value as the circuit on any given state
and primary inputs regardless of whether the state is reachable or not.
Theorem 6 ∀i∈{1, 2 . . . p}, Ante(Ai)
∧
R(s1,s2 . . . sn) is always satisfiable. Like-
wise, ∀i∈{1, 2 . . . q}, Ante(Bi)
∧
R(s1,s2 . . . sn) is also always satisfiable.
Proof intuition: FDT is built from concrete simulation data. Each path from root
to leaf node corresponds to a set of simulation data which means these simulation
data will satisfy Ante(Ai) or Ante(Bi). On the other hand, since these concrete
simulation data are from the computation of the design, they will satisfy R(s1,s2 . . .
sn).
The theorem 6 implies that all assertions generated from final decision tree are
non-vacuous. In other words, the antecedent of each assertion is able to cover at
least one reachable state and each reachable state is able to trigger one assertion.
Comparing with the BDD representation of f , each path from root node to leaf
node in BDD can be considered as an assertion for corresponding output. As a
result, some generated assertions from BDD are vacuous since the antecedent of
these assertions corresponds to unreachable state. If these assertions are output for
verification, it will lower the assertion coverage.
4.8.2 Dynamic Subtree Pruning
As an implementation optimization, decision tree can prune subtree with all true
assertions on leaf nodes during the incremental construction process. Since the
incremental decision tree algorithm will stop splitting on the nodes with true asser-
tions and only continue to split on spurious assertions, it is unnecessary to keep the
true assertions subtree in memory. It is possible to apply a memory optimization
strategy to dynamically prune the subtree with all true assertions in each refinement
iteration step. In contrast to BDDs, this dynamical pruning effectively walks around
the problem of memory explosion in this context. Moreover, removing the subtree
with true assertions does not compromise the functionality of the corresponding
output.
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4.9 Related Work
Our counterexample based stimulus generation approach distinguishes itself from
all the existing coverage guided test generation approaches in that the generated
counterexample is able to automatically explore logic not covered by previous
stimulus. Counterexample-based refinement of abstractions for verification has
been studied widely [10]. The idea of generating tests from counterexamples us-
ing model checking has been explored in software testing and hardware valida-
tion [102]–[104]. These methods require a predefined set of properties and then
formally verify these properties. In our work, the set of properties are generated
automatically, minimizing human intervention in the loop. Many techniques in
prior art automatically generate validation patterns by incorporating coverage feed-
back [105],[106] dynamically. However, they do not use a flow similar to GoldMine
for generating feedback.
Statistical methods have been adopted in hardware validation for assertion gener-
ation [31], [33], [107] and test generation [103], [108], [109]. IODINE [31] tries to
automatically infer likely invariants by hypothesizing a set of predefined invariant
pattern across one or more variables in the design and then analyzing the design’s
dynamic behavior during simulation. The generated assertions need not be sound,
as well as they are usually simple assertions like one-hot encoding. Invariant gener-
ation in software verification has been approached in [110]–[112] to speedup model
checking.
The similar idea of coverage closure or complete coverage has also been inves-
tigated by both academia and industry [113]–[116]. Three main differences exist
between these works and ours: (1) Their methods always assume a predefined set of
assertions. (2) Their methods do not utilize the dynamic simulation traces and are
not able to exclude unreachable states. (3) Their methods do not build an automatic
and incremental feedback loop.
In the field of data mining, incremental decision tree algorithms like VFDT (very
fast decision trees) [117] are explored to allow an existing tree to be updated or
revised using new data instances. These are typically applied to handling stream
data whose characteristics change over time.
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4.10 Conclusions
In conclusion, we have presented a completely automated stimulus generation method-
ology for systematic coverage closure based on GoldMine. The forward progress
and termination properties of the algorithm make it a sound and practically attrac-
tive solution.
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CHAPTER 5
WORD LEVEL FEATURE DISCOVERY TO
ENHANCE QUALITY OF ASSERTION
MINING
5.1 Introduction
Assertion based verification is an increasingly popular verification methodology
[18]. Assertions are used in formal property checking as well as simulation based
verification to monitor dynamic simulation, improve internal signal observability
and reduce debug effort [18].
Current assertion generation solutions [28]–[30], [34] generate assertions at the
bit level and the term-level information from the RTL abstractions is completely
lost. Even if there are word-level variables in RTL, all bits are ungrouped for bit-
level feature and target selection. As a result, all generated assertions are for every
bit of the target variable (output), and the features are selected as RTL variables,
one bit at a time.
These mechanically generated bit-level assertions have multiple disadvantages.
Firstly, the assertions have low readability. Since each bit of the existing RTL word-
level structure is treated as an independent variable in the learning engine, the gen-
erated assertions are typically not in a human-digestible form. Assertion based
checking is typically used in the RTL phase, so decomposition of assertions into bit
phase belies the purpose of automatic assertion generation. Frequently, designers
find the machine generated data too difficult to parse and assimilate since it is at a
lower level of abstraction. Secondly, each generated bit-level assertion has very low
coverage of input space of target variable. Thirdly, the bit-level assertions tend to
be repetitive, and therefore numerous. This is because a word-level relationship like
(a > b) where a and b are 16 bits wide, would be captured by 16 different bit-level
assertions. These disadvantages drastically limit the usability of the mechanically
generated bit-level assertions.
In this chapter, we present a technique that uses static and dynamic analysis of
RTL code to discover word level features. The generated word level features, which
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are in terms of primary inputs, are used by machine learning algorithm. This allows
the generated assertions to be at the same level of abstraction as RTL. All the anal-
ysis is done in steps preceding the machine learning algorithm phase. We do not
modify the learning algorithms themselves to achieve our goal. The machine learn-
ing algorithm, as such is agnostic to the level of abstraction of its features.
We identify conditional expressions in the RTL as initial word level predicates.
In order to obtain word level features, the conditional expression needs to be in
terms of primary inputs. This computation has been called the weakest precondition
computation [118] and has been used in software program analysis. We use this
methodology, adapted to RTL, to discover word level features.
The weakest precondition for a given predicate is computed from the RTL source
code. For temporal assertion generation, we require weakest precondition to be
computed for the length of temporal behavior (consecutive cycles) that we are in-
terested in. The resulting word level features will be in terms of primary input vari-
ables at every cycle within the given length and register variables (pseudo primary
inputs) in the first cycle.
Statically computing weakest precondition along all possible paths is subject to
blowup due to the inclusion of path conditions [53], [119]. Moreover, this static
computation method is unaware of infeasible paths. Hence, the generated word
level features may become arbitrarily complex. They will not serve the purpose of
increasing readability of our assertions. To avoid this blowup, we use concrete sim-
ulation to guide the weakest precondition computation along the feasible simulation
paths. The path conditions are not retained in predicates during the computation.
The resulting word level features are highly simplified. Therefore, our simulation
guided weakest precondition method combines static and dynamic analysis of RTL
code to discover word level features.
We further improve the generated assertions by post-processing them based on
design knowledge to remove redundancies in the assertions. Overlap in known ex-
clusive features can result in over-constrained assertions. For instance, the assertion
(p1 ∧ ¬p2) ⇒ (sum sel = 1)1 can be reported by the learning algorithm, where
(p1 : opcode = ADD) and (p2 : opcode = SUB) are mutually exclusive. There-
fore, predicate ¬p2 is redundant and can be removed.
The target can also be in the form of word level predicate. A word level variable
may have many possible values. We analyze RTL code to identify word level output
1The “=” symbol in this chapter is used to represent the comparison proposition that evaluates to
be true/false. Syntactic representations in C-like languages for this operator are “==”
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variable with constant assignments. The word level variable along with its assigned
constant is used as the word level target. Hence, the learning algorithm does not
have to decipher each bit of the word level variables.
After discovering word level features or targets, any learning algorithm can be
employed for assertion generation. We use a decision tree based learning algorithm
for our experiments. We apply our word level assertion generation technique to
Ethernet MAC, I2C, and OpenRISC designs [1]. We compare the generated word
level assertions with bit level assertions. Using word level features or targets, fewer
assertions are generated and the percentage of generated true assertions is higher.
The average number of propositions in word level assertions is nearly 50% of that in
bit level assertions. These measurements reflect the higher readability and expres-
siveness of generated word level assertions. Moreover, the word level assertions
tend to be able to detect more injected bugs than bit level assertions.
5.2 Background
This section introduces the terms used in this chapter. We also provide a background
on feature selection.
5.2.1 Definitions
We treat the RTL source code as a “program” as in [40]. Our static analysis is done
on the control data flow graph (CDFG) [119] of the RTL design.
A target is a variable for which we want to generate assertions. Variables in the
logic cone of a target are those variables that can affect the value of the target [40].
A feature is a variable that is used to predict the target’s value. The generated
assertions are of form A ⇒ B2, where the antecedent A can be a temporal or
propositional formula in terms of the features and the consequent B is written as a
temporal or propositional formula in terms of the target.
A word level variable refers to a variable with bit width larger than 1 in the
RTL design. A signal described by a bit-vector is typically considered a word level
variable.
A conditional expression in RTL is an expression evaluated to be true/false to
determine which branch should be executed. For example: a case statement or an
2We use LTL [7] notation for expressing generated assertions in this chapter.
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if-else branch may include a conditional expression. If a conditional expression is
in terms of word level variables, we refer to it as word level conditional expression.
A word level predicate is a first order formula in terms of word level variables
and is evaluated to be true/false. Typically, a word level predicate can be a word
level conditional expression in RTL.
A word level assertion is an assertion that has at least one word level predicate as
a proposition in its antecedent or consequent.
The mining window length is the duration of time cycles for which we want the
generated assertions to capture temporal behavior. It depends on the sequential
depth of target signal.
A Use-Definition Chain (UD Chain) is a data structure consisting of a used vari-
able and all the definitions of that variable that can reach that use without any other
intervening definitions.
In software verification, weakest precondition, denoted by wp(st,P ), is usually
defined with respect to a predicate (postcondition) P and statement st [53], [118],
[119]. wp is the weakest condition that is true before the execution of statement st
and also guarantees to meet the postcondition P after the execution of st.
Considering the truth table of a target’s function in terms of features, a table
entry is covered by a given assertion if the concrete value of the entry can satisfy
the antecedent of the given assertion. The input space coverage of a given assertion
refers to the percentage of truth table entries covered by the assertion.
5.2.2 Feature Selection
In machine learning, feature selection refers to the selection of a subset of input
variables by eliminating variables with little or no predictive information [120].
Given an RTL target variable for which want to generate assertions, the primary
input variables in the logic cone of the target are selected as features. We only
include primary input variables because the generated assertions will be able to
cover all functions within the logic cone of target.
For temporal assertion generation, the design is unrolled for the same number of
cycles as mining window length and the sequential variables are annotated with the
cycle in which they are assigned. For each variable, a different cycle annotation
is treated as different sequential variable. The sequential variables are then treated
the same manner as combinational variables. As an example, we can generate the
85
temporal assertion: a ∧ X¬b⇒ XX(c = 1), where a and b are at different cycles.
Besides the primary input variables within mining window, the register/state vari-
ables on the first cycle in the target’s logic cone are also treated as primary inputs
for feature selection. The first cycle’s register variable refers to the state variables in
farthest back temporal stage within the mining window. Our generated assertions
can cover the unrolled logic functions within the mining window.
5.3 A Motivating Example
(1) Verilog example and logic cone of target 
 
1. module  or1200_ctrl(clk,...); 
2. input rst, clk, ex_freeze, id_freeze, flushpipe; 
3. input [32:0] if_insn; 
4. output [3:0] alu_op; 
5. reg[32:0] id_insn; 
6. reg[3:0] alu_op; 
7. always@(posedge clk) 
8.   if(rst||flushpipe) 
9.     id_insn <= {6’h5, 26’h0410000}; 
10.   else if(!id_freeze) 
11.     id_insn <= if_insn; 
12.   else 
13.     id_insn <= id_insn; 
14. always@(posedge clk) 
15.   if(rst) 
16.     alu_op <= `ALU_NOP; 
17.   else if(!ex_freeze&id_freeze|flushpipe) 
18.     alu_op <= `ALU_NOP; 
19.   else if(!ex_freeze) 
20.      case(id_insn[31:26]) 
21.        `OR32_J:  alu_op  <= `ALU_IMM; 
22.        `OR32_ORI: alu_op <= `ALU_OR; 
23.        `OR32_ADDI: alu_op <= `ALU_ADD; 
24.        …… 
25.      endcase 
26.   else 
27.        alu_op <= `ALU_NOP;  
28. endmodule 
(2) Sample assertions 
 
Bit level assertion: 
(¬id_freeze)ᴧ(¬flushpipe) ᴧ(if_insn[31]) 
ᴧ(¬if_insn[30])ᴧ(if_insn[27]) ᴧ(X¬ ex_freeze) 
ᴧ(X¬ id_freeze)ᴧ(X¬ flushpipe)=>XX(alu_op[3]=0) 
 
Word level assertion : 
(¬id_freeze)ᴧ(¬flushpipe)ᴧ(if_insn[31:26]=`OR32_ORI) 
(X¬ex_freeze)ᴧ(X¬id_freeze)ᴧ(X¬flushpipe) 
=>XX(alu_op[3:0]=`ALU_OR) 
Word level feature 
Word level target 
line 7-13 
line 14-27 
ex_freeze<2>,  
id_freeze<2>,  
Flushpipe<2> reg 
alu_op[0] 
id_insn[31:26] 
if_insn<1>[31:26] 
flushpipe<1> 
id_freeze<1> id_insn<1>[31:26] 
C
yc
le
 2
 
C
yc
le
 1
 
target 
features 
Figure 5.1: A motivating Verilog example [1] for a comparison between word
level assertions and bit level assertions. The word level feature and the word level
target are highlighted in the word level assertion. Reset signal rst is disabled in
sample assertions. Mining window length is 2 for temporal assertion generation.
The Var〈#〉 in the logic cone denotes the variable’s annotated cycle index.
In Figure 5.1, we show a simple Verilog example from the decoder module of
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OR1200 [1] and the corresponding sample word and bit level assertions. We also
show the logic cone for the target alu op[0]. The if insn represents the instruction
from instruction fetch module and the id insn represents the current instruction
for decoding. The first always process (line 7-13) determines the instruction for
decoding. The second always process (line 14-27) assigns values to alu op, which
determines the functionality of ALU.
We set the word level target as alu op[3 : 0] = ‘ALU OR, where alu op[3 : 0]
is a word level variable. We generate assertions capturing two cycles’ temporal
behavior of the target. The bit level features in this example are: id freeze and
flushpipe in the first and the second cycles, ex freeze in the second cycle, and
if insn[31 : 26] and id insn[31 : 26] in the first cycle. If we use word level
features, (if insn[31 : 26] = ‘OR32 ORI) and (id insn[31 : 26] = ‘OR32 ORI)
will be the discovered word level features.
In the example, we show sample bit level and word level assertions generated
using the decision tree based learning algorithm (explained in section IV.C). The
word level assertion states “if the opcode of the fetched instruction is ORI in cur-
rent cycle, the opcode of ALU will be OR operation two cycles later.” It assumes
that execution unit and decoder is not disabled and pipeline is not flushed.
We can see that the word level assertion is more readable than the bit level as-
sertion. For example, it is hard to parse the meaning of single bit variables such
as if insn[31], alu op[3] in the bit level assertion. In addition, the input space
coverage of the word level assertion is higher than that of the bit level assertion,
because the number of features is reduced when using word level features. As a
result, covering the entire input space requires significantly fewer assertions.
5.4 Our Procedure for Automatic Word Level Assertion
Generation
In a typical flow for automatic assertion generation using machine learning [28],
[29], [31], [34], an RTL design is simulated using random or directed tests and the
simulation traces are passed as data to a machine learning engine. Bit level features
and targets are selected. The learning algorithm then infers rules among features
and targets from the data. Each rule corresponds to a candidate assertion for the
target. Formal verification tool can be used to filter spurious assertions [29], [34].
We extend the flow to generate word level assertions in Figure 5.2. To generate
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word level assertions, we require word level predicates to be provided as features
or targets. Our extension, which is shown in the dotted block in Figure 5.2, is a
preprocessing step for automatic assertion generation. Phase 1 in the flow discovers
word level targets. Given a discovered word level target from phase 1 or bit level
target, phase 2 is responsible for discovering word level features in the logic cone
of the target. The discovered word level features and targets are instrumented in the
RTL code. The updated RTL is simulated and the resulting traces are provided to
the learning engine to generate candidate assertions.
Features and targets 
RTL source 
code 
RTL predicates 
instrumentation 
Simulation on  
new RTL 
Learning 
engine 
New RTL Traces 
Word level  
assertions 
Phase 1.1: 
Identifying  constant assignments  
to word level output variables 
Phase 1.2: 
Discovering word level targets 
Phase 2.2: 
Simulation guided weakest 
precondition computation to discover 
word level features 
Phase 2.1: 
Identifying word level conditional 
expressions in target’s logic cone 
Bit level targets 
Bit level features in 
logic cone of target 
Figure 5.2: Our procedure for automatic word level assertion generation. Our
contributions, which are shown in dotted block, focus how to automatically
discover word level features and targets.
5.4.1 Phase 1: Discovering Word Level Targets
In Phase 1, we first identify the target we want to generation assertions for. Bit
level outputs or word level predicates on outputs are set as targets for assertion
generation. For word level targets, we consider bit-vector output variables with
constant assignments in the RTL code.
In the bit level assertion generation, the target bit level variable’s value is deci-
phered by the machine learning algorithm itself. Bit level variables can have one
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of two values: 0 and 1. Therefore the two propositions in the consequent for any
bit level target variable t are (t = 0) and (t = 1). The machine learning algorithm
thus deciphers the bit level predicate. However, at the word level, the variables are
bit-vectors and can have many possible values. Deciphering all these values by a
machine learning algorithm may lead to too many assertions, many of which could
be spurious or irrelevant to the design. Hence, we provide the word level predicate
itself as a target to the learning algorithm. In other words, the word level variable
along with its intended value is given as a proposition. Consequently, the learning
algorithm does not need to decipher the value of the word level variable.
We analyze all assignments to each word level output variable in RTL code. If all
the assignments assign constant values to the word level output, we then produce
the word level predicate as a target encoding whether the word level variable is
equal to the assigned constant. In Figure 5.1, alu op = ‘ALU NOP , alu op =
‘ALU IMM , alu op = ‘ALU OR and alu op = ‘ALU ADD can all be word
level targets.
5.4.2 Phase 2: Discovering Word Level Features
In Phase 2, we discover all the word level features that are in the logic cone of the
target from Phase 1. Phase 2 has two subphases. The first subphase identifies all
word level conditional expressions within the logic cone of the target from the RTL
code. These expressions are set as word level predicates. However, they may not be
in terms of primary inputs. Therefore, the second subphase uses a simulation guided
weakest precondition computation to discover all word level features in terms of
the primary inputs from the word level predicates. This phase will be elaborated in
section 5.5.
It should be noted that the variable, which is in target’s logic cone but not used
by any discovered word level feature, should also be output as feature. Moreover, if
a word level variable is already used by a discovered word level feature, some bits
of the variable may be selected as features. The reason is that our method is based
on the simulation, which may fail to cover all potential features.
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5.4.3 Data Generation and Learning Algorithm
After the discovery of the word level targets and features, every bit of the corre-
sponding word level variable will be hidden from the learning algorithm. To get
the concrete simulation values of these features and targets for learning engine, we
instrument them back to RTL code and rerun the simulation. The new simulation
traces are then provided to learning engine.
The machine learning algorithm tries to infer a logical relationship between the
target and features from simulation traces. Our word level feature or target discov-
ery approach is independent of the machine learning algorithm. We use a decision
tree based learning algorithm from GoldMine [29].
b1: 
rst|flushpipe 
b2: 
id_insn<={6’h… 
b3: 
!id_freeze 
b4: 
id_insn<=if_insn 
b5: 
id_insn<=id_insn 
b6: 
b7: 
b8: 
rst 
b9: 
alu_op<=`ALU_NOP 
b10: 
!ex_freeze&id… 
b11: 
alu_op<=`ALU_NOP 
b12: 
!ex_freeze 
b14: 
alu_op<=`ALU_NOP 
b19: 
b13: 
id_insn[31:26] 
b15: 
`OR32_J 
b17: 
alu_op<=`ALU_IMM 
b16: 
`OR32_ORI 
b18: 
alu_op<=`ALU_OR 
… 
CDFG1 
CDFG2 
Concrete path in cycle 1 
Concrete path in cycle 2 
UD chain 
id_insn 
b2 b4 b5 
... ... 
Figure 5.3: Data structures for weakest precondition computation. The data
structures are used for logic cone identification and simulation guided weakest
precondition computation. The bold arrow lines show the concrete paths during
simulation.
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5.5 Simulation Guided Weakest Precondition
Computation to Discover Word Level Features
5.5.1 Representing RTL as CDFGs
In this section, we introduce the data structures used in the simulation guided weak-
est precondition computation to discover word level features. We first use a Verilog
parser to transform Verilog design into CDFG. Figure 5.3 shows the CDFG of the
motivating Verilog example in Figure 5.1. There are three kinds of nodes in a
CDFG: a branch node (e.g., b1) corresponds to a branch statement in RTL; an as-
signment node (e.g., b2) corresponds to an assignment statement in RTL; a merge
node (e.g., b6) corresponds to the end of a branch.
The multiple-cycle path in RTL refers to a path that is executed across multi-
ple cycles. The Verilog program is unrolled and the variables in each cycle are
annotated with the corresponding cycle index. Each path corresponds to a set of
assignment statements and conditional expressions. The Path condition for an as-
signment statement is a conjunction of all conditional expressions leading to the
execution of that assignment statement on the path. The CDFG records multi-cycle
paths during simulation. Figure 5.3 shows two concrete paths in cycle 1 and cy-
cle 2. The concrete path in cycle 1 is b1 − b3 − b4 − b6 − b7 in the first always
process and b8 − b10 − b12 − b13 − b16 − b18 in the second always process.
The concrete path in cycle 2 is b1 − b3 − b5 − b6 − b7 in the first process and
b8 − b10 − b12 − b13 − b15 − b17 in the second process. These paths are used to
guide weakest precondition computation.
The UD chain of a variable points to all statements that assign it. The UD-
chain are used to compute the weakest precondition and track the variables in the
logic cone of the target. Figure 5.3 shows the UD-chain for variable id insn in
b13. Statements in b2, b4 and b5 define this variable. Note that the non-blocking
assignment (“<=”) in a clock triggered process means the assigned value is used in
next cycle.
5.5.2 Weakest Precondition Computation in RTL
In the example shown in Figure 5.1, we assume the postcondition predicate is
id insn[31 : 26] = ‘OR32 ADDI . We backward substitute the variables used
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in postcondition with the definitions to these variables. There are three definitions
in b2, b4 and b5. We must simultaneously consider path conditions for the variables
used in postcondition predicate. The resulting weakest precondition is computed as
follows:
Example(1) : static weakest precondition computation
wp(T , id insn[31 : 26] = ‘OR32 ADDI)
=((rst ∨ flushpipe)
⇒ 6′h5 = ‘OR32 ADDI)
∧(¬(rst ∨ flushpipe) ∧ (¬id freeze)
⇒ if insn[31 : 26] = ‘OR32 ADDI)
∧(¬(rst ∨ flushpipe) ∧ (id freeze)
⇒ id insn[31 : 26] = ‘OR32 ADDI)
We employ the RTL weakest precondition to derive word level features from the
conditional expressions in RTL. To guarantee that the resulting word level features
are in terms of primary inputs, we set k as the mining window length and set all
word level conditional expressions as postcondition predicates. These conditional
expressions are within both the logic cone of the given target and the mining win-
dow. If postcondition P is in cycle i within the mining window, the wpi−1 will be
computed.
5.5.3 Simulation Guided wp Computation
Statically computing the weakest precondition generates very complex and unread-
able predicates. Assignments to the same variable on different paths are considered
in the weakest precondition computation. The path condition for each assignment
is also included in the resulting expression. In example(1), the path condition for
if insn[31 : 26] = ‘OR32 ADDI is (¬(rst ∨ flushpipe) ∧ (¬id freeze).
In addition, the path conditions for different variables used in postcondition P
may conflict. If multiple variables are used in the postcondition predicate, the path
conditions for the assignments to these variables are conjunct. However, static wp
computation is unaware of the satisfiability of such condition. In other words, the
conjunct paths for different variables may be infeasible.
Finally, the number of static paths increases exponentially when we compute
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wpk for large k. We will transitively track the definitions to all variables used in
postcondition predicates until the primary inputs or constants are reached. The
resulting weakest precondition is easy to blowup. In example (1), if we want to
compute wp1, we should find definitions to id insn used in b5 since it is not in
terms of primary inputs. There are three definitions to it in previous cycle. As a
result, 9 paths are taken into account.
We use a dynamic simulation guided weakest precondition computation to re-
place the static computation. The RTL design is first simulated using either directed
or random tests. All concrete paths are recorded during the simulation. We limit
the backward substitution only along concrete simulation path. In this way, we can
disregard the path conditions in wp computation since there is only one assignment
to any variable used in postcondition P along the concrete simulation path.
In the example in Figure 5.3, the concrete simulation paths in cycles 1 and 2 are
shown. Given the postcondition predicate P: id insn[32 : 26] = ‘OR32 ORI in
cycle 2, we want to use simulation guided method to discover word level features.
The definition to id insn on the concrete path is in statement b4. Using substitution,
we can discover the word level feature: if insn[32 : 26] = ‘OR32 ORI . We can
see that the discovered word level feature using simulation guided wp computation
is simple and readable.
We simulate RTL design using directed or random tests to guide the wpi com-
putation. The simulation path may span over millions of cycles, which is much
larger than mining window length len. However, the concrete paths used in wpi
computation should be at most len cycles. We resolve this problem by shifting the
mining window during the simulation. Initially, simulation cycle 1 to cycle len is
in mining window. Then cycle 2 to cycle len + 1 is the new mining window. In
this way, the mining window is shifted every simulation cycle. The concrete paths
in every mining window can be used to guide the wpi computation.
We set the mining window length to 2 in Figure 5.3 and the word level tar-
get is alu op = ‘ALU OR. There are several conditional expressions within
both the mining window and the logic cone of alu op = ‘ALU OR. Only the
id insn〈2〉[31 : 26] = ‘OR32 ORI (b13 and b16) is at word level. The remaining
conditional expressions flushpipe〈1〉(b1), flushpipe〈2〉(b10), id freeze〈1 〉(b3),
id freeze〈2〉(b10), ex freeze〈2〉(b12) are selected as bit level features. Recall that
wp1(id insn〈2〉[31 : 26] = ‘OR32 ORI) = (if insn〈1〉[31 : 26] = ‘OR32 ORI).
When the mining window shifts to simulation cycle 2, the word level predicates
in cycle 3 and cycle 2 are considered. We assume that the concrete path in cy-
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cle 3 is the same as that in cycle 2. In this case, the definition in b5 is used.
wp1(id insn〈2〉[31 : 26] = ‘OR32 ORI)=(id insn〈1〉[31 : 26] = ‘OR32 ORI).
We can see that the discovered word level features do not suffer from the blow-up
problem even if we increase k in the wpk computation. It should be noted that the
concrete cycle numbers express the relative cycle order within the mining window.
They are replaced with the X operator if assertions are expressed in LTL.
The simulation, being inexhaustive, cannot exhaust all feasible paths reaching
postcondition P . However, finding a complete set of predicates as features for min-
ing is not required in the context of assertion generation. The mining of assertions
is not trying to extract the complete function of the given target. In addition, our
method cannot guarantee that the extracted word level features are in terms of every
primary input within the target’s logic cone. In this situation, we simply treat each
bit of the input variables as a bit level feature.
5.6 Removing Redundant Propositions
The word level features as generated in our technique may have a causal relationship
between them. They may also be mutually exclusive in certain design contexts. The
learning algorithm may produce overconstrained or meaningless assertions. For
example, both state[15 : 0] = S1 and state[15 : 0] = S2 can be discovered as
word level features. However, (state[15 : 0] = S1)∧¬(state[15 : 0] = S2) may
appear in assertion’s antecedent. Obviously, proposition ¬(state[15 : 0] = S2) is
redundant.
Figure 5.4 shows an example of the identification of mutually exclusive features.
P1, P2 and P3 are word level conditional expressions in the logic cone of the
target and they are set as postconditions for weakest precondition computation. For
P3, two word level predicates are produced by computing two concrete simulation
paths: Path 1 and Path 2. The assignment to variable Y is 1 in path 1 and the
assignment to variable Y is 2 in path 2. We can see that the two discovered word
level predicates are mutually exclusive.
Our solution to remove redundant propositions is a post-processing of all gen-
erated assertions to check for mutually exclusive propositions. When using the
simulation guided wp computation to discover word level features, we identify all
the word level conditional expressions in the logic cone of a given target. For each
conditional expression set as a postcondition predicate, we group all the discov-
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Figure 5.4: Identification of mutually exclusive features during feature discovery
ered features from the same postcondition predicate. Three groups G1, G2 and G3
are shown in Figure 5.4. Within each group, we check whether there are mutually
exclusive word level features. In the example, the discovered word level features
x = 1 and x = 2 are mutually exclusive. From the mutually exclusive word level
features, we can identify the mutually exclusive propositions in the antecedent of
generated assertions. Therefore, we postprocess all generated assertions one by one
to remove redundant propositions in each assertion’s antecedent. In Figure 5.4, if
(¬(x = 1))∧(x = 2) exists in the antecedent of an assertion, we can only retain
proposition x = 2.
5.7 Experimental Evaluation
We implemented the simulation guided weakest precondition computation for Ver-
ilog RTL. Our implementation reads Verilog code and builds the corresponding CD-
FGs. We use the VCS simulator to simulate a design. Our implementation interacts
with VCS through the directed programming interface (DPI). All dynamic simula-
tion paths are recorded in the CDFGs. The designs used for the experiments include
Ethernet MAC, I2C and OpenRISC [1]. We use the provided regression testbenches
to generate simulation traces for assertion generation. Our implementation uses a
decision tree based learning algorithm to mine assertion as in GoldMine [29].
We choose those target signals that have word level predicates within their logic
cone. In the case that there is no word level predicate within the logic cone, we
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set all the bit level variables as features. The word level experiments and the bit
level experiments use the same simulation data. Our implementation uses Cadence
IFV as the formal verification engine to check the generated candidate assertions.
All experiments were run on an Intel Core 2 Quad with 4GB of memory. Most
generation processes complete within half an hour depending on the IFV runtime.
The first experiment shows the word level feature discovery results for each target
signal. The following experiments compare the readability and expressiveness of
generated word level assertions and bit level assertions from the following perspec-
tives:
1. Number of generated candidate assertions.
2. Percentage of true assertions.
3. Average number of propositions in assertion’s antecedent.
4. Input space coverage analysis of generated assertions.
5. Analyzing relationship between word level assertions and bit level assertions.
6. Injecting bugs in RTL and using the generated assertions to detect the injected
bugs.
5.7.1 Word Level Feature Discovery Results Using Simulation
Guided wp Computation
The first experiment evaluates the results of our word level feature discovery method.
The target signal and the mining window length are determined by the user before-
hand. In Table 5.1, we show the number of word level features discovered by using
simulation guided method and also the number of bit level features. In addition,
the number of exclusive features column shows the number of detected mutually
exclusive features.
In Table 5.1, we can see that the number of features are significantly reduced
by using word level predicates. On average, there are 56% fewer word level fea-
tures than bit level features. The only exception is the Wb ack o signal in Ethernet
MAC. There are 7 features that are mutually exclusive for Wb ack o and redundant
propositions can be removed in the generated word level assertions. These word
level features are used for all following experiments and the exclusive features are
used to remove redundant propositions in generated word level assertions.
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Table 5.1: Results of our word level feature discovery method. Some bit variables,
which are in logic cone but not in predicates, should also be included in features
for word level assertion generation. The number of features can be reduced when
using word level features.
Target Signals Window Number of Number of Number of
Word Level Exclusive Bit Level
Length Features Features Features
I2C-scl oen 3 38 23 53
I2C-core cmd 2 36 23 36*4
I2C-sda oen 3 43 24 60
I2C-sto cond 4 9 0 22
I2C-busy 4 12 0 26
I2C-clk en 2 8 0 21
EMAC-WB ack o 3 18 7 16
EMAC-UnicastOK 2 16 0 64
EMAC-SetPauseTimer 1 6 0 52
EMAC-LatCrcError 2 5 0 36
EMAC-Ini-Crc 1 4 0 6
EMAC-ReclenOK 1 2 0 48
OR-alu op=OR 2 7 0 17
OR-alu op=NOP 2 9 0 17
OR-sig trap 2 8 0 24
5.7.2 Number of Generated Word Level Assertions and Bit Level
Assertions
In this experiment, the assertions generated by using word level features are com-
pared with those generated using bit level features. Figure 5.5 shows the number of
candidate assertions generated by the two methods. We can observe that the number
of assertions generated using word level features is fewer than the number using bit
level features. Intuitively, the provided word level features prevent learning engine
from generating too specific assertions.
5.7.3 Percentage of True Assertions in Candidate Assertions
Given the same simulation traces, we observe that the assertion generation using
word level features is able to output a higher percentage of true assertions. The
result is shown in Figure 5.6. The only exception is the sto cond signal, in which
some extracted predicates are not activated as frequently as bit level variables. In
addition, the clk en signal has no true assertions because the simulation traces do
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Figure 5.5: The comparison of the number of generated candidate assertions given
the same simulation traces. The number of generated candidate assertions is
reduced by using word level features.
not sufficiently cover this target’s function. As an extreme example, there is no true
bit level assertion for ReceivedLengthOK. In the design, this target depends on
the comparison of two 16-bit signals. Bit level features are not able to capture this
comparison relationship and the machine learning algorithm is not clever enough to
deduce this comparison relationship from simulation data. As a result, the generated
assertions are all spurious.
It should be noted that we are not trying to improve the true assertion percentage.
It can be improved by analyzing false assertions and then generating high coverage
tests, since a false assertion implies a coverage hole in the simulation traces or a
bug in the RTL design.
5.7.4 Average Number of Propositions in Assertion’s Antecedent
In this experiment, we compare the average number of propositions in the an-
tecedent of the generated assertions. From Figure 5.7, it can be observed that the
average number of propositions in the antecedent of assertions using word level fea-
tures is nearly 50% fewer than the average number using bit level features in several
cases. Bit level assertions use each bit as a feature and tend to be overconstrained.
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Figure 5.6: The comparison of the percentage of true assertions among all
candidate assertions. The percentage of true assertions is improved by using word
level features.
5.7.5 Input Space Coverage Analysis of Generated Assertions
In this experiment, we compare the input space coverage of the word level and bit
level assertions. We show that the input space coverage increases with the num-
ber of generated assertions. From Figure 5.8, we can observe that the input space
coverage of the word level assertions increases more quickly with the number of
the assertions when compared to the bit level assertions. In this example, the in-
put space coverage of 5 word level assertions is nearly 90% while the input space
coverage of the same number of bit level assertions is only 36%.
Table 5.2: We show that one word level assertion can cover multiple bit level
assertions. We also show the used word level feature for generating word level
assertions.
Assertion ID Word Level Features # Covered Bit Level Assertions
A1 (Crc[31 : 0]! = 32′hc704dd7b) 15
A2 (NibCnt[13 : 0] == 14′h17b7) 14
A3 (|DlyCrcCnt[3 : 0]), (DlyCrcCnt[3 : 0] < 4′h9) 4
A4 (ByteCnt[15 : 0] ==MaxFL[15 : 0]) 59
A5 (RandomLatched == 10′h0) 4
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Figure 5.7: The comparison of the average number of propositions in true
assertions’ antecedent. The fewer number of propositions in antecedent means
higher readability.
5.7.6 Relationship between Word Level Assertions and Bit Level
Assertions
In this experiment, we demonstrate that one word level assertion can cover several
bit level assertions. This covering relationship means that the antecedent of bit level
assertion implies the antecedent of word level assertion. Meanwhile, they assert the
same value on target. For example: the word level assertion a[7 : 0] > b[7 : 0]⇒
(out = 1) covers bit level assertion a[7] ∧ a[6] ∧ b[7] ∧ ¬b[6]⇒(out = 1) because
a[7]∧ a[6]∧ b[7]∧¬b[6] implies a[7 : 0] > b[7 : 0]. In Table 5.2, we collect 5 word
level assertions and analyze their covering relationship with the bit level assertions
generated for the same target. It can be observed that one word level assertion can
cover multiple bit level assertions. Intuitively, learning engine is not strong enough
to derive the word level features from the simulation data. Providing word level
features helps the learning engine to infer rules among word level variables.
5.7.7 Bug Detection Ability Comparison
This experiment uses assertions to detect bugs injected in the design. We want to
demonstrate that a word level assertion is able to detect more bugs than its corre-
sponding bit level assertion. We use a systematic mutation-based method to com-
pare the assertions’ ability to detect bugs. The RTL code within the target’s logic
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Figure 5.8: The increasing of input space coverage with the number of generated
word level assertions and bit level assertions. We use the alu op=OR as target and
generate two cycles’ temporal assertions.
cone is mutated and then all the generated true assertions are formally checked on
the mutated design. The failed assertions detect the corresponding bug in the mu-
tated design. Four types of corner case bugs are injected: operator replacement,
variable to constant replacement, constant replacement and relational operator re-
placement [98].
Table 5.3: The detecting of injected corner case bugs per word level assertion and
bit level assertion. Word level assertions are able to detect more injected bugs.
Target Signal Injected No. of Bugs Detected
Bugs Assertions Per Assertion
Word Bit Word Bit
Initialize crc 8 5 8 2.4 1.8
SetPauseT imer 11 5 2 6.2 5
scl oen 18 7 8 5.14 3.625
Each true assertion is able to detect multiple bugs. We find that each injected bug
is detected by at least one word level assertion. However, the bit level assertions are
not able to detect every bug. Table 5.3 shows the average number of bugs detected
by each assertion. It can be observed that word level assertions are able to detect
more injected corner case bugs than bit level assertions. Intuitively, a bit level
assertion tends to be more specific and thus fails to detect some corner case bugs.
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5.8 Related Work and Conclusion
We discuss work that is related to different aspects of our approach. Our word
level assertion approach distinguishes itself from current assertion generation in
that it uses word level predicates to help learning engine to generate high quality
assertions.
Assertion generation from RTL has been approached in the context of static anal-
ysis [32], and dynamic analysis [27],[30],[31],[33],[121]. In [31], the solution tries
to infer likely invariants by hypothesizing a set of predefined assertion templates in
the design and then match the simulation traces to the template. They do not use
data mining and also the generated assertions are typically low level invariants.
Our concept of word level assertions is also inspired by the predicate abstraction
in software [122] and hardware [53], [119]. They mainly use the weakest precon-
dition computation to find new predicates which are used to refine original abstract
model. Our method uses concrete simulation to guide the discovery of word level
features. Word level analysis in software [27] always predefines several invariant
templates among word level variables to match the running data.
In conclusion, we presented a word level assertion generation methodology and
the word level features are discovered by combining static and dynamic analysis.
Experimental results demonstrate that word level assertions have better expressive-
ness and readability, and can detect more bugs in design.
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CHAPTER 6
AUTOMATIC GENERATION OF SYSTEM
LEVEL ASSERTIONS FROM
TRANSACTION LEVEL MODELS
6.1 Introduction
Assertions were recently introduced for the verification of SystemC designs [37].
Cycle based SystemC designs are similar to RTL designs in that they are also based
on a clock signal. Therefore, assertions for such kind of SystemC designs resemble
RTL assertions. TLMs, which are at a higher level, deal with transactions instead of
cycles and therefore may not have the concept of clock or cycle. TLMs use function
calls for communication between different modules and events to trigger the com-
munication actions. Therefore, the assertions for TLMs involve the communication
actions and operating conditions for these communications [37].
Academia and industry have recently proposed several solutions to automate the
RTL assertion generation process [29]. GoldMine [29] is a representative tool that
mines assertions from an RTL design. Others tools like [28], [31], [110], [121] use
template matching or static analysis method.
It is highly desirable to generate assertions at the system level. The main motiva-
tion is that system level assertions achieve wider perspective and facilitate analysis
of the design early in the design cycle. Assertions can enhance understanding of
the functionality and performance of the design at the system level. They can also
serve as a succinct expression of the specification, or the “contract” expected by
the system level to the RTL implementation. There are many use cases for sys-
tem level assertions: regression testing, simulation monitoring, and debugging of
system level models. In addition, the assertions generated at system level can be po-
tentially included as an assertion library for RTL design verification. In GoldMine
and other RTL assertion generation engines, there is a fear of reproducing RTL
design bugs in the assertions. This situation can be countered with system level as-
sertion generation technology. If the assertions are generated from an independent
specification entity, like a system level TLM description, this greatly improves the
103
confidence in the generated assertions.
In this chapter, we first attempt to extend GoldMine to automatically generate
high quality assertions from Transaction Level Models using data mining. We apply
sequential pattern mining to generate assertions for abstract functional behaviors
of TLMs in [35]. All function calls and events occurring during one simulation
run of TLM designs were ordered by time to form a sequence. Sequential pattern
mining would then search for frequently occurring ordered events/function calls as
patterns from sequences [3]. We instrumented the TLMs and recorded all executed
functional calls, triggered events, and their occurring time during simulation as
sequences. The patterns generated by sequential pattern mining can be thought of
as candidate TLM assertions. The generated assertions were expressed using linear
temporal logic1 [7].
A good TLM assertion should express the data propagation relationships among
function parameters and return values [37]. However, with sequential pattern min-
ing, it is not possible to mine such relationships directly from the simulation traces
containing concrete values of these parameters. For example, the sequence S1:
read mem1(100)→write mem2(100) means that reading concrete data 100 from
memory 1 is always followed by writing 100 to memory 2. The concrete value of
the function parameter may be 200 in another simulation trace leading to another
sequence S2: read mem1(200)→write mem2(200). Sequential mining may out-
put S1 and S2 as distinct concrete assertions. Such multiple concrete assertions
are too repetitive and contain no extra information. A more general form of this
assertion is S: read mem1(A)→write mem2(A). This is a symbolic version of
the concrete assertions S1 and S2. We symbolized the concrete parameters and
return values in simulation traces using symbolic execution [42]. For each concrete
simulation path, symbolic execution evaluated the parameters or return values in
terms of given symbolic inputs. For the above example, the symbolized parameters
of read mem1() and write mem2() are the same in each simulation trace so that
the concrete values 100 and 200 do not interfere with the generation of the assertion
S.
The sequential pattern mining algorithm we used in [35] searches for relevant
function calls or events in the whole sequence. Typically, several thousands of
function calls or events are coincidental, but not causal. However, they are iden-
tified by sequential mining as assertions. As a result, the number of generated
1In this chapter, we use A→ B to represent the form of linear temporal logic: A⇒ FB
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TLM assertions will increase exponentially with the size of the corresponding se-
quence. Many of these generated assertions are spurious, irrelevant, and of low
quality. Generating too many assertions also hampers the usability of the assertions
by humans. It is difficult for users to sift through thousands of assertions and use
them for verification.
The sequential pattern mining algorithm also suffers from scalability, which makes
the mining intractable for long simulation traces. The algorithm always searches for
frequent sequence incrementally. The frequent sequences in current iteration are
used to form longer candidate sequence in next iteration. Consequently, the num-
ber of candidate sequences will grow rapidly and be combinatorially explosive. In
a DMA design trace including only 64 events, sequential pattern mining generates
more than 500, 000 TLM assertions.
Finally, assertions in [35] capture functionality without timing specifications.
The generated TLM assertions express the ordering relationship among the function
calls or events in the design. In practice, TLMs are employed for performance
evaluation. The assertions for TLMs should also be able to express performance
specification. In previous assertion S, it asserts that read mem1(A) always precede
write mem2(A), while the latency between read mem1(A) and write mem2(A)
is not specified in S. From the perspective of performance evaluation, the latency
between function calls or events is also interesting to verification engineers.
As a second attempt, we present a scalable algorithm to generate fewer and more
focused, useful assertions than sequential pattern mining. We use episode mining
to generate TLM assertions. An episode is a partially ordered sequence of events
occurring together [123]. Users are required to specify a time window constraining
how close the events are. The time window is then slid along the time axis of
the mined sequence. An episode can possibly occur in multiple sliding windows.
The number of sliding windows, in which an episode occurs, is the frequency of
this episode. In our context, the episode can be a sequence of function calls or
events in TLM design. The generated frequent episodes are then interpreted as
TLM assertions.
Episode mining is able to generate a more compact set of TLM assertions than
sequential pattern mining, and the generated TLM assertions have higher quality
than those generated by the sequential pattern mining in [35]. The time window
of episode mining constrains the search space of candidate episodes in a sequence.
Only the function calls or events occurring within the time window can be used
to form candidate episodes. In our context, two function calls or events, which
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occur far away from each other during simulation, tend to have no potential cause-
effect relationship and should not be correlated in a TLM assertion. Episode mining
avoids the generation of such kinds of assertions. Therefore, episode mining pro-
duces a more compact set of TLM assertions, and also the quality of assertions is
higher.
In addition, episode mining algorithm is much more scalable than sequential pat-
tern mining and can be used for a large simulation trace. Episode mining employs
time window to prune the search space during an incremental mining process. As a
result, the number of generated candidate episodes will not explode in the process.
We also extend the purely functional assertions from [35] to capture both perfor-
mance/timing as well as functional specifications. We enhance the generated TLM
assertions by annotating them with quantitative real time parameters. The asser-
tions can then express the latency between function calls or events in the design.
For example, assertion S in the previous example after annotating may become
read mem1(A)→ 2[2,10]write mem2(A) [50], which means that write mem2(A)
will occur between 2 and 10 time units after the occurrence of read mem1(A). The
assertions with quantitative real time parameters are useful for performance analy-
sis. For different test scenarios, the time parameters in TLM assertion are distinctive
and always reflect the latency of data transmission. Users are able to quickly local-
ize the root causes of performance bottleneck through these TLM assertions. For
example, a user may discover that the memory read from module A always takes
very long time. In our implementation, we extract the real time parameter from the
simulation trace for each generated assertion.
Due to the paucity of formal property verification engines at system level, we
only candidate TLM assertions. We believe that there is value in presenting candi-
date assertions to users of TLM designs. Those generated TLM assertions are useful
for design understanding and also help the users to understand the cause-effect re-
lationship among the function calls or events. In addition, they can facilitate the
debugging of TLMs.
We apply our TLM assertion generation technique to a transaction level AMBA
based DMA controller and AXI based interconnection network platform in Sys-
temC. We reuse AMBA based DMA controller design from [35] and addition-
ally implement an AXI based interconnection network platform for our experiment.
Since there is no available complex TLM platform for academic/research use, we
2Similarly, we use A →[a,b] B to represent the form of linear temporal logic with quantitative
time constraint: A⇒ F[a,b].B
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also release this platform in the public domain [124]. We demonstrate our TLM as-
sertion generation on both designs and show that our assertions capture their speci-
fications.
We evaluate system level assertions on the basis of standards we define for high
quality assertions. We compare episode mining with sequential pattern mining, and
show that the episode mining is more scalable and is able to generate a compact
set of assertions for TLM verification. The number of assertions is reduced by
150 to 228 times. We also analyze the quality of TLM assertions generated from
episode mining by measuring the distribution of time interval between the occur-
rence of two events/function calls in the generated assertions. The time interval
of events/function calls is smaller than 50 time units in the assertion generated by
episode mining, while this time interval in sequential pattern mining can be as great
as the length of each sequence.
Based on our previous work [35], our new contributions are as follows. We
generate much fewer assertion than our previous method in [35]. Assertions are
more focused, and have fewer spurious or purely coincidental relationships. The
used episode mining is scalable for design trace with arbitrary number of events,
while the sequential pattern mining in [35] is only able to handle less than 64 events.
We enhance the generated assertions with time annotation to express performance
constraints. We finally demonstrate our method on realistic SystemC models.
6.2 Symbolic Execution of TLMs
As we introduced in Chapter 2, Symbolic execution refers to the execution of a
single concrete path with symbolic inputs instead of concrete inputs [42]. It is
used to reason about all the inputs that take the same path through a program and is
applied in path based software testing. The symbolic execution follows the specified
concrete path.
In the context of system level designs, the model is simulated with concrete in-
puts. The concrete path is recorded in instrumented variables, which indicates the
taken branch during the concrete execution [44]. After that, the system level model
is symbolically re-executed along the concrete path and all variables on the paths
are evaluated using symbolic inputs. Although symbolic execution suffers from
path explosion problem, we do not try to use symbolic execution to explore all
paths in our context. Symbolic execution in our context is only along the concrete
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simulation paths triggered by testbench. The symbolic expressions for function pa-
rameters and return values are then calculated on each concrete path. Therefore, the
usage of symbolic execution in our context is scalable to large design.
1. dma_tb::run(){
2. ...
3. src_addr=rand();
4. value=src_addr+1024;
5. dma1.write(SRC, value)
6. ...
7. }
8. dma::write(addr, data, ...){
9. ....
10. case(addr)
11. SRC:
12. dma_src_addr=data;
13. DST:
14. ....
15. }
(2)concrete simulation (3)symbolic execution(1)source program
1. dma_tb::run(){
2. ...
3. src_addr=1038;
4. value=2062;
5. dma1.write(1, 2062)
6. ...
7. }
8. dma::write(1, 2062, ...){
9. ....
10. case(addr)
11. SRC:
12. dma_src_addr=2062;
13. DST:
14. ....
15. }
1. dma_tb::run(){
2. ...
3. src_addr=A;
4. value=A+1024;
5. dma1.write(1, A+1024)
6. ...
7. }
8. dma::write(1, A+1024, ...){
9. ....
10. case(addr)
11. SRC:
12. dma_src_addr=A+1024;
13. DST:
14. ....
15. }
Figure 6.1: A simple program [2] and its corresponding concrete simulation and
symbolic execution.
In Figure 6.1, we show a simple DMA testbench and its corresponding concrete
simulation and symbolic execution. The call to rand() returns 1038 during con-
crete simulation/execution. The expressions are evaluated using concrete values
and all variables are assigned concrete values during the execution. The symbolic
execution, on the other hand, evaluates expressions symbolically along the concrete
path using the initial symbolic input variables. The return value of function rand()
is considered as a symbolic input variable A. Along the path of concrete simula-
tion, the value is evaluated as A + 1024. The second parameter of the function
dma write() is evaluated as A + 1024 in the path. It should be noted that SRC is
a constant in the program and it is thus not evaluated with symbolic variables. In
general, branch conditions along the path are extracted as path constraints during
the symbolic execution.
6.3 TLM Assertion Definition
We express our generated TLM assertions in the form of temporal logic with quan-
titative real time constraints [50]. Our assertion definition considers both the quan-
titative real time constraint and function calls.
Let F denote the set of functions in a TLM design M and E denote the set of
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events in M. In the reset of this chapter, we also view function call as a special
event. We will use e to represent both f and e.
An event set Λ is a set of events. In our context, any event in Λ is either a function
call or an event in TLM designs. Formally, Λ = E ∪ F .
An event occurrence is a pair (e, t), where e ∈ Λ. t is the time when e occurs. It
is also denoted as e@t.
An event sequence S on Λ is an ordered sequence of event occurrences which are
ordered by the time t of each occurrence. S can be expressed as< (e0, t0), (e1, t1), ...,
(en, tn) >, where ∀i ∈ [0, n − 1], ti ≤ ti+1 and ei ∈ Λ. The event sequence corre-
sponds to TLM simulation trace.
The basic form of the generated TLM assertion is formally expressed as follows:
e1 ⇒ F[t1,t2]e2: where t1 ≥ 0 and t2 ≥ t1 (6.1)
The generated TLM assertions belong to the safety properties of the TLM mod-
els. We omit the global G operator when expressing the assertion. Its semantics can
be expressed as follows. During any execution/simulation, ∀ e1@tx, ∃ty s.t e2@ty
and t1 ≤ ty − tx ≤ t2. It means when e1 occurs at tx, e2 will occur between tx + t1
and tx + t2. We also name e1 the antecedent of the assertion and e2 the consequent
of the assertion.
If the antecedent of an assertion A1 is the same as the consequent of an assertion
A2, we can concatenate them together to form a longer TLM assertions. For exam-
ple, e1 ⇒ F[t1,t2]e2 and e2 ⇒ F[t3,t4]e3 can form a new assertion: e1 ⇒ F[t1,t2]e2 ⇒
F[t3,t4]e3, which is also expressed as e1 →[t1,t2] e2 →[t3,t4] e3 using our notation.
6.4 Flow of SystemC TLM Assertion Generation
Figure 6.2 shows the detailed framework for SystemC TLM assertion generation.
The entire framework also includes formal verification of the generated TLM asser-
tions and how to employ them for practical verification. In this chapter, we mainly
focus on the assertion generation part which is enclosed in the dotted box.
Given a SystemC TLM design, we first instrument callback functions to record
the parameter value and the time when the function is called, and the event occur-
rence [37]. The design is then simulated and simulation trace is recorded into a
file. Data symbolization is applied to replace concrete values in simulation trace
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Figure 6.2: Our vision of SystemC TLM assertion generation. The dotted line
outlines the portion of the flow that we have implemented in this chapter. An
important use case of our assertions can be as TLM assertions for SystemC model
validation and debug or a reference library for RTL assertion generation.
with symbolic expressions. We attempt sequential mining and episode mining to
discover frequently occurred patterns within the symbolized simulation trace. We
annotate the patterns with quantitative real time parameters and output the gener-
ated TLM assertions. Finally, the generated TLM assertions are evaluated using our
proposed standards.
These mined assertions can be formally checked on system-level design with
commercial model checking tool. For example, the C model checking tool like
BLAST or special SystemC verification tool [125] can be potentially applied for
formal verification of SystemC design. The counterexamples can also be incor-
porated to refine the spurious assertions. Similarly, the feedback from design and
verification engineer can also be used to direct the generation of new stimulus. Fi-
nally, all final true assertions can be output as a set of TLM assertions. To the best
of our knowledge, verifying the generated TLM assertions is still an open problem
and we do not try to solve it here. For employing the TLM assertions for RTL ver-
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ification, the general method is to refine system level assertions to RTL assertions,
which has been introduced in [126].
6.5 Data Generation
In the data generation stage, the target design simulated using several tests to gen-
erate trace for data mining. During the execution of each test, function calls and
events triggering communication activity are recorded. At the entrance and exit of
each communication function, code is manually instrumented to report the function
call, parameters, and return value of that function call. Any event that occurs is
reported as well. This reported data is piped to a file which will serve as the input
for the data symbolization and episode mining algorithm. An example of this file
can be seen in Figure 6.3.
• Function calls: Calls to, and returning from, functions always involve com-
munication activity. The parameters passed to the function are also recorded.
The return value of each function call is considered as a special function call.
• Events: These are instances of the built-in event type. Events are used to
trigger the computation blocks or other communication actions. Therefore,
they are indispensable components for expressing transaction level assertions.
We also record the exact time when the function calls or events occur during
the simulation. The time is used in episode mining and also for determining the
quantitative real time values of generated TLM assertions. It should be noted that
a simulation trace consists of multiple runs of different tests. Sequential pattern
mining in [35] generated frequent sequential patterns from these multiple simu-
lation runs. In this chapter, we combine multiple runs into one simulation trace
for episode mining. We will present in experiment section about how to combine
multiple runs into one simulation trace for mining.
Our assertions are mined from the simulation traces. The quality of the applied
test stimulus has a big impact on the generated assertions. If the test stimuli are
not able to cover the entire design sufficiently, the generated assertions tend to be
spurious assertions and are not able to capture the entire specifications of the de-
sign. Therefore, we require that the applied test stimulus should have high coverage
of the design functionality. In practice, users can adopt real testcases from system
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Figure 6.3: An example of one simulation run from a timed DMA controller
design. The function dma.write() is a command called by DMA testbench which
configures the controlling register in the DMA controller. b transport is the
primitive function call. mem read().return is a function call return.
group due to the fast simulation speed at system level. Users can also adopt cov-
erage metric to evaluate the test stimuli. We do not solve the problem of stimulus
generation for TLMs here.
6.5.1 Data Symbolization Using Symbolic Execution
As we mention before, we require the TLM assertions to be able to capture the
abstract behaviors of the design such as the data propagation relationship between
different modules. A typical example of TLM assertion is shown as follows:
TLM Assertion: tb.write(addr=‘SRC, data=src addr)
⇒ F[5,20] mem1.read(addr=src addr, ...)
The tb.write and mem1.read are both function calls in SystemC TLM designs,
and addr and data are parameters of the functions. It states that once the DMA
testbench(tb) writes the address of the source memory to the SRC register in the
DMA controller, the source memory(mem1) will issue a read operation with that
address afterwards. It can be observed that the propagation of src addr is incorpo-
rated into the assertion.
In the shown assertion example, the data parameter in function tb.write will be
used as the addr parameter in the function mem1.read. During model simulation,
the variable src addr is assigned a different concrete value in each test. This means
that if two function calls have differing parameters, they will be represented as
unrelated items by the mining algorithm. This makes it difficult for the mining
algorithm to realize that the same sequence occurs in each test since the functions
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are seemingly unrelated.
To solve this problem, we use a method of data symbolization. Symbolic execu-
tion is employed to calculate the symbolic value of each parameter in terms of the
symbolic input variables. The symbolic values, rather than the concrete values, are
recorded for mining.
For transaction level designs, we specify all the design inputs as primary sym-
bolic inputs in the top-level testbench module. In a constraint random testbench,
the primary inputs are randomized during simulation. We specify a symbolic value
for each primary input. The symbolic values are kept the same for each iteration of
the test, although these inputs will be assigned different concrete values in each test
during the model simulation. For example, in the test we used for the DMA con-
troller, the source and destination address, along with the length of each transaction,
were randomized. We specify different symbolic value for these input variables.
In each test simulation, the concrete execution path is tracked by recording the
taken branch. At the end of the simulation, symbolic execution is initiated along
the concrete execution path taken in the test. Each assignment expression on this
path is calculated in terms of primary symbolic inputs. The function parameters
and return values are replaced with expressions in terms of the primary symbolic
values. These symbolic function calls replace the concrete function calls in the
original trace. It should be noted that we do not need to symbolize the conditional
expressions in each simulation path since the conditional expressions do not assign
values to any variable in the model. In the example shown in Figure 6.1, it is shown
that the dma.write() function is recorded as dma.write(1, A + 1024) rather than
dma.write(1, 2062) in the simulation trace.
One symbolized trace is generated for each test simulation. All symbolized traces
are collected and used as the database for assertion mining. In other words, the
assertion generation is based on the traces of all simulation paths instead of a single
path. Mining engine will discover the invariants among the traces of all simulation
paths. The generated candidate assertions are checked on the whole design when
using SystemC model checker.
6.6 Attempt I: Sequential Pattern Mining
Sequential pattern mining searches for frequent subsequences as patterns in a se-
quence data set, where a sequence records an ordering events [3]. The sequences
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in the database are recorded with or without a concrete notion of time. A typi-
cal example of sequential pattern is “Customers who buy bread are likely to buy
milk within one month.” For retail market, sequential patterns are useful for shelf
placement and promotions. They also find applications in web access analysis and
network intrusion detection.
<eg(af)cbc>4
<(ef)(ab)(df)cb>3
<(ad)c(bc)(ae)>2
<a(abc)(ac)d(cf)>1
SequenceSeq ID
Figure 6.4: A sequence database [3].
Figure 6.4 shows a sequence database and there are four sequences. In sequence
1, there are 5 events: (a),(abc),(ac),(d),(cf ). In each event, there may be several
items and these items are not ordered within event. An item can occur at most
once in an event of a sequence and can occur multiple times in different events of a
sequence. A sequence α is called a subsequence of another sequence β if α can be
derived from β by deleting some items or events without changing the event order.
For example, <a(bc)dc> is a subsequence of <a(abc)(ac)d(cf)>.
The support of a sequence α in a sequence database is the number of tuples in
the database containing α. A frequent sequence α is called a sequential pattern if
the support of α is not less than a given minimum support threshold. The support
parameter is the most widely used measure for evaluating sequential patterns and
it denotes the frequency with which a pattern occurs. Consider the subsequence
s=<(ab)c>, which is highlighted in the Figure 6.4. It occurs in sequence 1 and
sequence 2. Therefore, the support of subsequence s is 2. If the given minimum
support threshold is less than 2, then sequence s is frequent pattern.
The sequential mining algorithms are mostly based on the Apriori algorithm. In
the first pass, it counts all frequent single items. These frequent items are then used
to form candidate sequences with length 2. Similarly, all frequent sequences with
length 2 are used to generate candidate sequences with length 3. This process is
converged until no more frequent sequences are generated.
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6.7 Attempt II: Episode Mining
In this section, we first give several basic definitions which are necessary to explain
episode mining algorithm. Then we introduce the episode mining algorithm for
generating frequent episodes from the TLM simulation traces.
6.7.1 Basic Definitions
An episode ξ is an ordered sequence of events. The events in the episode must
occur in the order denoted as . For example, if e1 occurs before e2 and e2 oc-
curs before e3 in TLM design M , then ξ can be e1  e2  e3. We can gener-
ate subepisode of an episode by removing one or more events from that episode.
e2  e3 is a subepisode of ξ. The prefix of an episode ξ is a special subepisode by
removing the last event of ξ. The postfix of an episode ξ is a special subepisode by
removing the first event of ξ. In previous episode ξ, e2  e3 is the postfix of ξ, and
e1  e2 is the prefix of ξ.
A window constraint is a real value w, that refers to the width of a time window.
We can slide the time window along the time axis of an event sequence S. At time
tx, the sliding window corresponds to a time interval [tx, tx + w].
Given a window constraint w, an episode ξ occurs in a window [tx, tx + w] if
∀em  en in ξ, ∃ tm,tn such that em@tm and en@tn in event sequence and tx ≤
tm ≤ tn ≤ (tx + w). This means that every event in ξ must occur in the sliding
window [tx, tx + w].
An episode could occur in multiple sliding windows as the window is slid along
the time axis. We define the support of an episode as the number of sliding windows
this episode could occur in.
Given a support threshold value, a frequent episode is one whose support value
is larger than the given threshold. Given an episode ξ, if the support of its prefix is
the same as the support of ξ, we say that the confidence of ξ is 100%.
Figure 6.5 shows an episode example and an event sequence. The episode e1 
e2 occurs three times in the given event sequence. The support is thus 3. e1 is a
subepisode of e1  e2 and e1 is also a frequent episode.
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Figure 6.5: A frequent episode example of an event sequence. The window
constraint is 3.5 in this example and frequency threshold is 3.
6.7.2 Episode Mining Algorithm
Given an event set E, an event sequence E Seq, a support threshold Min supp
and a window constraint Win, the episode mining algorithm tries to discover all
frequent episodes from S. The algorithm is an incremental extension process. It
first generates frequent episodes including only one event. Then it generates fre-
quent two-event episodes from these frequent one-event episodes. Iteratively, it
generates frequent episodes from the frequent episodes reported in last iteration un-
til there are no more frequent episodes. The algorithm is based on the following
observation: If an episode is frequent in an event sequence, then any subepisodes
are also frequent [123].
The algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. The input parameters are event set, event
sequence, support threshold, and the window constraint. Ci+1 records candidate
episodes generated from frequent episodes of previous iteration. Li+1 records the
frequent episodes in iteration i. Freq Check function is responsible for checking
whether the provided episode is frequent or not in the event sequence. The checking
process needs to slide the window to count the support of each episode.
In every iteration, the algorithm generates candidate episodes first and then checks
whether the candidate episodes are frequent or not in event sequence. If a candidate
episode is frequent, it will be reported as a frequent episode and is also kept for
generating episodes in the next iteration.
Cand Gen function generates candidate episodes in current iteration i. The gen-
eration process is shown in Figure 6.6. The frequent episodes generated in iteration
i− 1 are used to form candidate episodes for iteration i. All infrequent episodes in
iteration i − 1 are discarded in the next iteration. e1  e2 in this example is not a
116
Algorithm 1 Episode Mining algorithm
EpisodeMine(E,E Seq,Min supp,Win)
1: FreqEpisode = ∅;
2: L1 = Freq Check(E,Min supp,Win); L2 = L1;
3: for (i = 1; Li+1 6= ∅; i+ +) do
4: Ci+1 = Cand Gen(Li);
5: Li+1 = Freq Check(Ci+1,Min supp,Win);
6: FreqEpisode = FreqEpisode
⋃
Li+1;
7: end for
8: return FreqEpisode;
frequent episode and is not used in the next iteration. Given two frequent episodes
ξ1 and ξ2 in iteration i, we consider the prefix and postfix of both ξ1 and ξ2. If the
prefix (postfix) of ξ1 and the postfix (prefix) of ξ2 are the same, ξ1 and ξ2 can form
a candidate episode in next iteration. For example, e1  e2  e3 and e2  e3  e4
can be used to form candidate episode e1  e2  e3  e4.
During candidate generation, we also require that the generated episode is 100%
confidence in the event trace since these assertions reflect the specification of the
TLM design and they will be used for design debugging.
The generated frequent episodes are simply interpreted as TLM assertions. The
order  in episode is translated to → in TLM assertion. For example, episode
e1  e2  e3  e4 is translated into assertion e1 → e2 → e3 → e4.
e1 e2 
e1≤e2 
frequent 
infrequent 
e3 e4 e5 e6 e7 
e1≤e3 e1≤e4 e2≤e1 e3≤e4 e1≤e7 e3≤e5 
e1≤e3≤e5 
ξ1 ξ2 
Iteration i 
Iteration i+1 
Figure 6.6: The incremental candidate episode generation in episode mining. The
algorithm incrementally generate candidate episodes with i+ 1 events from
frequent episodes with i events.
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6.8 Comparison between Sequential Pattern Mining
and Episode Mining for TLM Assertion Generation
We first attempt sequential pattern mining to generate TLM assertions [35]. We
found that it is inefficient when applying it for large simulation traces. Episode min-
ing uses a window constraint to prune the search space and improves the scalability
of mining algorithm. As shown in Figure 6.5, episode e3  e4 does not satisfy the
window constraint and are not considered as candidate episodes in mining process.
The framework of mining frequent episodes was first proposed in [123]. It is dif-
ferent from sequential pattern mining. First, the episodes are mined from an event
sequence in which events are ordered by their occurrence time. Sequential pattern
mining discovers frequent subsequence from multiple event sequences. Second, the
events of an episode must occur close enough in time. Therefore, episode mining
employs a time window constraint to search for the candidate episodes. Sequen-
tial pattern mining only considers the order of events and searches for frequent
patterns in each entire sequence. Finally, in sequential pattern mining, multiple
occurrences of a pattern in one sequence is considered as one occurrence when cal-
culating the support value. The episode mining calculates the number of occurrence
of an episode within on sequence.
From the perspective of practical TLM specification, using a window to limit
the search space is also meaningful. For example, DMA controller initiates two
independent transactions. However, the function call or events occurring during
the first transaction is not correlated to the function calls or events in the second
transaction. Window constraint is able to avoid the generation of such assertions.
6.9 Quantitative Time Annotation
Given a frequent episode (assertion) reported by the mining algorithm, we need
to annotate it with quantitative real time constraint. We check every adjacent event
pair< ei, ej > in the episode (assertion) and extract the time parameters from event
sequence. We initially set a lower bound as +∞ and upper bound as 0. For every
episode occurrence < ...ei@ti, ej@tj... > in event sequence, we update the lower
bound to | tj − ti | if | tj − ti | is less than the current lower bound. Similarly, if the
| tj − ti | is larger than upper bound, we update the upper bound accordingly.
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6.10 Evaluation of TLM Assertions
In order to classify and evaluate the quality of generated assertions for transaction
level designs, we propose the following standards for good TLM assertions:
• Standard I: If the assertion involves several function calls, the parameters
of these function calls should be correlated and be able to express the data
propagation property during the test. For example, f(A,B)→ g(C,B + 2).
• Standard II: The involved function calls or events in the assertion should
be at different interfaces of the design. In other words, the assertion should
be across at least one computation module. This standard is different from
cycle based design’s assertions, in which we assert the relative timing of the
signals in the same interface. In TLMs, the signals on the same interface are
encapsulated in one function call.
• Standard III: The length of generated assertions should be constrained. We
use the constraint 3 to limit the assertion length. For example, the assertion
A → B → C has length 3. It will be very difficult to accurately localize
the failed stage if an assertion is very long. Moreover, too long assertions
will degrade the simulation performance if we will monitor the generated
assertion during simulation.
6.11 TLM Benchmark Platform: An AXI Based
Interconnection Network
To evaluate our research in system level, we specially implement a practical plat-
form using SystemC TLM. We use a hierarchical AXI bus model as the inter-
connect. We model it at approximately-timed transaction level. Each transaction
communication has multiple phases, and delays are annotated on process interac-
tions. The model is shown in Figure 6.7, and the source code can be downloaded
from [124]. The model includes one processor cluster and one DSP cluster, both of
which serve as initiators. The platform is close to a real industrial system in wireless
baseband application and is agreed upon as a common platform for experiment by
our industry collaborators. Any CPU/DSP initiator is allowed to communicate with
any target. We generated tests in five initiators to test the whole platform. Target
0 and target 1 are DMA controller. Target 2 and target 3 are eight bank memory
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models, and they are able to respond to the requests from different memory banks
in parallel.
Bus 0 Bus 1 
Bus 2 
Bus 3 
Bridge 4 Bridge 5 
Bridge 0 Bridge 1 Bridge 2 Bridge 3 
Initiator 0 Initiator 1 Initiator 2 Initiator 3 Initiator 4 
Target 0 Target 1 Target 2 Target 3 
Figure 6.7: Figure showing the framework of AXI based interconnection network.
All interconnection buses are AXI.
6.12 Experimental Analysis
We apply our flow to generate system level assertions for the SystemC TLM de-
signs. We use two SystemC designs for evaluating our proposed method. The
first design is a transaction level AMBA-based DMA controller. The second de-
sign is the AXI based interconnection network benchmark. For the AMBA-based
DMA controller design, we generate TLM assertions using our mining method and
evaluate sample assertions with our proposed standards. We also compare the per-
formance of episode mining with that of general sequential pattern mining [35].
For the AXI-based interconnection network design, we use our method to generate
TLM assertions with annotated time constraints and analyze these assertions.
6.12.1 AMBA-based DMA Controller
The SystemC code in this experiment is from the DMA example of AMBA-PV API
provided by ARM [2]. The entire environment consists of: 1) a simple testbench to
program the DMA transfers; 2) an AMBA-PV bus decoder routing transactions be-
tween the system components; 3) a simple DMA controller model implementing a
producer-consumer scheme; 4) two AMBA-PV memories. The DMA controller is
responsible for transferring the data between memories according to DMA control
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command. Each transfer is considered as one transaction. The testbench config-
ures the DMA controller by writing control registers of DMA through AMBA-PV
channel. The environment framework is shown in Figure 6.8. We can configure the
DMA controller for multiple simulation runs.
Testbench
DMA
AMBA
Decoder
(Router)
Memory 1
Memory 2
: master socket
: slave socket
dma_irq interface
Figure 6.8: The framework of a transaction level AMBA-based DMA controller.
Table 6.1: Evaluation of assertions generated by episode mining for a transaction
level model of a DMA controller. Quantitative time constraints are discarded in the
assertions since the DMA controller model is a programmer view model, and there
is no timing information.
Assertion TLMs sample assertions Standard
A1 dma1.write(DST, B)→ mem2.write(B) I+II+III
A2 tb.write(DST, B)→ dma1.write(DST, B) I+III
A3 tb.write(CTRL, 0x01)→ m start transfer II+III
A4 m start transfer→ dma irq→ m end transfer II+III
A5 burst read(A, G)→ burst write(B, G) I+II+III
A6 tb.write(SRC, A)→ b tran rd(A, 0, H) I+II+III
Augmenting DMA Controller with Timing
The DMA controller design we use is an untimed model for early software devel-
opment, and there is no timing information in the model. All events/function calls
occur at time zero during simulation and the delay between events/function calls
is abstracted away for fast simulation. Absence of timing information in the un-
timed model does not mean that all events and function calls occur simultaneously.
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Our TLM simulation trace still records the occurrence order of the function calls
and events. In order to apply episode mining, we need to identify the time when a
function call or an event occurs.
We need to preprocess the simulation trace of the untimed DMA controller model
for episode mining. Recall that multiple simulation runs need to be combined into
one simulation trace. We preprocess multiple simulation runs one at a time. For the
first simulation run, we assign an ordering numerical value to each event or function
calls. The numerical value initially starts at 0 and increments the order number by
one for each function call or event within the first simulation run. The numerical
value represents the artificial occurrence time of the event or function call within
simulation run. When it comes to the end of one simulation run, we increment
the ordering numerical value by the value of window constraint, and then continue
to assign ordering numerical value for another simulation run. We thus avoid the
interference between events/function calls in two different simulation runs. We
wish to keep the events/function calls in two simulation runs independent while
generating TLM assertions. Hence, we manually assign a sufficient gap between
different simulation runs.
Evaluation of Generated Sample TLM Assertions
Table 6.1 shows several sample assertions automatically generated from the simula-
tion traces. We also evaluate these assertions using our proposed standards for good
assertions. The variables A, B, etc., in function call parameters are the symbolic
input variables in the design. Table 6.2 describes what each assertion means.
Since the transaction level model focuses on communication between different
modules, only the communication specification of the DMA controller is captured
by the assertions. We also analyze the relationship between the generated assertions
and the coverage of communication actions in the DMA controller.
• Configuration interface of DMA controller: The testbench serves as the AMBA
master device and DMA controller is the slave device. The testbench issues
various configuration command to the master interface and the DMA con-
troller accepts the configuration. This functionality is covered by the sample
assertions A2, A3 and A6.
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• Communication between DMA controller and memories: The DMA con-
troller serves as AMBA master and memory 1 and 2 are slaves. DMA con-
troller reads the data from memory 1 and writes it to memory 2. This function
is covered by A1 and A5.
• Interrupt interface between DMA controller and testbench: When the DMA
controller finishes one transaction, it will set the interrupt request interface.
This function is covered by A4.
Table 6.2: Functional descriptions of the sample set of assertions shown in
Table 6.1. Our techniques are able to generate assertions which capture
communication specification intent and temporal functionality.
Assertion Function description
A1
Once the dma testbench(tb) writes the
address of source memory to the DST
register in DMA controller, the source
memory(mem2) will issue a write oper-
ation with the address.
A2
The dma write function call follows the
testbench write function call and they
have the same function parameters.
A3
Once the testbench writes 0x01 to the
control register, the event m start transfer
will be issued.
A4 The three ordering events appear in every
DMA transaction.
A5
The burst write function to destination
memory follows the burst read function
from the source memory and the length
parameter is the same.
A6
Once the dma testbench writes the ad-
dress of source memory to the SRC reg-
ister in DMA controller, the b transport
function is called with the source address
as first parameter. Function b transport
is an API function of the library.
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Comparison between Episode Mining and General Sequential Pattern Mining
In this experiment, we compare the number of generated assertions and running
time between episode mining and general sequential pattern mining as described
in [35]. The time of simulation, instrumentation and symbolic execution is negli-
gible when compared to the pattern mining time. For episode mining, we use one
simulation trace consisting of multiple simulation runs and preprocess it by includ-
ing artificial time for each event or function call. For sequential pattern mining, we
use multiple simulation runs as in [35].
Table 6.3: Comparison between episode mining and general sequential pattern
mining for TLMs assertions generation on DMA controller model. The number of
generated assertions and running time are shown in the table. We also compare the
average number of generated TLM assertions per event or function call in the
design.
Num of Episode Mining Sequential Mining Reduction in
runs Num. of Runtime Num. of Num. of Runtime Num. of Num. of
Assertions Assertions/Event Assertions Assertion/Event Assertions
5 8682 0.365s 130 1980363 10s 30943 228x
10 3923 0.292s 50 589823 3s 9216 150x
15 3923 0.219s 47 589823 4s 9216 150x
20 3923 0.240s 47 589823 8s 9216 150x
30 3923 0.233s 47 589823 5s 9216 150x
50 3923 0.363s 47 589823 6s 9216 150x
In Table 6.3, it can be observed that episode pattern mining is able to generate a
much more compact set of assertions within 2 seconds than sequential pattern min-
ing. For episode mining, we also do not constrain the number of events/function
calls in the trace. However, for general sequential pattern mining, we include only
64 events/function calls in each simulation run since SPAM [127] does not sup-
port more than 64 transactions in our experiment. We discover that the number of
assertions generated by sequential pattern mining is significantly larger than that
generated by episode mining. From the table, the number of generated assertions
by sequential pattern mining can be 150 to 228 times more than that by episode
mining. Also, sequential pattern mining generates much more assertions per event
or function call than episode mining does. As a result, it is also very difficult to find
readable and useful assertions for TLM verification.
In Table 6.4, we show several sample assertions which are generated by sequen-
tial pattern mining but not generated by episode mining. It can be observed that
there is no cause-effect relationship between the events within each assertion. For
example, two DMA write function calls are included in assertion Seq A1. The
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Table 6.4: Evaluation the quality of assertions generated by sequential pattern
mining. The events within each assertion have no cause-effect relationship, and
they are related coincidentally by the sequential mining algorithm. Episode
mining, however, is able to avoid the generation of these low quality assertions.
Assertion TLMs sample assertions
Seq A1 dma1.write(DST, B)→ dma1.write(CTR, E)
Seq A2 dma1.write(DST, B)→ dma1.write(DST, B)
Seq A3 tb.write(LEN, B)→ m end transfer
first call writes the destination address, and the second one writes the control reg-
ister to clear the interrupt after all transactions are finished. We cannot assert any
relationship between these two function calls. Seq A2 relates the same function
call in two different transaction activity. The second write belongs to another in-
dependent transaction trace. There should be no cause-effect relationship between
them. Sequential pattern mining does not take into account the interval between
any events. It searches for the correlated events in the entire sequence. As a result,
a lot of events are related coincidentally. This is also why sequential pattern mining
algorithm generates much more assertions than episode mining does.
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Figure 6.9: Figure showing the distribution of the time interval between two
events/function calls of two-event assertions generated by episode mining. We fix
one event/function call (write source addr) in the DMA controller and consider all
assertions including this event.
We further analyze the quality of assertions by measuring the time interval be-
tween occurrence of events/function calls in the generated assertions. If the time in-
terval between two events/function calls occurrence exceeds the lifetime of a trans-
action, then we conclude that there is no cause-effect relationship between these
two events/function calls. This is reasonable, since an event in one transaction is
unlikely to affect an event in another transaction. We find that episode mining tends
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to correlate the events/function calls within small enough time interval. Figure 6.9
shows the distribution of the occurrence time interval for the assertions generated
using episode mining. We used a window constraint of 100 time units. It can be
observed that the time intervals between two events/function calls in each generated
assertion is smaller than 50 time units. We cannot show the results for sequential
pattern mining, because the tool [127] we used can only support a maximum of
64 events. This is an artificial constraints of the tool. Other implementation of se-
quential pattern mining might not impose such constraints. It is thus not feasible to
compare it with episode mining that does not limit the number of events. In general,
the sequential pattern mining’s time interval can be as great as the length of each
sequence. In addition, there are hundred thousand assertions, and it is difficult to
characterize the distribution of their time intervals.
6.12.2 AXI Based Interconnection Network Platform
In this section, we evaluate the assertions generated by episode mining for our AXI
based interconnection network platform.
Table 6.5: Evaluation of assertions generated by episode mining for an AXI based
interconnection network. The unit of time constraint is nanosecond. The used
window constraint is 300ns.
Assertion TLMs sample assertions Standard
B1 bus1.socket1.nb tran fw(tran.cmd=Rd, tran.tgt=target1, phase=begin req) I+II+III
→[2.005,100] target1.nb tran fw(tran.cmd=Rd, tran.tgt=target1, phase=end resp)
B2 bus0.socket0.nb tran fw(tran.cmd=Rd, tran.tgt=target0, phase=begin req) I+II+III
→[2.005,200] target0.memory read()
B3 bridge2.socket0.nb tran fw(tran.cmd=Wr, tran.tgt=target2, phase=begin req) I+II+III
→[0,1] bus2.socket2.nb tran fw(tran.cmd=Wr, tran.tgt=target2, phase=begin req)
B4 end request@init 2 I+II+III
→[2,99.995] bus0.socket2.nb tran fw(tran.cmd=Rd, tran.tgt=target0, phase=end resp)
B5 bus0.socket2.nb tran fw(tran.cmd=Rd, tran.tgt=target0, phase=begin req) I+III
→[2.005,100] bus0.socket2.nb tran fw(tran.cmd=Rd, tran.tgt=target0, phase=end resp)
Evaluation and Analysis of Generated Time Annotated TLM Assertions
In this experiment, the communication primitive functions of all used sockets are
instrumented for recording simulation traces. We simulate the design and generate
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TLM assertions from the simulation traces using episode mining. The final simu-
lation traces consist of events, TLM communication primitive function calls during
simulation, the parameters in each call, and the occurrence time of each function
call. The generated trace is then used for episode mining. We show five sample
TLM assertions from different sockets in Table 6.5 and also evaluate these asser-
tions according to our proposed standards.
Assertion B1 asserts that once nb tran fw function in bridge1 is called, the
nb tran fw function in target1 will be called within the range [2.005ns, 100ns].
Initiator4 calls the nb tran fw function in bridge1 to initiate a transaction. The
nb tran fw function in target1 with phase = end resp means the end of com-
munication. This assertion thus implies the entire latency of one read transaction
communication between initiator4 and target1.
Assertion B2 asserts that once the initiator0 initiates a read transaction to target0,
the memory read function in target0 will be called. The initiator0 calls the
nb tran fw function in bridge0 to initiate a transaction. The communication la-
tency is within range [2.005ns, 200ns] for different transactions.
Assertion B3 asserts that the nb tran fw call in bridge2 is followed by nb tran fw
call in bus2 for the write transaction. It also expresses that the delay time of write
transaction in the bridge block is less than 1ns.
Assertion B4 asserts that once the event end request occurs in initiator2, the
primitive function nb tran fw() in bus0 will be called by initiator2. The param-
eters imply that the transaction is a read transaction, the target is target0 and the
phase is begin resp. The begin resp is the last phase of the communication be-
tween initiator2 and target0. The latency between the event and the function call
is within the range [2ns, 99.995ns].
Assertion B5 asserts that the latency between two phases of nb tran fw func-
tion call by initiator2 is within the range [2.005ns, 100ns]. The antecedent of B5
indicates the beginning of the communication and the consequent of B5 indicates
the ending of that communication.
It can be observed that these assertions always capture the data propagation rela-
tions in the interconnection network since we include the function call parameters
in simulation traces. Each event or function call represents a high level data opera-
tion in the design. For example, the nb tran fw means the sending or receiving of
a transaction. The mined assertions thus capture the temporal relationships among
these high level data operations.
We also conduct experiments on the following two types of simulation traces that
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can affect the quantitative time constraint on each assertion.
• Random data trace: Each initiator is allowed to send transaction to any target
at random time.
• Concurrent data trace: Multiple initiators send transactions to the same target
at approximately the same time.
We observe that the annotated time constraints will change depending on the
nature of simulation traces. The value of quantitative real time constraint in con-
current data trace is larger than that in random data trace, which means the latency
of data communication is increasing due to the concurrent data requests. Too many
such concurrent accesses degrade the performance of the design. Take the assertion
B1 as one example. The quantitative real time constraint becomes [2.005, 1500] in
the case of concurrent data trace.
Window Constraint’s Impact on TLM Assertion Generation
Window in episode mining is used to prune the search space and thus improve
the efficiency of mining algorithm. Episode mining generates candidate assertions
among the events within the window. The setting of the window constraint influ-
ences the number of generated assertions and also the quality of generated asser-
tions. In this experiment, we show the number of generated assertions for different
window constraint in Figure 6.10.
It can be observed that more TLM assertions are generated with the increase of
window constraint. Also, the running time the episode mining increases as we en-
large the window constraint, because more events appear in the time window and
more candidate episodes needs to be checked by the algorithm. However, if the
window is too large, a lot of TLM assertions will be generated. The events/function
calls, which belong to different transaction communications, are coincidentally cor-
related in one assertion. It means the quality of generated TLM assertions are de-
creasing. In the extreme case, the episode mining is close to the general sequential
pattern mining if we set the window constraint to the time length of event sequence.
In our experiment, we set the window constraint as the maximum lifetime of
transaction in the simulation trace. In this way, our generated assertions are able to
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Figure 6.10: The number of TLM assertions and running time for different
window constraints. The experimental design is an AXI based interconnection
network. As we increase the window constraint further, the number of generated
assertions appears to approach that of sequential pattern mining.
capture the functional behaviors frequently occurring within all transaction commu-
nications. Meanwhile, it is less likely to generate the assertions involving events/function
calls from two different transaction communications.
6.13 Related Work and Conclusion
The specification mining from software is extensively studied before. Assertion
generation though static analysis of source code or a model has been studied in the
context of deductive program verification [27]. The deduction of loop invariants
can quickly get very complex. Static analysis techniques have been used to learn
invariants for assisting software verification. Dynamic analysis techniques like data
mining have been used in software to determine system invariants [110]. Daikon
[27] runs a software program, observes the value that the program computes and
then reports likely invariants that were true over the observed executions. These
likely invariants are used in program understanding and evolution. However, the
generated likely invariants largely depend on input stimulus of the program and
may be spurious with respect to specification. SMArTIC [128] tries to improve the
accuracy of mined specification using clustering, filtering, learning and merging
techniques.
In hardware assertion generation, most of the work focuses on RTL design [28],
[29], [31], [121]. IODINE [31] tries to automatically infer likely invariants by hy-
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pothesizing a set of predefined invariant pattern across one or more variables in the
design and then analyzing its dynamic behavior during simulation. The generated
assertions need not be sound and they are usually simple assertions like one-hot en-
coding. Specification patterns mined from correct and erroneous traces can be used
to automatically localize an error [28]. Sequential pattern mining is also applied to
generate assertions from RTL design [121].
The definition of assertions at transaction level and how to efficiently monitor
them in simulation are also explored. A temporal language for SystemC is proposed
in [37], [38], [129]. The hierarchical concept is adopted to construct complex high
layer assertion from simple low layer assertions. The generation of SystemC moni-
tors from given assertions is implemented in Horus [37]. Each monitor is enclosed
in a wrapper observing the channels or events involved in the assertions. However,
the quantitative real time constraint is not considered in the work. The work in [129]
defines TLM assertions in terms of design events or transaction events. The com-
munication action, which is a function call during simulation, is excluded from the
assertion.
The refinement of the assertions at transaction level model to RTL model is dis-
cussed in [126], in which a transactor is specifically designed to map the events/function
calls in transaction level to signals in RTL design. These works do not consider how
to automatically derive the assertions from the transaction level designs.
The performance constraints at system level are also defined and formalized in
[130]. The authors in [130] mainly specified these quantitative constraints in terms
of only events/signals instead of transactions. Moreover, their proposed logic of
constraints are based on post-processing of simulation traces.
Sequential data mining problem was first introduced by Agrawal and Srikant [131].
Many efficient algorithms have been proposed for mining sequential patterns like
GSP [131], SPADE [132], PrefixSpan [133] and SPAM [127]. In SPAM, a depth-
first search strategy is used to generate candidate sequences, and various pruning
mechanisms are implemented to reduce the search space [127]. Mining frequent
episodes from complex sequences has extensive application in financial analysis,
alarm sequence analysis in telecommunication network, and web access pattern
analysis [123].
In hardware, to the best of our knowledge, there have been no prior attempts to
automatically generate system level assertions through data mining.
In conclusion, we have presented an automatic assertion generation from SysmteC
designs by mining the simulation traces of the designs. We propose to use a scalable
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episode mining algorithm on a transaction level AMBA-based DMA controller and
AXI-based interconnection network. We specifically adopt symbolic execution to
symbolize the parameters and returned values of function calls to improve the qual-
ity of generated assertions. We finally output assertions with annotated quantitative
time constraint.
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CHAPTER 7
DIAGNOSING ROOT CAUSES OF SYSTEM
LEVEL PERFORMANCE VIOLATIONS
7.1 Introduction
One of the main tasks in system level verification is the evaluation of platform
performance. Performance specifications are described in the form of latency re-
quirements between two modules or throughput requirement of a single module.
Transaction traffic is generated on the input of the platform and the entire platform
is simulated. Performance specifications are then verified by checking the generated
transaction traces during simulation. When a performance specification is violated,
designers have to identify the root cause of the violation in the models using trans-
action traces. A transaction trace consists of all the operations performed on each
transaction during the simulation.
Commercial ESL tools are capable of providing limited statistical analyses of
transaction traces [36]. However, the diagnosis process is still ad-hoc and unsys-
tematic. System designers usually have to instrument source code within the models
to collect dynamic transaction traces that help localize the root cause. Due to the
high speed of system level simulation, an enormous amount of data is generated,
with trace files ranging up to several gigabytes. For example, in Huawei’s multi-
core TLM platform of a wireless baseband chip, the size of one transaction trace
file ranges from 100MB to 7GB. Localizing the root cause of a tough performance
violation could take them 2 days to 2 weeks, which tremendously increases the time
to market of their product.
In general, the root cause of a performance violation at system level can stem
from either hardware resource limitation or inefficiency of software applications in
utilizing the underlying hardware resources. In this chapter, we focus on the root
causes of the second category.
Determining the root causes of a violating trace requires enormous effort due to
the massive size of the trace file. This “finding a needle in a haystack” nature of
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system level diagnosis lends itself to a solution using data mining. However, off-
the-shelf data mining algorithms are too generic to be applied, or get meaningful
answers from, in a specific context. They always generate a huge number of pat-
terns, and it is difficult to use these patterns in diagnosis. Lack of domain context
makes the data miner produce arbitrary relationships that might be statistically cor-
related, but are non-causal. It has been established by GoldMine that providing
domain information and knowledge helps to focus the data mining algorithms and
filter out random correlation data [29], [46], [48], [134]. GoldMine is an assertion
generation tool for RTL. We have extended GoldMine to system level with the same
principle in [35].
In this chapter, we present a methodology to extract domain knowledge at the
system level to help the data miner isolate behavior relevant to the violation. We
also present concurrent mining, an algorithm adapted to identify concurrent patterns
in trace data.
Performance violations can usually be traced to concurrent operations on trans-
actions. We identify key culprit scenarios through which application software can
cause performance violations in the system level design. All our culprit scenarios
pertain to concurrent operations on transactions that are potential causes of vio-
lation. From our experience with real industrial scenarios, we have identified the
following most probable culprit scenarios: (1) multiple modules send transactions
to the same target module frequently, and these requests occur at approximately
the same time; (2) interleaving read/write access sequences to the same memory
target occurs frequently; (3) multiple modules request data from the same memory
bank of one target memory at approximately the same time. Frequent occurrences
of these concurrent patterns will increase the response time of the corresponding
request, and thus lower the performance of the platform.
We provide three types of domain specific information to focus the data miner.
The first type of domain knowledge concerns the performance violation time. Any
transactions occurring after the time of performance violation need not be analyzed
by the data miner, since the root cause of violation is obviously before the viola-
tion. This is the first filter we apply to the data traces. The second type of domain
knowledge is identifying transaction traces that do not compete for resources with
the violating entity. The violating entity can be a transaction for a latency viola-
tion and a module for throughput violation. We present a systematic procedure to
check for competing transaction traces and retain only these traces. Non-competing
transactions are irrelevant when searching for behavior causing latency or through-
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put violation. This is the second filter we apply to the data traces. The third kind
of domain knowledge we apply is to identify and preprocess the transactions that
we want the data miner to analyze for all culprit scenarios. The culprit scenarios
involve multiple modules accessing the same target or the same memory bank si-
multaneously. The data miner needs to be made aware of such information, so it can
mine the culprit scenarios we suspect. We analyze the target address in transaction
traces and abstract it to the target ID or memory bank ID.
In view of our interest in diagnosing concurrent behavioral patterns that cause
violations, we present a concurrent pattern mining algorithm. This algorithm finds
concurrent patterns that occur frequently in the transaction traces. The discovered
patterns are in terms of transaction operations in the transaction traces. We require
that the operations in the patterns occur at approximately the same time, because
the performance violation is an accumulative effect of many transactions in a period
of time. In order to find these patterns, we use an interval window sliding with
time. Transaction operations that occur within the interval window are considered
as having occurred at the same time. Finally, these frequent concurrent patterns are
reported as the most likely root causes of performance violations. Existing frequent
itemset mining [3] algorithms will not be able to produce the result we need, since
they do not restrict themselves to concurrent behaviors and cannot be applied in
diagnosing performance violations.
We provide the three culprit scenarios to the concurrent pattern algorithm, by
preprocessing and augmenting the transaction trace data to include information rel-
evant to the corresponding culprit scenario. As an example, for the interleaving
read/write culprit scenario, we remove all other attributes but retain the read/write
attribute, the source ID attribute, the target/memory bank ID attribute, and the oper-
ation occurrence time in the transaction traces. Only the transaction traces of these
attributes are necessary to characterize this culprit scenarios. Consequently, the root
causes output by the concurrent pattern mining will belong to this culprit scenario
category.
When a human being debugs and diagnoses such a violation, he/she implicitly
applies certain filters based on knowledge of context and relevance. The difficult
part of the process for a human is sifting through and analyzing large amounts
of data. We systematize human intuition as generic domain knowledge, and culprit
scenarios use the data miner simply to hasten the process of searching through large
data. In essence, we present a flow for manipulating our core data mining algorithm
to provide meaningful answers to our problem. We do not use the data mining as a
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single point solution, since our and others’ experience shows that the value of the
mined information is highly dependent on context [28], [29], [121]. We use domain
knowledge to remove irrelevant traces as well as to preprocess and augment the
transactions with the behavior we want the miner to focus on. We also provide
three bins for the miner to classify its results into, using the culprit scenarios.
We have implemented a complex, realistic experimental platform similar to an
industrial platform to facilitate industrial collaboration. The platform uses hier-
archical AXI buses to connect a cluster of CPUs, a cluster of DSPs, two DMA
controllers, and two eight bank memories. CPUs and DSPs serve as initiators, and
DMA controllers and memories serve as targets during communication. Since there
is no publicly available complex TLM platform for academic/research use, we also
release this platform in the public domain [124]. We evaluate our technique on this
platform. Our results show that the domain knowledge can reduce the number of
transaction traces by up to 92.8%. Also, the concurrent pattern mining pinpoints the
root cause of one violation to one of fewer than 10 patterns among 100000 transac-
tion traces. Without domain knowledge, more than 900 patterns are generated for
each culprit scenario.
7.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we provide the background about transaction traces and performance
violation. We also give several definitions used in the mining algorithm.
7.2.1 Transaction Traces
In TLMs, the communication between computation modules is done through chan-
nels. These channels provide a set of standard communication primitives in order
to hide low level protocol details. The data and protocol related attributes, such as
address and data length, are encapsulated into transactions [55]. The TLMs serve
as the executable virtual platform of the entire system.
A transaction is structural data transmitted between modules. Each transaction
has multiple protocol related attributes, such as command type, address, and data
length. Each transaction has a lifecycle, from its creation to its release. During
its lifecycle, modules in the design perform operations on the transaction. Each
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transaction is assigned a unique ID to track all operations on the transaction during
its lifecycle.
During a simulation, we record the transaction traces into a database. In addition
to the transaction attributes and ID, we also record the operation attributes. The
operation attributes include operation name, operation module, and operation time.
Examples of operation name are “forward requesting”, “pushing into some fifo”,
“popping out from some fifo” etc.. Operation module specifies which module per-
forms the operation on the transaction. We also annotate each operation with a time
property to record when the operation occurs. The structure of an operation in the
transaction traces is a tuple, shown as follows:
< ID,Attr1, Attr2, ...Attrn, Op name,Op mod > @time
A sample transaction trace during simulation is shown below. Operations in
the transaction traces are sorted by the annotated time property. From the sample
shown below, we can see that all operations on transaction 1 during its lifecycle are
recorded from the creation operation to the release operation. Also one transaction
operation may occur multiple times in the transaction trace.
< 1, read, 0x1234, ...16, create, initiator1 > @200ns,
< 1, read, 0x1234, ...16, fw req, initiator1 > @200ns,
< 2, write, 0x1278, ...32, fifo push,moduleA > @207ns,
...
< 1, read, 0x1234, ...16, bw resp, target1 > @500ns.
< 1, read, 0x1234, ...16, release, target1 > @500ns,
...
An occurrence of an operation in the transaction trace is also called an event.
Therefore, we call a transaction trace an event sequence. In this chapter, a pattern
is a collection of events from the event sequence.
7.2.2 Performance Violations in TLMs
Performance evaluation is one of the main tasks in transaction level modeling of
systems. Performance specifications include latency specification and throughput
specification. The specifications impose constraints on communication latency and
a module’s processing capability of transactions.
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In TLMs, one time communication is initiated by the initiator module and re-
sponded by the target module.
Latency specification refers to the allowed time limit of transmitting a transac-
tion between an initiator and a target in the model. The transmission of a transaction
corresponds to one operation in the initiator and one operation in the target. We re-
quire that all transactions transmitted between a specified initiator and target satisfy
the latency specification.
Throughput specification refers to the minimum total number of bytes of trans-
actions processed by a module within a time unit. The processing of a transaction
corresponds to one operation of the transaction. For example, we can measure the
throughput of a module by accumulating all transactions received by this module
within a time unit.
We claim that the performance specification in the model is violated when at
least one transaction latency exceeds its corresponding specification or at least one
module’s throughput is smaller than its corresponding specification.
Given a performance specification and transaction traces, if there is a perfor-
mance violation in the transaction traces, our problem is how to discover the fre-
quent concurrent patterns that cause this violation.
7.2.3 Concurrent Patterns
Our approach tries to mine concurrent patterns from an event sequence as the root
causes of performance violations. Concurrent pattern is similar to parallel episode
defined in [123]. It is different from the episode definition of Chapter 6 in that it
does not impose an ordering constraint on the events in the generated patterns. We
formally define concurrent patterns in this section.
Let E be a set of distinct events. An event occurrence is denoted by e@t, where
e ∈ E and t > 0. t denotes the time of occurrence of event e. Let S be an ordered
list of event occurrences. Let us denote S as < e1@t1, e2@t2), ...en@tn > where ∀
i ei ∈ E and t1 ≤ t2... ≤ tn. Note that one event e may occur multiple times in
S. We call S the event sequence. In Figure 7.1, we show an example of sequence
database.
A concurrent pattern is defined as a set of multiple events that occur within a
given interval in an event sequence. We are interested in concurrent patterns that
include at least two events. It should be noted that a concurrent pattern does not
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Figure 7.1: Concurrent pattern in an event sequence and interval window for
discovering concurrent patterns.
impose ordering constraints on the events. In the event sequence example shown
in Figure 7.1, if the given interval is 3, {e1, e2}, {e2, e4}, and {e2, e5} are all sam-
ple concurrent patterns. To discover the concurrent pattern, we slide the interval
window on the time axis.
The same concurrent pattern may occur multiple times in an event sequence. In
Figure 7.1, pattern {e1, e2} occurs four times. If the concurrent pattern occurs in one
interval window, then it is counted as one occurrence. The occurrence frequency of
a concurrent pattern is called the support of the pattern in the event sequence. Given
a minimum support threshold, the concurrent pattern is frequent if its occurrence
frequency is greater than the threshold.
We require that the events in a concurrent pattern occur within a given interval
rather than at exactly the same time. Within the context of our application, two
events that occur closely enough may lead to a performance violation. Since per-
formance violation is a cumulative effect of many transaction operations during
simulation, we require that the concurrent patterns occur frequently,
7.3 Concurrent Pattern Mining Algorithm
Our concurrent pattern mining algorithm generates frequent concurrent patterns
from an event sequence. The algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2. The top algo-
rithm flow is the same as that defined in Algorithm 1. We elaborate each function
called in the algorithm.
In the mining algorithm, E is the set of distinct events, andE Seq is the event se-
quence. Min supp is the minimum support threshold, and Interval is the interval
value for concurrent pattern mining. ConPat is the set of all discovered concurrent
patterns. Li is the set of frequent patterns having i events. The algorithm derives
candidate patterns with i+ 1 events from the frequent patterns with i events, which
is based on the Apriori property [3]. All nonempty subsets of a frequent concurrent
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Algorithm 2 Concurrent Pattern Mining algorithm
ConPatMine(E,E Seq,Min supp, Interval)
1: ConPat = ∅;
2: L1 = Con Check(E,E Seq,Min supp, Interval);
3: for (i = 1; Li 6= ∅; i++) do
4: Ci+1 = Cand Gen(Li);
5: Li+1 = Con Check(Ci+1, E Seq,Min supp, Interval);
6: ConPat = ConPat
⋃
Li+1;
7: end for
8: return ConPat;
pattern must also be frequent. Cand Gen(Li) in line 4 generates candidate patterns
from Li, and each pattern in Ci+1 has exactly one more event than the pattern in Li.
Con Check(C, ...) in line 5 checks the frequency of each pattern in C and returns
the frequent patterns in C.
Algorithm 3 Candidate Generation algorithm
Cand Gen(Li)
1: Ci+1 = ∅;
2: for all Pm, Pn ∈ Li; do
3: P emn = P
e
m
⋂
P en;
4: if |P emn| == (i− 1) then
5: Ci+1 = Ci+1
⋃{P em⋃P en};
6: end if
7: end for
8: return Ci+1;
Algorithm 3 is the candidate pattern generation algorithm. In iteration i, for all
two candidate pattern pairs (Pm, Pn) from Li, Cand Gen tries to join them together
to form a new pattern Pmn with i+1 events. We require that there are i−1 common
events in Pm and Pn when joining them, which is shown in line 4. P em represents
the set of all events in Pm. We also show the generation process in Figure 7.2.
Cand Gen is allowed to join {e1, e2} and {e1, e3} to form {e1, e2, e3}. It is not
allowed to join {e1, e2} and {e3, e4} to form {e1, e2, e3, e4}.
Not all candidate patterns are frequent concurrent patterns. The functionCon Check
slides the interval window along the time axis to compute the frequency of each
concurrent pattern in C, and returns the set of frequent concurrent patterns. The
detailed algorithm is shown in Algorithm 4. Lines 3 − 16 check the frequency of
pattern P in the event sequence. E Seq[i].e represents the ith event in event se-
quence E Seq, and E Seq[i].t represents the occurrence time of the ith event. j
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Figure 7.2: Candidate pattern generation. Ci is generated from Li−1. Li is the
subset of frequent patterns in Ci.
is the first event in E Seq after the current window (line 6). The current interval
window is [E Seq[i].t, E Seq[i].t+ Interval). If the first event in the current win-
dow is not in P e (line 5), the window is slid to next event (line 14). Otherwise, it
computes all events in the current window (line 7). If all events in P e appear in the
current window (line 8), it increases the frequency of P by one (line 9) and slides
the window to the jth event (line 9). If not all events in P e appear in the current
window, the window is slid to the next event (line 11). Finally, if the occurrence
frequency is larger than the threshold support, the candidate pattern is considered
as a frequent pattern (line 17).
7.4 Mining Concurrent Patterns for Root Cause
Localization
In this section, we first introduce transaction trace management using a database.
We then explain the entire framework of our approach to discover the concurrent
patterns in the transaction traces when a performance violation occurs.
7.4.1 Transaction Trace Management
Our approach is based on an off-line analysis of generated transaction traces. We
use a SQL database to manage the transaction traces. The trace database facilitates
efficient performance specification checking and concurrent pattern mining.
Figure 7.3 shows our procedure for managing the transaction traces using the
SQL database. We extend the SystemC TLM library [55] for recording the transac-
tion traces. Each operation on a transaction in SystemC TLM is a call to a primitive
function provided in the library. For example, the initiator calls the nb transport fw
function in the TLM library to send a transaction to a target module. For every prim-
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Algorithm 4 Candidate Check algorithm
Con Check(C,E Seq,Min supp, Interval)
1: L = ∅;
2: for all P ∈ C; do
3: freq = 0; i = 0;
4: while E Seq[i].t < E Seq[MAX].t do
5: if E Seq[i].e ∈ P e then
6: j = minj(E Seq[j].t > (E Seq[i].t+ Interval));
7: Event in Win =
⋃
i≤k<j{E Seq[k].e};
8: if P e ⊆ Event in Win then
9: freq ++; i = j;
10: else
11: i++;
12: end if
13: else
14: i++;
15: end if
16: end while
17: if (freq ≥Min supp) then
18: L = L
⋃
P ;
19: end if
20: end for
21: return L;
Transaction Level 
Models 
Enhanced 
SystemC 2.3 Library 
Simulation 
insert transaction 
record 
Transaction Trace DB APIs 
Figure 7.3: Transaction trace management using SQL database.
itive function, our extension implements a call back function to write the operation
with its time, transaction, and parameters to the SQL database using the database
programming interface [135].
Our transaction trace management using the SQL database is much more efficient
than that provided by commercial ESL tools [36]. Users are allowed to select the
modules for which they wish to record traces. We also use a standard SQL database
tool [136], which provides highly efficient and optimized data management of large
transaction traces. To facilitate the performance violation checking and concurrent
pattern mining, we provide API interfaces to access the trace database.
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7.4.2 Framework of Our Approach
Figure 7.4 shows the complete flow of our method. Given a transaction trace
database and latency/throughput specification, we conduct an off-line analysis on
the trace database to check whether there is any latency/throughput violation. The
identified violation information, which includes the violation time and violated
transaction, provides domain knowledge I&II for filtering the irrelevant transaction
traces. The address space of each memory or bank provides domain knowledge III
for target/memory bank ID abstraction.
After preprocessing the transaction traces, we remove unnecessary attributes of
the transaction according to the category of culprit scenarios. The remaining trans-
action traces are mapped to event sequences for concurrent pattern mining. We
target the three main categories of culprit scenarios as shown in Figure 7.4. Cul-
prit scenario I represents concurrent request scenario; Culprit scenario II represents
interleaving read/write scenario; and Culprit III represents bank conflict scenario.
According to the three different scenarios, we route the concurrent pattern mining
algorithm using the relevant transaction attributes. The generated concurrent pat-
terns pinpoint the root cause pertaining to the corresponding culprit scenario. The
output patterns are listed by mining algorithm according to their support value in
the event sequence. The most frequently occurring patterns in every culprit scenario
are the most likely root causes of the performance violation.
7.4.3 Checking Performance Violations
Using the API interfaces we have implemented, it is easy to check the latency spec-
ification and throughput specification. For latency specification, we first specify the
operations in the source and target as query conditions to get all related transac-
tions, and then compute each transaction latency with the corresponding operation
time. For example, if we want to check the transaction latency between modules A
and B, the SQL query in the corresponding API is as follows:
SELECT T.ID, T.rec time from T where T.src = Aand T.dst = B and (T.rec time−
T.send time > latency spec).
As shown in Figure 7.4, if there is no performance specification violation, the
flow exits. Otherwise, the violation time and the violated transaction ID (latency
violation)/Module ID (throughput violation) are returned from the query. Violation
time is used as domain knowledge I, and violated transaction/Module ID is used as
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Figure 7.4: The flow for root cause localization of performance violation using
data mining. The discovered root causes are in the form of generated concurrent
patterns.
domain knowledge II in the next step.
7.4.4 Preprocessing Transaction Traces with Domain Knowledge
The preprocessing step uses the domain knowledge to prepare the transaction traces
for concurrent pattern mining.
Filtering Irrelevant Transaction Traces
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Algorithm 5 Detect Competition by DK II algorithm
Trace F ilter DK II(V io Tran ID, Trace DB)
1: M Queue = Select(Trace DB, V io Tran ID);
2: Tran Set = {V io Tran ID};
3: while M Queue 6= ∅ do
4: module =M Queue.pop front();
5: if (Is processed(module) == False) then
6: Tran = Select(Trace DB,module); ;
7: Tran Set = Tran Set
⋃
Tran;
8: Is processed(module) = true;
9: for all m inc ∈ Select(Trace DB, Tran) do
10: M Queue.push back(m inc);
11: end for
12: end if
13: end while
14: return Tran Set;
Domain knowledge I: Domain knowledge I concerns the time when a perfor-
mance violation occurs. We use this violation time to filter the irrelevant transaction
traces. Only transaction traces occurring before or at the time point of violation are
used for further mining. Transaction traces occurring after the violation time cannot
cause the violation.
Domain knowledge II: Domain knowledge II is the violated transaction/module
ID when a performance violation occurs. We use this violated transaction/Module
ID to filter the irrelevant transaction traces. Only the traces of transactions that
compete for resources with the violated transaction or module are used for further
mining.
We describe our procedure for finding the traces of transactions competing for
resources with the violated transaction. We first get the entire violated trace of the
transaction by using the API interfaces. We then identify all modules appearing
in the trace. Any transaction having operations occurring in these modules is a
relevant transaction. In addition, the transaction records with operations that occur
in some modules before these modules in the transaction traces are also necessary.
The formal algorithm for filtering irrelevant transaction traces with violated trans-
action ID is shown in Algorithm 5. The Select function in line 1 gets all modules
in the violated transaction trace. For each unprocessed module (line 5), any trans-
action having operations in that module is retained (lines 6 and 7). Recursively, for
each retained transaction, the algorithm identifies the modules in that transaction
trace (lines 9 and 10). Finally, for the violated transaction, all relevant transaction
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traces are extracted , and the irrelevant ones are filtered.
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
Initiator 
1 
Initiator 
2 
Target 
1 
Target 
2 
: Occurred transaction traces 
Figure 7.5: Figure showing how domain knowledge II is used to filter irrelevant
transaction traces. The red arrow trace from initiator 2 to target 1 shows a latency
violated transaction trace. Some operations in the transaction trace are irrelevant to
the performance violation.
In the example shown in Figure 7.5, the identified modules in the violated trans-
action trace are initiator 2, B, C, D, and target 1. The traces of any transac-
tion record having operations occurring in those modules are kept for mining. If a
transaction is sent from module initiator 1 to module C, then the corresponding
transaction traces are also kept for further mining.
In case the throughput specification of a module is violated, the algorithm is sim-
ilar to that in Algorithm 5. Given a violated module ID, we get all transactions
having operations in this module. Recursively, for each relevant transaction, the al-
gorithm identifies the modules in that transaction trace. In Figure 7.5, let us assume
that the throughput specification of module C is violated. The transaction traces in
initiator 1, initiator 2, A, and B are included for mining if there are transactions
sent from initiator 1 and initiator 2 to module C.
Target/Bank Abstraction
Domain knowledge III: Domain knowledge III is the address space information
of each target module. We use it to abstract the target ID or memory bank number
from the concrete address in the transaction traces. Once we have gotten the target
ID information for a transaction operation, we can determine whether two trans-
actions are sent to the same target. With target memory bank information, we can
determine whether two transactions are sent to the same memory bank.
The target ID and bank number information is not provided in the transaction
attributes, and the mining engine is unaware of such information. Sending a trans-
action to a single concrete address does not lead to a performance violation. How-
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ever, sending a group of transactions to the same target may result in a performance
violation. Therefore, this target ID or memory bank information helps the mining
engine to produce more meaningful concurrent patterns that are more relevant to
the performance violation.
As shown in Figure 7.4, our flow adds the symbolic target memory or bank ID
attribute to the transaction traces. The value of this attribute is determined by its tar-
get address of the transaction and the address space information. We check which
target memory or bank the target address belongs to. After applying domain knowl-
edge III, we obtain the relevant transaction traces with symbolic target memory or
bank IDs.
7.4.5 Mining Concurrent Patterns from Three Culprit Scenarios
The performance violation is always an accumulative effect of many concurrent
patterns rather than just one. Therefore, we require the concurrent patterns to be
frequent in the transaction traces. We provide three culprit scenarios to the con-
current pattern mining algorithm by including only the information relevant to the
corresponding culprit scenario. As a result, the root causes output by the concurrent
data mining engine will belong to this culprit scenario category.
Concurrent Request Patterns
A concurrent request pattern refers to multiple transactions from initiators being
sent to the same target within a given interval. We use the interval value to express
such approximate concurrency. Multiple concurrent accesses to the same target
may result in a very high response time. Modules routing access to the target are
thus at high risk of becoming congested. Therefore, concurrent request patterns are
usually one of the root causes of performance violations.
In the concurrent request culprit scenario, we remove all attributes in the transac-
tion traces but the source module ID, the target module ID, and the operation time.
We then map the transaction traces into an event sequence. As shown in Figure 7.4,
the event e is a pair containing the source module ID and the target module ID. We
calculate the target module ID in the target/bank abstraction step of Figure 7.4. The
time t is the same as the operation time in the transaction traces.
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Interleaving Read/Write Patterns
Interleaving read/write pattern refers to a read/write or write/read sequence that is
issued to the same target memory within a given interval. The memory controller
module takes several cycles to reverse the direction of the memory data bus when
read and write operations are interleaved. Thus, it gives tremendously different
response times to different input request patterns [137]. For example, issuing mul-
tiple consecutive reads tends to be much faster than issuing the interleaving read
and write patterns. Therefore, we consider the concurrent interleaving read/write
patterns one of the root causes of performance violation.
In the interleaving read/write culprit scenario, we remove all attributes in the
transaction traces but the source module ID, the target memory ID, the Rd/Wr and
the operation time. We then map the transaction traces into an event sequence. As
shown in Figure 7.4, the event e is a triple containing the operation module name,
the read/write attribute and the target module. We calculate the target module in the
target/bank abstraction step of Figure 7.4. The time t is the same as the operation
time in the transaction traces.
Bank Conflict Patterns
Bank conflict pattern refers to several memory accesses being issued to the same
memory bank in a target within a given interval. This pattern will lead to a bank
conflict in the memory, which results in a longer response time for memory access,
since the memory controller has to serialize the accesses to the same memory bank.
However, the memory can respond quickly to the access of different banks in the
memory. Therefore, we consider the bank conflict patterns as one of the root causes
of performance violation.
In the bank conflict culprit scenario, we remove all attributes in the transaction
traces but the source module ID, the target module ID, the target bank ID and the
operation time. We then map the transaction traces into an event sequence. As
shown in Figure 7.4, the event e is a triple of operation module ID, memory bank
ID and target ID. We calculate the target memory bank and the target ID in the
target/bank abstraction step of Figure 7.4. The time t is the same as the operation
time in the transaction traces.
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7.5 A Case Study
We reuse the platform in Figure 6.7 from Chapter 6 as a case study in this section.
7.5.1 Relating Concurrent Patterns to Performance Violations
In the first experiment, we intentionally generate input transactions in five initia-
tors according to our three categories of concurrent patterns. We demonstrate the
relation between concurrent patterns and performance violations.
Figure 7.6: Figure showing the relations between concurrent patterns and
performance violations. The x-z plane plots the transaction latency versus time,
while the x-y plane depicts the occurrences of different patterns at different times,
where each frequent occurrence is arranged along the y-axis. Concurrent requests,
interleaving read/write accesses, and bank conflict accesses are depicted as color
coded triangles or trapezoid.
Figure 7.6 shows the observed transaction latency together with the occurred pat-
terns in transaction traces. In the figure, the y-axis represents different concurrent
patterns. (Ii, Tj) means that initiator i sends transactions to target j. (Ii, R, Tj)
means initiator i sends read transactions to target j. (Ii, Bk, Tj) means that initiator
i sends transactions to bank k of target (memory) j.
It can be observed that the transaction latency will increase tremendously if we
have concurrent requests, interleaving read/write accesses, and memory bank con-
flict accesses in transaction traces. As an example, in the culprit scenario II shown
in the middle of the figure, the latency specification is that the transaction latency
between CPUs and memories should be less than 100ps.
In the initiators, CPU0 (initiator 0) keeps sending read transaction to Memory 2
(target 3), and DSP0 (initiator 3) keeps sending write transaction to the same target
memory. We control the sending time difference in CPU0 and DSP0 within 10ps.
The sending frequency is one transaction per 50ps.
148
We observe that the latency of transaction between CPU0 (initiator 0) and Mem-
ory 2 (target 3) becomes 1200ps, which violates the specified latency specification.
However, if DSP0 (initiator 3) does not send write transactions to Memory 2 (tar-
get 3) in this case, the latency is only 7.5ps. The interleaving read/write pattern
increases the response time of Memory 2 (target 3).
7.5.2 Domain Knowledge for Filtering Irrelevant Traces
In this experiment, we evaluate the effectiveness of applying domain knowledge
I&II for filtering irrelevant transaction traces. We run three test cases correspond-
ing to three categories of concurrent patterns and generate 5000 transactions in each
case. We then record the transaction traces during simulation. We analyze the trans-
action traces and calculate how many transactions are retained after applying each
kind of domain knowledge. There might be multiple latency/throughput violations.
We use the earliest latency violation in this experiment.
Table 7.1: Applying domain knowledge I and II to filter the irrelevant transaction
traces for mining. The table entries show the retained number of transactions after
preprocessing of the transaction traces.
Testcases Total number of Apply domain Apply domain
transactions knowledge I knowledge II
Case I 5000 1125 396
Case II 5000 1030 412
Case III 5000 2130 1801
The latency specification is that the transaction latency between CPUs and DMACs
should be less than 250ps. In Case I, three CPUs send transactions to the target
DMAC0 at the same time and all other DSPs randomly generate transactions, and
the violation occurs at 1005ps. The entire simulation runs for 5000ps. In Case II,
CPU0 sends read transactions to Memory 1 (target 3) and CPU1 sends write trans-
action to Memory 1 (target 3) simultaneously, and CPU2 and other DSPs randomly
generate transactions. The earliest violation occurs at 1200ps. In Case III, all three
CPUs send the transactions to bank 4 in Memory 0 (target 2), and the concrete ad-
dress within bank is randomized. All other DSPs randomly generate transactions.
The earliest violation occurs at 2700ps.
From Table 7.1, it can be observed that domain knowledge I&II significantly
reduces the number of transaction traces for further mining. Taking Case I as an
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example, domain knowledge I can reduce the number of transactions by 77.5% and
domain knowledge II can reduce the number of transactions by 64.8%. In Case III,
domain knowledge II can be used to filter out the random transaction traces from
DSPs to DMA controller. There are about 15% irrelevant transaction traces.
7.5.3 Domain Knowledge for Improving Mining Results
In this experiment, we randomly generate input transactions in initiators and then
simulate our platform. We demonstrate that the domain knowledge helps improve
mining results. We apply our approach with and without domain knowledge I and
II. Without domain knowledge III, the mining engine is not capable of producing
the three categories of patterns.
Figure 7.7: Figure showing the number of generated concurrent patterns with and
without domain knowledge. The domain knowledge reduces the number of
discovered concurrent patterns to less than 10.
Figure 7.7 shows the number of generated concurrent patterns with and without
domain knowledge. It can be observed that the number of generated patterns is
reduced from 1000 to less than 10. The reason for this is that multiple irrelevant
operations occur within the given interval along with the relevant operations in the
transaction traces. As a result, several irrelevant patterns are generated and the
number of patterns generated suffers from combinatorial explosion. However, with
domain knowledge, these irrelevant operations are removed before mining and the
mining engine is able to discover more accurate and fewer patterns as the true root
causes. As seen in Figure 7.7, the mining engine discovers less than 10 patterns for
each category as root causes.
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7.5.4 Sample Concurrent Patterns Analysis
Table 7.2: Sample concurrent patterns discovered using concurrent pattern mining.
Ix represents initiator x. Tx represents target x. Bx represents bank x. W
represents write operation. R represents read operation. Therefore, (I1, B2, T2)
means initiator 1 sends request to bank 2 of target 2.
ID Concurrent Pattern Category
1 (I1, T3)-(I3, T3) Concurrent request
2 (I0, T3)-(I4, T3)-(I3, T3) Concurrent request
3 (I0, W, T3)-(I1, R, T3) Interleaving read/write
4 (I0, R, T3)-(I1, W, T3)-(I2, R, T3) Interleaving read/write
5 (I1, B5, T3)-(I1, B5, T3) Bank conflict
6 (I1, B2, T2)-(I1, B2, T2)-(I2, B2, T2) Bank conflict
The memory model is pipelined. One transaction does not need to wait for the
previous transaction to finish unless there is a bank conflict. A bank conflict arises
when one transaction is trying to access a bank that is currently being accessed by a
previous transaction. In such a case, this transaction is pushed into a pending queue
in the memory model. Once the previous transaction has finished and released the
bank, this transaction is popped out of the pending queue and is processed. The
waiting time in the queue contributes to a large transaction latency. In Table 7.2,
for pattern 5 and 6, B5 in T3 and B2 in T2 are repeatedly accessed, which leads to
severe bank conflicts, a long pending queue and large latency. The throughput of
the memory target is also violated.
Read/write patterns are another causes for latency. A read followed by a write or
vice versa will require the reversal of the direction of the data bus and thus result in
extra delay. Pattern 3 and 4 represent interleaving read/write patterns. Pattern 3 is a
simple read after write while pattern 4 takes one write in between two reads.
Patterns 1 and 2 represent multiple initiators requesting T3 concurrently. Because
of the pipelined memory model, these requests can be accepted without extra delay.
The reason that concurrent requests are correlated to latency violation is the higher
probability of having interleaving read/write and bank conflicts in multiple requests.
7.5.5 Experiments with Different Threshold Value and Interval
Size
The interval value and support threshold value have a large impact on the discovered
concurrent patterns. Choosing a threshold value is a trial-and-error process. We
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rank all generated patterns by their absolute support value in transaction traces.
If we are not able to generate correct concurrent patterns as root causes, we can
decrease the threshold value in order to generate more concurrent patterns.
The interval value depends on the transaction latency in the system. If the in-
terval is too large, the discovered concurrent patterns may not lead to performance
violation. If the interval is too small, we may miss some important concurrent pat-
terns, which are the true root causes of performance violations. Figure 7.8 shows
the number of generated concurrent patterns as we increase the size of the interval
constraint. It can be observed that the number of generated patterns increases as
we enlarge the size of interval. When we increase the interval size, many events
are coincidentally correlated in one pattern. As a result, the discovered concurrent
patterns might not be the real root cause of violation. Also it can be observed that
few concurrent patterns are discovered when the interval size is less than 100ns.
Changing the interval value reduces the number of patterns. However, it does not
reduce the number of transactions in the traces since the window is slid on the time
axis of all transaction traces.
In Figure 7.8, we find that all injected concurrent patterns are discovered when
the interval is set as 100ns, which is the largest transaction latency in this experi-
ment. Intuitively, the interval gives the time range in which transactions can com-
pete for resources with each other. Therefore, we set interval value as the average
transaction latency before the occurred violation in transaction traces in practice.
The running time of mining algorithm heavily depends on the number of events in
the trace. In our experimental platform, the number of events is less than 100 and
the running time is less than one second.
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Figure 7.8: The number of generated concurrent patterns as we increase the size of
interval constraint in concurrent pattern mining.
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7.6 Related Work
Many previous studies about system level TLM verification focus on functionality
instead of performance [138]. Assertion based verification is also employed in
verifying system level TLMs [37], [139].
Performance constraints at the system level are defined and formalized in the
form of logic of constraints [130]. However, they do not solve the problem of root
cause localization when performance constraints are violated; also their method is
not based on standard TLM. Online monitoring of the simulation is impractical
since we need to store the transactions in memory and dynamically check the as-
sertion violation. This process not only consumes a lot of memory, but also slows
down the simulation speed. Moreover, the root cause localization for a performance
violation has not been considered.
Data mining techniques have been explored for hardware verification [28], [29],
[46], [121]. The work in [140] uses a hardware logging mechanism and a data-
mining approach to automatically report abnormal instruction timings and the con-
text of occurrence of these instructions. The mining algorithm is based on frequent
itemset mining, and also the model is not a standard TLM. Moreover, their method
tries to find the frequent contention patterns instead of diagnosing performance vi-
olations. In [141], frequent itemset mining is also applied for TLM functional ver-
ification. However, it simply counts the number of different transactions and is not
related to performance diagnosis.
Concurrent pattern mining in this chapter is inspired from multiple pattern min-
ing algorithms such as the Apriori algorithm [3], sequential pattern mining [3], and
episode mining [123]. Our concurrent pattern mining is similar to parallel episode
mining. However, episode mining always assumes discrete time points [123]. Episode
mining slides the interval window at a step of unit time and calculate the number
of windows the pattern appears in. The support value of a pattern is the number
of windows, in which the pattern appears, divided by total number of windows. In
our context, we do not limit the transaction occurrence time to discrete time points.
We calculate the absolute support of patterns and also the window can slide by an
interval size each time when one occurrence of a pattern is found.
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7.7 Summary
In conclusion, we have presented a methodology to localize root causes of perfor-
mance violations in TLMs. The discovered root causes are presented in the form
of concurrent patterns mined from transaction traces. The methodology can also
easily be extended to other new culprit scenarios related to performance violation.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
We have presented a suite of techniques that are a significant departure from tradi-
tional formal or simulation based verification approaches. The presented algorithms
are based on static/dynamic analysis of design code and data mining from dynamic
simulation traces. The techniques presented here can blend seamlessly into current
chip design cycle.
We use hybrid analysis of RTL source code for systematic and scalable input vec-
tor generation for simulation based verification. Static analysis of RTL source code
for test generation is not scalable to large designs due to the space explosion, and
the dynamic simulation only captures partial design behaviors. The hybrid analysis
offsets both disadvantages and improves the scalability of input vector generation
for practical design.
Data mining opens the door to many difficult problems in hardware verification as
the hardware system is becoming increasingly complex. In GoldMine, data mining
algorithm is successfully applied to learn the invariant rules as RTL assertions from
dynamic simulation traces. We have proposed a methodology for attaining coverage
closure of design validation using GoldMine spurious assertions. Our algorithm
always converges and captures the complete functionality of each output of a design
on convergence. It always results in a monotonic increase in simulation coverage
and finally attains coverage closure with respect to the input space coverage.
Simply applying data mining without any guidance will generate meaningless
results. In other words, the value of the mined information (knowledge) depends
heavily on application context. Our word level assertion generation technique could
improve the readability and expressiveness of mined assertions by providing word
level features to guide the data mining algorithm. These word level features are
discovered from RTL source code.
ESL verification is indispensable for complex SoC designs. We lift the auto-
matic assertion generation methodology from RTL to ESL. We have attempted to
use sequential pattern mining and episode mining for system level assertion gener-
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ation from TLMs. We have demonstrated that episode mining is more scalable in
our context, and also generates a more compact set of assertions. The TLM asser-
tions generated by the episode mining algorithm have higher quality in terms of the
evaluation standards defined by us.
We have presented a concurrent pattern mining technique for troubleshooting
performance violations in ESL verification. The root causes of performance viola-
tions are attributed to concurrent and frequent accesses of shard resources, which
are mined from transaction traces. We systematize human intuition as generic do-
main knowledge, and culprit scenarios use the data miner simply to hasten the pro-
cess of searching through large data.
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